Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/54

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"did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected."[1] A cable further explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about "impending future terrorist plans against the United States,"[2] and that the CIA officer told Abu Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is keeping from the [interrogator]."[3] The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI Headquarters, adding that: "We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydah] apparently went to sleep… they did not approach [Abu Zubaydah] the rest of the day."[4] In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members with much success (al-Owhali,[5] KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information.…"[6]

(TS// //NF) On April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator delivered what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah: that "time is running out," that his situation had changed, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu Zubaydah did not signal "to discuss the one thing he was hiding."[7] Abu Zubaydah was sedated and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at 11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at his most vulnerable state."[8]

(TS// //NF) A cable described Abu Zubaydah's cell as white with no natural lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell.[9] An air conditioner was also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable than the other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah "from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with."[10] The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with


  1.   10026 (131233Z APR 02)
  2.   10029 (131505Z APR 02)
  3.   10029 (131505Z APR 02)
  4. Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
  5. See Intelligence Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies" for additional details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali.
  6. Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
  7.   10043 (151614Z APR 02)
  8.   10047 (161406Z APR 02)
  9.   10116 (250731Z APR 02)
  10.   10053 (162029Z APR 02)

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