Latest Important Cases insurrection, rebellion or riot therein, and, in such a case, to place such town, city, district or county under martial law. "The constitutional guaranties of subordina tion of the military to the civil power, trial of citizens for offenses cognizable by the civil courts in such courts only and maintenance of the writ of habeas corpus are to be read and interpreted so as to harmonize with other provisions of the Constitution authorizing the maintenance of a military organization and its use by the executive to repel invasion and suppress rebel lion and insurrection, and the presumption against intent on the part of the people, in the formulation and adoption of the Constitution, to abolish a generally recognized incident of sovereignty, the power of self-preservation in the state by the use of its military power in cases of invasion, insurrection and riot. "It is within the exclusive province of the executive and legislative departments of the Government to say whether a state of war exists and neither their declaration thereof, nor execu tive acts under the same, are reviewable by the courts, while the military occupation continues." (See editorial in New York Law Journal, Mar. 26, 1913.) Self-incrimination. Statutory Immunity — Prosecution jor Conspiracy. U. S. An important decision, concerning the lia bility of an officer of a corporation to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, was rendered by the United States Supreme Court in Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 (L. ed. adv. sheets no. 7, p. 226), de cided Jan. 27. An officer of a sugar refining company, whose testimony before a federal grand jury engaged in investigating alleged violations by the cor poration of the anti-trust act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat, at L. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200), consisted chiefly of documentary evidence drawn from the corporation's books and papers, and produced by him in obedience to a subpoena, cannot defeat a prosecution for a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States by effecting entries of raw sugars at less than their true weights, by a claim of immunity founded on the proviso to the act of February 25, 1903 (32 Stat, at L. 904, chap. 755, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1314), that no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evi
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dence, documentary or otherwise, in any pro ceeding, suit, or prosecution under the inter state commerce and anti-trust acts, where the evi dence given in the former proceeding does not concern the present one in any substantial way, and has no such tendency to incriminate him as to have afforded a ground for refusing to give it, even apart from the statute and the factThe thatCourt, it camespeaking from thethrough corporation's Mr. Justice books. Holmes, held in part: — "The petitioner contended that as soon as he had testified upon a matter under the Sherman act he had an amnesty by the statute from liability for any and every offense that was connected with that matter in any degree; or, at least, every offense towards the discovery of which his testimony led up, even if it had no actual effect in bringing the discovery about. At times the argument seemed to suggest that any testimony, although not incriminating, if relevant to the later charge, brought the am nesty into play. . . . "Of course there is a clear distinction between an amnesty and the constitutional protection of a party from being compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. Amendment 5. But the obvious purpose of the statute is to make evidence available and compulsory that otherwise could not be got. We see no reason for supposing that the act offered a gratuity to crime. It should be construed, so far as its words fairly allow the construction, as coter minous with what otherwise would have been the privilege of the person concerned. We be lieve its policy to be the same as that of the earlier act of February 11, 1893, chap. 83, 27 Stat, at L. 443, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3173, which read: 'No person shall be excused from attending and testifying,' etc. 'But no per son shall be prosecuted,' etc., as now, thus showing the correlation between constitutional right and immunity by the form. That statute was passed because an earlier one, in the lan guage of a late case, 'was not co-extensive with the constitutional privilege.' American Litthographic Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 611, 55 L. ed. 873, 878, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676. Com pare act of February 19, 1903, chap. 708, § 3, 32 Stat, at L. 848, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1312. To illustrate, we think it plain that merely testifying to his own name, although the fact is relevant to the present indictment as well as to the previous investigation, was not enough to give the petitioner the benefit of the act. Sec 3 Wigmore, Ev. § 22G1."
