reaſon for ſo doing; and there are fourteen ſuch reaſons reckoned up[1], which may juſtify ſuch diſinheriſon. If the parent alleged no reaſon, or a bad, or falſe one, the child might ſet the will aſide, tanquam teſtamentum inofficioſum, a teſtament contrary to the natural duty of the parent. And it is remarkable under what colour the children were to move for relief in ſuch a caſe: by ſuggeſting that the parent had loſt the uſe of his reaſon, when he made the inofficious teſtament. And this, as Puffendorf obſerves[2], was not to bring into diſpute the teſtator's power of diſinheriting his own offspring; but to examine the motives upon which he did it: and, if they were found defective in reaſon, then to ſet them aſide. But perhaps this is going rather too far: every man has, or ought to have, by the laws of ſociety, a power over his own property: and, as Grotius very well diſtinguiſhes[3], natural right obliges to give a neceſſary maintenance to children; but what is more than that they have no other right to, than as it is given them by the favour of their parents, or the poſitive conſtitutions of the municipal law.
Let us next ſee what proviſion our own laws have made for this natural duty. It is a principle of law[4], that there is an obligation on every man to provide for thoſe deſcended from his loins: and the manner in which this obligation ſhall be performed, is thus pointed out[5]. The father, and mother, grandfather, and grandmother of poor impotent perſons ſhall maintain them at their own charges, if of ſufficient ability, according as the quarter ſeſſions ſhall direct: and[6] if a parent runs away, and leaves his children, the churchwardens and overſeers of the pariſh ſhall ſeiſe his rents, goods, and chattels, and diſpoſe of them towards their relief. By the interpretations which the courts of law have made upon theſe ſtatutes, if a mother or grandmother marries again, and was before ſuch ſecond marriage of ſufficient ability to keep the child, the huſband ſhall be charged to main-
