his face covered, that he may not falter through shame. He begins by a definition of love, which he represents to be desire hurried on to the pleasure derived from personal beauty; and then he goes on to shew, with great perspicuity, how a person under the influence of such a passion must needs be anxious that the beloved object should not excel himself or be admired by others. Then with regard to the body, he will wish to make it effeminate, and be anxious that his beloved should be as much as possible dependent on him; and at length he will become unfaithful, forget all his former vows and promises, and leave his favourite despised and destitute, who will suffer most of all in this, that he has been debarred from cultivating his soul, than which, he adds, there neither is nor ever will be any thing more precious in the sight of gods and men[1].
Phædrus expects that Socrates will not only shew the disadvantages of granting favours to a lover, but also go on to point out the advantages of granting them to one who is not in love. This, however, he refuses to do; and then, conscience-stricken for that he has been guilty of an offence against the deity of Love in speaking of him in so impious a manner, he determines on making his recantation, by uttering a speech which shall describe that deity in his true character. He begins by condemning his former assertion that favour ought rather to be shewn to one who is not in love than to a lover, because the latter is mad and the former in his sober senses. For, he argues, it is not universally true that madness is an evil, so far from it, that the greatest blessings spring from madness, for even prophetic inspiration is a species of madness and derives its very name from it. And love is one of many kinds of madness, and as such the source of the greatest happiness to man. To prove this, he says, it is necessary to examine into the nature of the soul, both human and divine. The soul, then, is immortal, because it contains the principle of motion within itself (a subtle argument which it may be observed was
- ↑ § 28–40.
