113 STAT. 1614 PUBLIC LAW 106-120—DEC. 3, 1999 Augusto Pinochet. SEC. 311. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CHILE. Deadline. (a) IN GENERAL.— By not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing all activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements in the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the Republic of Chile: (1) The assassination of President Salvador Allende in September 1973. (2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic of Chile. (3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former President Pinochet. (b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. SEC. 312. REPORT ON KOSOVA LIBERATION ARMY. Deadline. (a) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report (in both classified and unclassified form) on the organized resistance in Kosovo known as the Kosova Liberation Army. The report shall include the following: (1) A summary of the history of the Kosova Liberation Army. (2) As of the date of the enactment of this Act— (A) the number of individuals currently participating in or supporting combat operations of the Kosova Liberation Army (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training for such service (recruits); (B) the types, and quantity of each type, of weapon employed by the Kosova Liberation Army, the training afforded to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military operations; and (C) minimum additional weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of such military operations. (3) An estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army that is attributable to profits from the sale of illicit narcotics. (4) A description of the involvement (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army in terrorist activities. (5) A description of the number of killings of noncombatant civilians (if any) carried out by the Kosova Liberation Army since its formation. (6) A description of the leadership of the Kosova Liberation Army, including an analysis of— (A) the political philosophy and program of the leadership; and (B) the sentiment of the leadership toward the United States.
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