Page:The Folk-Lore Journal Volume 3 1885.djvu/128

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THE SCIENCE OF FOLK-LORE.

The time may come when the conquests of folk-lore shall be reckoned among the most remarkable and in their results the most important achievements of inductive reasoning.

This, expressed imperfectly and without much attempt at scientific precision, is my conception of the science of folk-lore. I may be told that this conception is too ambitious, that it soars beyond any practicable range. It may be so; but to recognise a lower ultimate aim than this, it seems to me, will be to limit the interest and to distort the methods of the science. Put broadly, Mr. Gomme's view is that folklore is an antiquarian—mine, that it is strictly a scientific pursuit. He sees its subjects only in the remains of a distant epoch, preserved less perfectly in Europe, more perfectly in Africa; and his method is to take for primary subjects the less perfect remains, using the more perfect remains only, as it were, incidentally. I contend that Tradition is always being created anew, and that traditions of modern origin wherever found are as much within our province as ancient ones. They may not be quite so useful in the analysis of human thought, since the influences at work in compounding and moulding them are now so complex; but they cannot be overlooked, and occasionally they may afford evidence of a most important character. Illustrations of this are found in the stories which have grown up around the names of historical personages, such as Mary Queen of Scots or Oliver Cromwell. The strength with which a large personality like these will still strike the uncultivated mind, and the attraction it proves for floating tales, however originating, are considerations often by no means irrelevant in discussing myths and folk-tales. And instances of superstitions obviously of recent birth among peoples of all degrees of civilisation will occur to every reader as throwing sometimes unexpected light on the way in which practices, meaningless to us, are generated.

The space I have already occupied forbids my entering now upon any farther discussion of classification, terminology, or methods. I do not regret this, because I hope that other members of the Society, who, like Mr. Gomme, are intimately acquainted with portions of the study of which I am comparatively ignorant, will be prevailed upon to express their opinions upon the points at issue. Just one word, how-