Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 3.djvu/323

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If insurrections should arise, or invasions should take place, the people ought unquestionably to be employed to suppress and repel them, rather than a standing army. The best way to do these things, was to put the militia on a good and sure footing, and enable the government to make use of their services when necessary. …

Governor Randolph. … With respect to a standing army, I believe there was not a member in the federal convention who did not feel indignation at such an institution. What remedy then could be provided?—Leave the country defenceless? In order to provide for our defence, and exclude the dangers of a standing army, the general defence is left to those who are the objects of defence. It is left to the militia who will suffer if they become the instruments of tyranny. The general government must have power to call them forth when the general defence requires it. In order to produce greater security, the state governments are to appoint the officers. The president, who commands them when in the actual service of the union, is appointed secondarily by the people.—This is a further security. It is not incredible that men who are interested in the happiness of their country, whose friends, relations, and connections, must be involved in the fate of their country, should turn against their country? I appeal to every man, whether, if any of our own officers were called upon to destroy the liberty of their country, he believes they would assent to such an act of suicide? The state governments having the power of appointing them, may elect men who are the most remarkable for their virtue & attachment to their country. …

Mr. Madison. … The power of regulating the time, place, and manner of elections, must be vested some where. It could not be fixed in the constitution without involving great inconveniences.—They could then have no authority to adjust the regulations to the changes of circumstances. The question then is, whether it ought to be fixed unalterably in the state governments, or subject to the controul of the general government. Is it not obvious that the general government would be destroyed without this controul? It has already been demonstrated that it will produce many inconveniences.



ⅭⅭⅪ. Daniel Carroll: Notes and Correspondence.[1]

Copy of what Col. Mercer gave me [Daniel Carroll] at Annapolis during the sitting of the Assembly.

  1. These papers in the handwriting of Daniel Carroll were found among the McHenry MSS. They are reprinted here from the American Historical Review, Ⅺ, 619–624. They are put here under the date of the last two items,—the letters of McHenry—in order to bring them all together. See also ⅭⅭⅢ above.