Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 3.djvu/361

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But why, it may be asked, was the Senate joined with the President in appointing to office, if they have no responsibility? I answer, merely for the sake of advising, being supposed, from their nature, better acquainted with the characters of the candidates than an individual;


ⅭⅭⅩⅬⅡ. Debate in House of Representatives.[1]

June 8, 1789.

Mr. Madison.The first of these amendments relates to what may be called a bill of rights. I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to the federal constitution, to make it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form, and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. …

Mr. Sherman.—I do not suppose the constitution to be perfect, nor do I imagine if Congress and all the Legislatures on the continent were to revise it, that their united labors would make it perfect. I do not expect any perfection on this side the grave in the works of man; but my opinion is, that we are not at present in circumstances to make it better. It is at wonder that there has been such unanimity in adopting it, considering the ordeal it had to undergo; and the unanimity which prevailed at its formation is equally astonishing; amidst all the members from the twelve States present at the federal convention, there were only three who did not sign the instrument to attest their opinion of its goodness.


ⅭⅭⅩⅬⅢ. Roger Sherman in the House of Representatives.[2]

June 18, 1789.

The convention, who formed this constitution, thought it would tend to secure the liberties of the people, if they prohibited the President from the sole appointment of all officers. They knew that the Crown of Great Britain, by having that prerogative has been enabled to swallow up the whole administration; the influence of the Crown upon the Legislature subjects both Houses to its will and pleasure. Perhaps it may be thought, by the people of that kingdom, that it is best for the Executive Magistrate to have such kind of influence; if so, it is very well, and we have no right to complain that it is injurious to them, while they themselves consider it beneficial. But this Government is different, and intended by the people to be different.

  1. Annals of Congress, First Congress, Ⅰ, 436, 448.
  2. Annals of Congress, First Congress, Ⅰ, 537.