Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/79

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UNCLASSIFIED

(TS// //NF) On August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA Headquarters authorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and hooding.[1]

(TS// //NF) More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as result of the isolation.[2] The cable added that al-Najjar was willing to do whatever the CIA officer asked.[3]

(TS// //NF) In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest in a more thorough debriefing.[4] On November  , 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited DETENTION SITE COBALT and described it as a "CIA detention facility," noting that "while CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country  ] facility."[5] The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the facility "has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to al-Najjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included "isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms—for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted al-Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.[6]

(TS// //NF) The U.S. military legal advisor concluded that, because of al-Najjar's treatment, and the concealment of the facility from the ICRC, military participation in al-Najjar's interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military  . The legal advisor recommended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S.  


    [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCl DAILY 1630 OPS UPDATE - 26 JULY; date: July 26, 2002.

  1. DIRECTOR   (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydah. The Office of Legal Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004.
  2. [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02)
  3. [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02)
  4. November  , 2002, Memorandum for  , Subject: Legal Analysis of   Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
  5. November  , 2002, Memorandum for  , Subject: Legal Analysis of   Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
  6. November  , 2002, Memorandum for  , Subject: Legal Analysis of   Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").

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UNCLASSIFIED