Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/119

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elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement existed.[1] In confirming Faris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks."[2]

(TS// //NF) With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM stopped abruptly on March 24, 2003.[3] There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous documentation explaining the decision.[4]

4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information

(TS// //NF) On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources.[5]

(TS// //NF) On April 24, 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking direct FBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S. cities.[6] Despite personal commitments from DCI Tenet to Director Mueller that access would be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would


  1. According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smuggling plot, but rather was asked about it by interrogators. (See ALEC   (052230Z MAY 03). All parties to the purported plot – Paracha and Ammar-al Baluchi – denied any agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR   (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as  ;   39239 (301600Z MAY 03);   13588 (171505Z JUL 03); DIRECTOR   (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as  ;   39239 (301600Z MAY 03); ALEC   (012248Z APR 03).) With regard to the explosives smuggling reporting, the former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email: "again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks and got everything he neede right nere. this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me." See email from:    ; to:  ,  ,  ,  ; subject: see highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.
  2.   10985 (242351Z MAR 03). "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.
  3. Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was interrupted by "catnapping." See   10999 (260835Z MAR 03).
  4. For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume III.
  5. "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.
  6. Email from:  ; to:  ; cc: James L. Pavitt;  ; John H. Moseman; Jose Rodriguez;  ; and  ; subject: Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM; date: April 24, 2003, at 10:59:53 AM.

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