PUBLIC LAW 103-337—OCT. 5, 1994 108 STAT. 2687 ment of Defense for fiscal year 1995 may be used to design, develop, or produce a modified version of the C-17 aircraft that could be considered to be a nondevelopmental alternative aircraft for purposes of future Department of the Air Force competitions for intertheater airlift requirements. (g) OTHER CONTRACTOR OBLIGATIONS. — Nothing in this section shall iDe construed as relieving the prime contractor for the C- 17 aircraft from any obligation provided for in the C-17 settlement agreement. (h) C-17 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DEFINED. —For purposes of this section, the term "C-17 settlement agreement" means the settlement agreement that was proposed to the prime contractor for the C-17 aircraft program by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology by letter dated January 3, 1994, and that was accepted by that prime contractor on January 6, 1994. (i) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY. —The authority of the Secretary of the Air Force to enter into agreements and contract modifications under subsection (a) expires at the close of September 30, 1995. SEC. 133. HEAVY BOMBER FORCE REQUIREMENTS. (a) REQUIREMENTS STUDY.— The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of bomber force requirements of the Department of Defense. The Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on Reports, the results of the study not later than April 15, 1995. The study shall address, for each of the target years 1998, 2006, and 2014, the following: (1) Realistic alternative mixes of bombers constituting the bomber force and whether, for each of the alternative mixes, the bomber force so produced can meet well-defined national security requirements. (2) The incremental levels of munitions requirements, bomber upgrade requirements, and other support requirements for implementation of each of the alternative mixes. (3) The cost of implementation, affordability of implementation, and time required for implementation of each of the alternative mixes. (4) The sensitivity to small changes in assumptions of the capabilities of the bomber force produced by each of the alternative mixes to meet mission requirements. (b) FURTHER ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES.— If the Secretary determines in the study carried out under subsection (a) that the bomber force capabilities are not adequate to meet requirements for any of the target years considered, the Secretary shall undertake a further study to examine alternative strategies for increasing bomber force capabilities. As part of such examination, the Secretary shall do the following: (1) Determine those core bomber industrial capabilities that are needed to maintain the ability to design, develop, and produce bomber aircraft in the near-term and in the longterm and that— (A) would take extended periods of time or substantial expense to regenerate; and (B) are in imminent danger of being lost. (2) For each strategy examined— (A) estimate the cost of implementing the strategy;
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