Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/123

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UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN

enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention sites.[1]

2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country   and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country  

(TS// //NF) The CIA entered into an agreement with the     in Country   to host a CIA detention facility in  2002.[2] In  2003, CIA Headquarters invited the CIA Station in Country   to identify ways to support the   in Country   to "demonstrate to   and the highest levels of the [Country  ] government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention program.[3] The Station responded with an $  million "wish list"  ;[4] CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $  million more than was requested for the purposes of the   subsidy.[5] CIA detainees were transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country   in the fall of 2003.[6]

(TS// //NF) In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country   sought to contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-à-vis the [Country  ] government."[7] The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the CIA detention facility in Country  . Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not to discuss the program with the secretary of state.[8] CIA Headquarters then sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.[9]

(TS// //NF) Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in Country   to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.[10] In the fall of 2004, when   U.S. ambassador to Country   sought documents authorizing the program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again


  1. DIRECTOR   (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR   (040049Z MAR 03)
  2. [REDACTED] 60040  
  3. HEADQUARTERS    
  4. [REDACTED] 5759   03)
  5. HEADQUARTERS    
  6. According to a cable from CIA Headquarters,   detainees arrived in Country  , 2003. HEADQUARTERS    
  7. [REDACTED]    
  8. [REDACTED]    
  9. Email from:  ; to:  ; subject: Re: DDCI-Armitage call on [Country  ] Detention Facility; date: August  , 2003.
  10. [REDACTED] 6762 (  MAY 04)

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UNCLASSIFIED