acts of the legislative body: the other has an absolute negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation: the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the, formation of treaties: the other is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices: the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges whatever: the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation: the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction: the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church!.... What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us, that things so unlike resemble each other?.... The same that ought to be given to those who tell us, that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.
PUBLIUS.
No. LXX.
By Alexander Hamilton.
The same, view continued, in relation to the unity of the executive, and with an examination of the project of an executive council.
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the
