Page:Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2).pdf/63

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186 The substance and crux of the respondents' argument is that gender identity, on this definition, is only a series of outward manifestations, not located in any status or notion of status. They submit it is therefore too nebulous a concept to pick out a "political class" which, they assert, is necessary to be covered by Art 26. In substance, this is a rather weak submission that this definition is too vague or malleable to be a status contemplated by Art 26. As the Commissioner contends in response, the above s 4 definition of gender identity is clear enough to be a workable definition, correctly noting that gender identity is not exclusively defined by outward manifestations in any event. Moreover, many of the other grounds of discrimination referred to in Art 26 are similarly malleable or vague. For example, the phrase "political or other opinion" is not a reference to some kind of immutable or biologically founded characteristic, but one that is capable of profound change across an individual's life. The scope of what is political and what is an opinion as opposed to an objective fact is not necessarily fixed either, but can evolve over time. Status is a concept within which categories may be difficult to define with precision, especially in the abstract.

187 That gender identity is an "other status" that is subject to the non-discrimination obligation in Art 26 is affirmed by several communications from the Human Rights Committee, which is empowered under the Convention's Optional Protocol to hear and provide views on allegations that States Parties have violated individuals' rights under the ICCPR: see Human Rights Committee, G v Australia, Communication No. 2172/2012, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2172/20 12 (28 June 2017) at [7.2]; Human Rights Committee, MZBM v Denmark, Communication No. 2593/2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2593/2015 (12 May 2017) at [6.6]; Human Rights Committee, Nepomnyashchiy v Russian Federation, Communication No. 2318/2013, UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2318/2013 (23 August 2018) at [7.3]; Human Rights Committee, Ivanov v Russian Federation, Communication No. 2635/2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/131/D/2635/2015 (14 May 2021) at [7.12]; Human Rights Committee, Alekseev v Russian Federation, Communication No. 2757/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/130/D/2757/2016 (9 June 2021) at [9.14]; Human Rights Committee, Mikhailova et al v Russian Federation, Communications No. 2943/2017, UN Doc CCPR/C/134/D/2943/2017 (29 August 2022) at [9.12]; Human Rights Committee, Savolaynen v Russian Federation, Communication No. 2830/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/135/D/2830/2016 (23 January 2023) at [7.15].

188 Article 26 creates an obligation for States Parties to prohibit discrimination on a number of grounds, which may readily extend to gender identity as being another status as substantial, yet potentially changeable, among those expressly and non-exhaustively listed of language,


Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 960
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