Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/107

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN

time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,[1] concluded that:

"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the information... he had been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non-specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a role... The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003."[2]

G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS// //NF) The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who first came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001.[3] The source     led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani custody from the time of his capture on March 1, 2003, to March  , 2003, and was interrogated by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody, KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive interrogation techniques being used.[4] While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,[5] he did provide limited information on various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—behavior noted by CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention and interrogation in CIA custody.[6]

(TS// //NF) Less than two hours after KSM's capture, anticipating KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief of interrogations,  , sent an email to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away."[7] Later that day, CIA Headquarters authorized   to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against


  1. Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE BLUE.
  2. ALEC   (302240Z JUN 05)
  3. For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume II.
  4.   41403 (020949Z MAR 03)
  5.   41484 (031315Z MAR 03)
  6.   41564 (041307Z MAR 03);  41592 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM's detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
  7. Email from: [REDACTED]; to  ,  ; subject: Let's Roll with the new guy; date: March 1, 2003, at 03:43:12 AM.

TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
Page 81 of 499

UNCLASSIFIED