Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/80

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  [combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military   being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of al-Najjar.[1] According to the CIA inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.[2] The CIA disseminated one intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar.[3]

4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site

(TS// //NF) In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.[4] While DUNBAR was present at DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assisted   [CIA OFFICER 1] in the interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CIA Headquarters, this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment." CIA Headquarters did not approve these interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures" might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a psychological assessment of Rahman be completed.[5] Prior to DUNBAR's departure from the detention site on November  , 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered suggestions to   [CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques.[6]

(TS// //NF) On November  , 2002, [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as   [CIA OFFICER 1] had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part


  1. November  , 2002, Memorandum for  , Subject: Legal Analysis of  Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
  2. According to the IG report, "in late July or early August 2002, a senior operations officer on TDY to   interrogated a particularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at   detention facility that was used before [COBALT] was opened. The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, became the model for [COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death of a Detainee   (2003-7402-IG). See also Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,  , April 3, 2003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,  , April 2, 2003.
  3. See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.
  4. ALEC    
  5. ALEC    
  6.   29963  

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