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(TS// //NF) On January , 2003, CIA contractor DUNBAR arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE to cunduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge al-Nashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a "desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and transition to a debriefing phase once again.[1]
(TS// //NF) After receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on January 21, 2003, , the CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear[2]—emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservation[s] [he had] about the current state of affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, wrote, "[t]his is a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens."[3] drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the record." The CIA Headquarters cable—which does not appear to have been disseminated to DETENTION SITE BLUE—included the following:
"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It is the assessment of the prior interrogators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is the incentive for continued cooperation. Also, both C/CTC/RG [Chief of CTC RDG ] and HVT Interrogator [ ] who departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in January, believe continued enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically."[4]
- ↑ 10267
- ↑ According to a December 12, 2002, CIA cable, al-Nashiri "visibly and markedly trembles with fear every time he sees [ ]." See 10038 (122119Z DEC 02).
- ↑ Email from: ; to: ; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re; date: January 22, 2003. Despite this notification, did not immediately resign from the interrogation program.
- ↑ Email from: ; to: , [REDACTED], , , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. , referenced in the passage as a "HVT Interrogator," was the chief of interrogations.
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