Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/108

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KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive interrogation techniques be used first.[1] On March  , 2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for KSM.[2]

(TS// //NF) According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, and water dousing.[3] Chief of Interrogations   also ordered the rectal rehydration of KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee."[4] At the end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into battles of will with the interrogator."[5] KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA believed detainees provided false or worthless information.[6]


  1. DIRECTOR   (012240Z MAR 03)
  2.   34354 (  MAR 03); DIRECTOR   (  MAR 03)
  3.   34491 (051400Z MAR 03)
  4.   34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of  , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003.
  5.   34575  
  6. "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003. KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa'ida anthrax program that was still in its "earliest stages." They were led, he said, by "Omar" who had been arrested in the country of  . The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See   34475  .) KSM would later state that "Yazid" led al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts. (See   10769 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid Sufaat, who had been in   [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspected of participating in al-Qa'ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to:  ,  ,   cc:    , [REDACTED],  , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re:   RESPONSE – INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO USAMA BIN LADIN ASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM;  ; email from:  ; to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at 08:28:31 AM.) A draft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that "Sufaat's own claims to   [foreign government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See "KSM Guarding Most Sensitive Information," labeled "For the President Only 18 March 2003," stamped 0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March 2003.) On April 3, 2003, an IICT analysis stated that KSM "likely judges that information related to Sufaat already has been compromised since his arrest." (See "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that "    [a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid's involvement in al-Qa'ida's anthrax program by early 2002," although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See CIA Directorate of Intelligence; "Al-Qa'ida's Anthrax Program; Cracks Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New Insights into Yazid Sufaat's Credibility  " (DTS#2005-3265).) Al-Filistini was later captured and detained by the CIA. While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also known as Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that "we never made anthrax." At the time, he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told the truth." According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "I made the anthrax." Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said that he was. After CIA interrogators "demonstrated the penalty for lying," al-Barq again stated that "I made the anthrax" and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. (See   1015 (012057Z AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production "only because he thought that was what interrogators wanted." See   1017 (030812Z AUG 03).

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