cially such as relate to the intercourse of nations. He was the first to point out that the intercourse of independent states was regulated not merely by principles of natural law, but by usages long observed and uniformly acted upon. “Nunquam enim civitates sunt sibi tam sufficientes, quin indigeant mutuo juvamine et societate, interdum ad majorem utilitatem, interdum ob necessitatem moralem. Hac igitur ratione indigent aliquo jure quo dirigantur et recte ordinentur in hoc genere societatis. Et quamvis magna ex parte hoc fiat per rationem naturalem, non tamen sufficienter et immediate quoad omnia, ideoque specialia jura poterant usu earundem gentium introduci,” (Suarez, de Legibus, c. II. 1. II. § 9. et seq.) This is the first recognition of an usage or consuetudo amongst nations, which was binding as a rule of intercourse amongst them; and upon this subject the views of Suarez were more definite and more clear than those of his contemporary, Albericus Gentilis, the last of the pioneers of juridical science, whose works it will be necessary to notice on the present occasion, and whose labours contributed to clear the way for Grotius.
Whilst Mr. Hallam is disposed to consider the treatise of Ayala as the first book that systematically reduced the practice of nations in the conduct of war to legitimate rules, Lampredi, a very competent judge, claims for his fellow-countryman Albericus Gentilis the honour of being entitled the father of the modern science of Public Law. Gentilis was a native of Ancona. His father, having adopted the Reformed Faith, found himself obliged to leave his native country and to remove with his family into Germany. He thereupon sent his son Alberic into England, where, through the favour of the Earl of
