attainments in the practice, as well as in the theory, of grammar; and that, in any tolerable performance of this exercise, there must be an exact adherence to the truth of facts, as they occur in the example, and to the forms of expression, which are prescribed as models, in the book. For parsing is, in no degree, a work of invention; but wholly an exercise, an exertion of skill. It is, indeed, an exercise for all the powers of the mind, except the inventive faculty. Perception, judgement, reasoning, memory, and method, are indispensable to the performance. Nothing is to be guessed at, or devised, or uttered at random. If the learner can but rehearse the necessary definitions and rules, and perform the simplest exercise of judgement in their application, he cannot but perceive what he must say in order to speak the truth in parsing. His principal difficulty is in determining the parts of speech. To lessen this, the trial should commence with easy sentences, also with few of the definitions, and with definitions that have been perfectly learned. This difficulty being surmounted, let him follow the forms prescribed for the several praxes of this work, and he shall not err. The directions and examples given at the head of each exercise, will show him exactly the number, the order, and the proper phraseology, of the particulars to be stated; so that he may go through the explanation with every advantage which a book can afford. There is no hope of him whom these aids will not save from "plunging into chaos."
"Of all the works of man, language is the most enduring, and partakes the most of eternity. And, as our own language, so far as thought can project itself into the future, seems likely to be coeval with the world, and to spread vastly beyond even its present immeasurable limits, there cannot easily be a nobler object of ambition than to purify and better it."—Philological Museum, Vol. i, p. 665.
It was some ambition of the kind here meant, awakened by a discovery of the scandalous errors and defects which abound in all our common English grammars, that prompted me to undertake the present work. Now, by the bettering of a language, I understand little else than the extensive teaching of its just forms, according to analogy and the general custom of the most accurate writers. This teaching, however, may well embrace also, or be combined with, an exposition of the various forms of false grammar by which inaccurate writers have corrupted, if not the language itself, at least their own style in it.
With respect to our present English, I know not whether any other improvement of it ought to be attempted, than the avoiding and correcting of those improprieties and unwarrantable anomalies by which carelessness, ignorance, and affectation, are ever tending to debase it, and the careful teaching of its true grammar, according to its real importance in education. What further amendment is feasible, or is worthy to engage attention, I will not pretend to say; nor do I claim to have been competent to so much as was manifestly desirable within these limits. But what I lacked in ability, I have endeavored to supply by diligence; and what I could conveniently strengthen by better authority than my own, I have not failed to support with all that was due, of names, guillemets, and references.
Like every other grammarian, I stake my reputation as an author, upon "a certain set of opinions," and a certain manner of exhibiting them, appealing to the good sense of my readers for the correctness of both. All contrary doctrines are unavoidably censured by him who attempts to sustain his own; but, to grammatical censures, no more importance ought to be attached than what belongs to grammar itself. He who cares not to be accurate in the use of language, is inconsistent with himself, if he be offended at verbal criticism; and he who is displeased at finding his opinions rejected, is equally so, if he cannot prove them to be well founded. It is only in cases susceptible of a rule, that any writer can be judged deficient. I can censure no man for differing from me, till I can show him a principle which he ought to follow. According to Lord Kames, the standard of taste, both in arts and in manners, is "the common sense of mankind," a principle founded in the universal conviction of a common nature in our species. (See Elements of Criticism, Chap, xxv, Vol. ii, p. 364.) If this is so, the doctrine applies to grammar as fully as to any thing about which criticism may concern itself.
But, to the discerning student or teacher, I owe an apology for the abundant condescension with which I have noticed in this volume the works of unskillful grammarians. For men of sense have no natural inclination to dwell upon palpable offences against taste and scholarship; nor can they be easily persuaded to approve the course of an author who makes it his business to criticise petty productions. And is it not a fact, that grammatical authorship has sunk so low, that no man who is capable of perceiving its multitudinous errors, dares now stoop to notice the most flagrant of its abuses, or the most successful of its abuses? And, of the quackery which is now so prevalent, what can be a more natural effect, than a very general contempt for the study of grammar? My apology to the reader therefore is, that, as the honour of our language demands correctness in all the manuals prepared for schools, a just exposition of any that are lacking in this point, is a service due to the study of English grammar, if not to the authors in question.
The exposition, however, that I have made of the errors and defects of other writers, is only an incident, or underpart, of the scheme of this treatise. Nor have I anywhere exhibited blunders as one that takes delight in their discovery. My main design has been, to prepare a work which, by its own completeness and excellence, should deserve the title
