and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought to ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of the imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, hut of such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine "De anima," whereunto it most fitly belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that Human Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, Rational and Moral.
The part of Human Philosophy which is rational is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is "pabulum animi;" so in the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned "ad ollas carnium," and were weary of manna; which, though it were celestial seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, aoout the which men s affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and are conversant: but this same "lumen siccum" doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures. But, to speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all other arts; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "That the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms:" so these be truly said to be the art of arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.
The arts intellectual are four in number; divided according to the ends whereunton they are referred: for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition.
Invention is of two kinds, much differing; the one, of arts and sciences; and the other, of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an inventory touching the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered, if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no farther discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.
That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a "cuique in sua arte credendum." And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed: and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato, in his Theætetus, noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.
"Dictaminum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida,
Puberihus caulem foliis, et flore comantem
Purpureo: non ilia feris incognita capris
Graniina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ."
So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Ægyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but all most all brute.
"Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam," &c
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark: and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that
