114 STAT. 1654A-120 PUBLIC LAW 106-398 —APPENDIX (B) criticized the higher command for not sharing with Admiral Kimmel "during the very critical period of November 26 to December 7, 1941, important information... regarding the Japanese situation"; and (C) concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome was attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the naval service. (7) On June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral Kimmel. (8) On October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation determined that— (A) Lieutenant General Short had not been kept "fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war"; (B) detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were available in "abundance" but were not shared with the Lieutenant General Short's Hawaii command; and (C) Lieutenant General Short was not provided "on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this". (9) The reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation were kept secret, and Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short were denied their requests to defend themselves through trial by court-martial. (10) The joint committee of Congress that was established to investigate the conduct of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short completed, on May 31, 1946, a 1,075-page report which included the conclusions of the committee that the two officers had not been guilty of dereliction of duty. (11) On April 27, 1954, the Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., recommended that Rear Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. (12) On November 13, 1991, a majority of the members of the Board for the Correction of Military Records of the Department of the Army found that Major General Short "was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster" and that "it would be equitable and just" to advance him to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list. (13) In October 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle Trost, withdrew his 1988 recommendation against the advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel and recommended that his case be reopened. (14) Although the Dom Report, a report on the results of a Department of Defense study that was issued on December 15, 1995, did not provide support for an advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade, it did set forth as a conclusion of the study that "responsibility for the
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