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(TS// //NF) The draft cable from also raised "conflict of responsibility" concerns, stating:
"Another area of concern is the use of the psychologist as an interrogator. The role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of pressure which might cause permanent psychological harm to the subject. The medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of responsibility. We note that [the proposed plan] contains a psychological interrogation assessment by psychologist [DUNBAR] which is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR]. We have a problem with him conducting both roles simultaneously."[1]
(TS// //NF) Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by , CIA Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his arms affixed over his head.[2] CIA cables describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the standing position, handcuffed and shackled."[3] According to cables, CIA interrogators decided to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent them from deteriorating,"[4] noting in a cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an interrogation.[5]
(TS// //NF) Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on September 5, 2006.[6] In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having "anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,[7], while others found no symptoms of either illness.[8] He was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his
- ↑ ref>Email from: ; to: , [REDACTED], , , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to participate in the interrogation process.
- ↑ DIRECTOR (201659Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR (230008Z JAN 03)
- ↑ 10289 (241203Z JAN 03); 10296 (251113Z JAN 03), 10306 (261403Z JAN 03)
- ↑ 10309 (261403Z JAN 03)
- ↑ 10312 (270854Z JAN 03)
- ↑ HEADQUARTERS (031945Z SEP 06); 1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS (051613Z SEP 06)
- ↑ See, for example, 11247 (141321Z APR 03); 1959 (111700Z DEC 04); 2038 (211558Z JAN 05); 2169 (251133Z MAR 05); 11701 (191640Z MAY 03); 1756 (190800Z SEP 03).
- ↑ 1502 (021841Z AUG 04); 2709 (271517Z APR 06); 3910 (241852Z JAN 06); 2709 (271517Z APR 06)
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