Page:Yale Law Journal - Volume 27.pdf/32

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
8
YALE LAW JOURNAL

makers’ purpose—that is, they are the tools he invents to effectuate his purpose; and they limit individual freedom of action. As it seems to me, these features are common to all rules of law, and are the only features common to all laws and systems of law; that is, to the laws of grammar, of baseball, of billiards, etc., to say nothing of moral and of juridical law. You cannot think of a law that was not made; nor of one that is not a tool; that is, of one that was not made to effectuate its makers’ ideals; nor of one that does not attempt to do that by limiting individual freedom of action, or by delimiting what those subject to it shall do in a given situation.

It is probably true that in the beginning these were all the features common to the rules of juridical law, but for countless centuries all such rules have had another common feature: that is, they have been rules the state may enforce. If laws are made either by individuals or by communities, it is obvious that they cannot effectuate their makers’ purpose in and of themselves; for if they are made, they are not a force like gravity, but simply tools, and do not differ from other tools—for example, a blacksmith's hammer—in so far as the capacity to effectuate their makers’ purpose is concerned. The hammer, in and of itself, is an inert mass, but the smith uses it to shape iron, or to effectuate his ideals. Force, however, is necessary to effectuate them, and as there is no force in the hammer, the smith applies force to it.

In the same way, there must be force behind laws if they are to effectuate their makers’ ideals. The making of laws, therefore, is but one step in the process of effectuating ideals. To do that, laws must be both made and enforced. In other words, if a community is to effectuate its ideals, it must both delimit what its members shall do or omit in a given situation, and create an entity that will punish those who fail to do or omit the things the law commands; or it must compel them to compensate one who is injured or damaged for all the loss he sustains because of their illegal acts. By this is not intended that force enters into the composition of a rule of law.[1] What is intended is that force is one of the things necessary to effectuate ideals. Since this is so, when the entity which evolves ideals is a community, it must both make the laws and give some individual or corporation the power to enforce them, if it is to effectuate its ideals.

  1. Korkunov, op. cit. 96.