103 STAT. 1544 PUBLIC LAW 101-189—NOV. 29, 1989 President of U.S. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (3) on October 23, 1989, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS. —It is the sense of Congress— (1) that the Soviet Union should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar {as announced in the joint statement referred to in subsec- tion 03X2)) expeditiously and without conditions; and (2) that until such radar is completely dismantled it will remain a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. SEC. 1007. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING EXPLORING THE FEASIBIL- ITY OF TREATY LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS CAPABLE OF THREATENING MILITARY SATELLITES It is the sense of Congress that, as soon as practicable, the President should explore the feasibility of a mutual and verifiable treaty with the Soviet Union which places the strictest possible limitations, consistent with the security interests of the United States and its allies, on the development, testing, production, and deployment of weapons capable of directly threatening United States military satellites. SEC. 1008. REPORT ON SATELLITE SURVIVABILITY (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.— The President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on United States antisatellite weapon activities and the survivability of United States satellites against current and potential antisatellite weapons deployed by the Soviet Union. The report shall be submitted by March 15, 1990, and shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions. Oa) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) Detailed information (including funding profiles, expected capabilities, and schedules for development, testing, and deploy- ment) on all United States antisatellite weapon programs. (2) An analysis of the antisatellite potential of the anticipated deployed version of each Strategic Defense Initiative technology capable of damaging or destroying objects in space. (3) An assessment of the threat that would be posed to satellites of the United States if the technologies described in paragraphs (1) and (2) were to be tested by the Soviet Union, at levels of performance equal to those intended by the United States, and developed into weapons for damaging or destroying objects in space. (4) A review of arms control options and satellite survivability measures (including cost data) that would improve the surviv- ability of current and future United States military satellite systems. (5) A review of alternative means of providing the support to military forces of the United States that is currently provided by United States satellites if those satellites become vulnerable to attack as the result of the deployment by the Soviet Union of antisatellite weapons with the levels of performance con- templated in paragraph (3).
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