101 STAT. 1136
International agreements. President of U.S.
PUBLIC LAW 100-180—DEC. 4, 1987
radars except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward. V (2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party ^- to the Treaty from deploying an anti-ballistic missile system to defend its national territory and from providing a base for any ^ such nationwide defense. (3) Large phased-array radars were recognized during negotiation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. (4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction, in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of Krasnoyarsk, <J of a large phased-array radar that has subsequently been judged J • f to be for ballistic missile early warning and tracking. ?» (5) The Krasnoyarsk radar is more than 700 kilometers from the Soviet-Mongolian border and is not directed outward but instead, faces the northeast Soviet border more than 4,500 kilometers away. VI- (6) The Krasnoyarsk radar is identical to other Soviet ballistic r missile early warning radars and is ideally situated to fill the gap that would otherwise exist in a nationwide Soviet ballistic missile early warning radar network. (7) The President has certified that the Krasnoyarsk radar is an unequivocal violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that the Soviet Union is in violation of its legal obligation under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. SEC. 903. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to Congress, not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report discussing the use of the current official United States method of estimating the yield of Soviet underground nuclear tests to determine the extent to which the Soviet Union is complying with the 150 kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Q}) FORM AND CONTENT OF REPORT.—The report shall be submitted in both classified form and (if possible) unclassified form and shall include the following matters: (1) A discussion of whether past assessments made by the United States of the extent of Soviet compliance with the 150 kiloton limit contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty would have been different if the United States, in making those assessments, had used the current official United States method (if of estimating the yield of underground nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union. (2) The number of nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union after March 31, 1976, that have a central value exceeding < 150 kilotons yield (estimated on the basis of the current official method used by the United States in estimating underground nuclear test jrields), the central value of those tests (estimated on such basis), and the dates on which those tests were conducted. (3) The number, dates, and estimated central values of tests, if any, conducted by the United States after March 31, 1976,
�
