118 STAT. 612 PUBLIC LAW 108–218—APR. 10, 2004 about a medical specialty or a residency program and before residency programs could make an informed assessment of students’ qualifications. This situation was inefficient, chaotic, and unfair and it often led to placements that did not serve the interests of either medical students or residency programs. (C) The original matching program, now operated by the independent non profit National Resident Matching Program and popularly known as ‘‘the Match’’, was devel oped and implemented more than 50 years ago in response to widespread student complaints about the prior process. This Program includes on its board of directors individuals nominated by medical student organizations as well as by major medical education and hospital associations. (D) The Match uses a computerized mathematical algo rithm, as students had recommended, to analyze the pref erences of students and residency programs and match students with their highest preferences from among the available positions in residency programs that listed them. Students thus obtain a residency position in the most highly ranked program on their list that has ranked them sufficiently high among its preferences. Each year, about 85 percent of participating United States medical students secure a place in one of their top 3 residency program choices. (E) Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to undermine this highly efficient, pro competitive, and long standing process. The costs of defending such litigation would divert the scarce resources of our country’s teaching hospitals and medical schools from their crucial missions of patient care, physician training, and medical research. In addition, such costs may lead to abandonment of the matching process, which has effectively served the interests of medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a century. (2) PURPOSES.—It is the purpose of this section to— (A) confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a graduate med ical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so; and (B) ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or partici pate in such matching programs are not subjected to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges such matching programs under the antitrust laws. (b) APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAMS.— (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: (A) ANTITRUST LAWS.—The term ‘‘antitrust laws’’— (i) has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent such section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition; and
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