Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, authorized to instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels of the United States to subdue, seize, taken, and send into any port of the United States, any armed vessel or boat, or any vessel or
act of Congress of April 30th, 1790, ch. 9, and is punishable in the courts of the United States. United States v Furlong, 5 Wheat. 185; 4 Cond. Rep. 623.
There is a distinction between the crimes of murder and piracy. The latter is an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations: not so with murder, it is punishable under the laws of each state. Ibid. It is not necessary to produce documentary evidence, to prove the national character of a vessel, on an indictment for piracy. Ibid. Upon a piratical capture, the property of the original owners cannot be forfeited for the misconduct of the captors, in violating the municipal laws of the country where the captors have carried the property. The Josefa Segunda, 5 Wheat. 338; 4 Cond. Rep. 672. Pirates may be lawfully captured by the public or private ships of any nation, in peace or in war; for they are hostes humani generis. The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1; 6 Cond. Rep. 201. On a question of probable cause of seizure, under the piracy acts of 3d March, 1819, ch. 77, and of the 15th of May, 1820, ch. 113; although the crew may be protected by a commission bona fide received, and acted under, from the consequences attaching to the offence of piracy by the general law of nations; although such commission was irregularly issued; yet if the defects in the commission be such as, connected with the insubordination and predatory spirit of the crew, to excite a justly founded suspicion, it is sufficient, under the act of Congress, to justify the captors for bringing in the vessel for adjudication, and to exempt them from costs and damages. The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; 6 Cond. Rep. 397. Whatever difficulty there may be, under our municipal institutions, in punishing as pirates, citizens of the United States who take from a state at war with Spain, a commission to cruise against that power, contrary to the 14th article of the Spanish treaty: yet there is no doubt that such acts are to be considered as piratical acts for all civil purposes, and the offending parties cannot appear, and claim in our courts the property thus taken. The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152; 5 Cond. Rep. 45. To constitute the offence of piracy, within the act of 1790, ch. 9, by “piratically and feloniously” running away with a vessel, personal force and violence is not necessary. United States v. Tully, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 247. The “piratically and feloniously” running away with a vessel, within the act, is the running away with a vessel, with an intent to convert the same to the taker’s own use, against the will of the owner. The intent must be animo furandi. Ibid. The circuit court has cognisance, under the act of 1790, ch. 9, sec. 8, of piracy on board an American ship, although committed in an open roadstead, adjacent to a foreign territory, and within half a mile of the shore. United States v. Ross, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 524. Where the defendant was indicted for robbery and piracy, on the high seas, on board a brig called L’Eclair, a foreign vessel, belonging exclusively to French owners, and sailing under the French flag: Held, that under the acts of Congress, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try and punish the offence. United States v. Kessler, 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 25. Whether the offence was committed within or without a marine league of the coast of the United States, makes no difference. Ibid. The defendant who was the first lieutenant of an American privateer, the Revenge, was indicted for piracy committed on a Portuguese vessel, and for assaulting the crew, and putting them in bodily fear, &c. The defendant was charged with boarding the vessel, and by force and intimidation, taking from her money and other articles, not claiming the vessel as prize; but pretending that the Revenge was an English vessel, and that the articles would be paid for by an order on the English consul. Held, that the eight section of the act for the punishment of certain crimes, makes murder and robbery on the high seas acts of piracy. The words, “which if committed in the body of a county,” do not relate to “murder and robbery,” but to the words immediately preceding them, or any other offence. United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 209. To define the meaning of “robbery,” the common law must be resorted to: wherever a statute of the United States uses a technical term, which is known, and its meaning clearly ascertained by the common law or civil law, from one or other of which it is obviously borrowed, it is proper to refer for its meaning to the source from which it is taken. Ibid. The act of Congress of 1812, for the government of the navy of the United States, does not repeal the provisions of the law relating to piracy, contained in the act of Congress passed 30th April, 1790. The general rule of law, that robbery on the high seas is piracy, has no exception or qualification in favour of commissioned privateers, in any act of Congress, in the common law, or in the law of nations. Robbery is the felonious taking of goods from the person of another; or in his presence by violence; or by putting him in fear, and against his will. Ibid. As there was no proof under the indictment, that in the first instance any unlawful acts were meditated by the commander of the Revenge, and his officers; it was held to be insufficient to charge the defendants, who were part of the crew, with piracy, by proving acts of robbery committed by the crew in general. It must be proved that the defendants, who were part of the crew, participated in the taking; and that they did it feloniously. The captain of the Revenge may have been guilty of robbery, and those who executed his orders may have been innocent. Ibid. The crimes of piracy mentioned in the 8th section of the act for the punishment of certain crimes, passed the 30th April, 1790, are such as are committed by citizens of the United States, or on board of vessels of the United States; and the 10th and 11th sections of the act, which refer to accessaries, refer to acts of piracy mentioned in the 8th section. United States v. Howard et al., 3 Wash. C. C. R. 340. An endeavour by a mariner to corrupt the master of a vessel, and to induce him to go over to pirates, is within the provisions of the eighth section of the law. Ibid.