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Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."[1] Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in 1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[p]hysical abuse or other degrading treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be ineffective."[2] By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army Field Manual "Intelligence Interrogation."[3] A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation."[4]
(U) The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In 1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, intended as a manual for Cold War interrogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis and induced regression."[5] In 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko[6] using the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.[7] In Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, he noted that in his 31 years of government service:
- "It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I
- ↑ January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on , at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
- ↑ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302).
- ↑ Attachment to Memorandum entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists," CTC: 1026(138)/01 from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI Counterterrorist Center, to Director of Central Intelligence via multiple parties, October 25, 2001; Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogations."
- ↑ Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), updated October 9, 2001.
- ↑ KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85.
- ↑ According to public records, in the mid-1960s, the CIA imprisoned and interrogated Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964, for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defector and ordered his imprisonment and interrogation. Nosenko was confined in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.
- ↑ Among other documents, see CIA "Family Jewels" Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23-24, available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf.
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