face out a man's own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say, that that line cost them more labour than any of the rest; and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dismantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge: which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a man's self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good felicity.
Another precept of this knowledge is, by all possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much as this; "Idem manebat, neque idem decebat," men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth, that he had "versatile ingenium." And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and cannot make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn; in some it is a conceit, that is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a loathness to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.
Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, "Fatis accede Deisque," that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation.
Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; "Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ; ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus tantum persequi cogantur." For, if we observe, we shall find two different kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very imperfect without the other.
Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way, "qualis est via navis in mari," (which the French call sourdes menées, when men set things in work without opening themselves at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many times "Dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant;" and therefore, we see the greatest politicians have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them; for so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, "that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies." So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruples to profess, "that he had rather be first in a village than second at Rome." So again, as soon as he had begun the war we see what Cicero saith of him, "Alter (meaning of Cæsar) non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut, ut est, sic appelletur tyrannus." So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear, "Ita parentis honores consequi liceat," which was no less than the tyranny; save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar's that was erected in the place: whereat many men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever hear the like to this? and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey,
