Page:Wittengenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922.djvu/149

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its constituents are combined in such and such a way.

This perhaps explains that the figure


can be seen in two ways as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.

(If I fix my eyes first on the corners a and only glance at b, a appears in front and b behind, and vice versa.)

5.55 We must now answer a priori the question as to all possible forms of the elementary propositions.

The elementary proposition consists of names. Since we cannot give the number of names with different meanings, we cannot give the composition of the elementary proposition.

5.551 Our fundamental principle is that every question which can be decided at all by logic can be decided off-hand.

(And if we get into a situation where we need to answer such a problem by looking at the world, this shows that we are on a fundamentally wrong track.)

5.552 The "experience" which we need to understand logic is not that such and such is the case, but that something is; but that is no experience.

Logic precedes every experience — that something is so.

It is before the How, not before the What.