PUBLIC LAW 99-661—NOV. 14, 1986
100 STAT. 3959
making such assessment, the Chairman shall specifically consider the following: (1) The effect on the ability of United States strategic forces to accomplish their nuclear deterrent mission (including the effect on the survivability of United States strategic forces and on the ability of United States strategic forces to achieve required damage expectancies against Soviet targets) of any expansion of Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements. (2) The additional cost to the United States, above currently projected military expenditures for those periods for which such budget projections are available, of research, development, production, deployment, and annual operations and support for any additional strategic forces required to counter any expansion in Soviet military capabilities undertaken in response to a United States decision to abandon compliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements. ? (3) Under average annual real growth projections in defense spending of 0 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent, the percent of the annual defense budget in each year between fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1996 which would be consumed by increased United States strategic forces needed to counter '^' 'c ^MI the Soviet force expansions. (4) The military effect on United States national security of the diversion the funds identified under paragraph (2) away from nonstrategic defense programs and to strategic programs to counter expanded Soviet strategic capabilities, including the military effect of such a diversion on the ability of United States conventional forces to meet the specific non-nuclear defense commitments of the United States as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan. 11 UST 1632. (5) The military implications for the United States of Soviet violations of offensive arms control agreements that have been J ii^rfn*, • determined, (c) REPORT REQUIREMENTS.—(1) The Chairman shall—
(A) include in the report required under subsection (a) the individual views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (B) submit such report in both classified and unclassified ' form. (2) The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than December 19, 1986. (e) RESTRICTION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.—If the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff fails to submit the report required by subsection (a) before December 20, 1986, no funds may be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, on or after such date by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for any study or analysis to be conducted by a civilian contractor until such report is received by Congress. SEC. 1004. SENSE OF CONGRESS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR A CENTRAL ROLE FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS (a) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS.—The Congress—
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(1) has expressed its prior support for the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers; and
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