PUBLIC LAW 103-236—APR. 30, 1994 108 STAT. 479 (14) Toward these ends, the United States and South Korea should take all steps necessai^ to ensure that United States and South Korean forces stationed on the Korean peninsula can defend themselves, including the holding of Team Spirit or other joint military exercises, the deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea, and other appropriate measures. (15) The problem posed by North Korea's nuclear program is not a bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea, but a problem in which virtually the entire global community is united against North Korea. (16) The international community must insist upon full compliance by North Korea with all its nonproliferation commitments including acceptance of regular and ad hoc inspections of its declared nuclear facilities on a continuing basis, as well as special inspections of all suspected nuclear sites as the IAEA deems appropriate. (17) International concerns about North Korea's nuclear intentions and capabilities will not be adequatelv addressed until North Korea cooperates fully with the IAEA, all North Korea nuclear facilities and materials are placed under fullscope safeguards, and North Korea adheres uneqviivocally to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as well as to its 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea. (18) The Administration should work to encourage a productive dialogue between North and South Korea that adequately addresses all security concerns on the Korean peninsula. SEC. 530. ENFORCEMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES. 22 USC 2429a-2. (a) POLICY.— It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to enhance the role of that institution in the enforcement of nonproliferation treaties through the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution which would state that, any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the United Nations Security Council, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement would be subjected to international economic sanctions, the scope of which to be determined by the United Nations Security Council. (b) PROHIBITION. —Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no United States assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall be provided to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement or materially violated a bilateral United States nuclear cooperation agreement entered into after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Pro- Uferation Act of 1978. (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of subsection (b) if— (1) the President determines that the termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; and (2) the President reports such determination to the Congress at least 15 days in advance of any resumption of assistance to that state.
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