liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutiona] privilege.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
PUBLIUS.
No. LXXIII.
BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
The same view continued, in relation to the provision concerning support, and the power of the negative.
The third ingredient towards constituting the vigour of the executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department, would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the chief magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will, as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him, by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms would no doubt convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils: and in the main it will be found, that a power over a man's support, is a power over his will. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be wanting even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the executive by the terrors, or allurements, of the pecuniary arrangements of the legislative body.
