Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 20
PROPOSITION XX.
THE ABSOLUTE IN COGNITION.
DEMONSTRATION.
The demonstration commences with the definition of the known absolute, which is almost coincident with that of known substance. "Whatever can be known (or conceived) out of relation, that is to say, without any correlative being necessarily known (or conceived) along with it, is the known Absolute." But some such thing must be known, otherwise all knowledge would be impossible. Because, if everything had a correlative thing which required to be known before it could be known; and again, if the thing and its correlative had another correlative thing which required to be known before knowledge could arise, and so on perpetually,—it is obvious that no cognition could ever take place; but cognition does take place. Therefore, something can, and must be known, out of relation, or without any correlative being known along with it; and this, whatever it may be, is the known Absolute conformably to the definition. Consequently there is an Absolute in cognition; in other words, the Absolute is knowable and is known by us.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Nothing is affired as to the existing Absolute.1. Here, as elsewhere in this section of the science, we are occupied only with the definition and consideration of the known Absolute, and not at all with the definition and consideration of the existing Absolute. Whatever the existing Absolute may be, it is certain, with all the certainty of necessary truth, as this demonstration proves, that there is a known Absolute, or something which can be embraced in cognition, without any correlative being necessarily embraced in cognition along with it.
Comment on definition of the known Absolute.2. The word "absolute" is a term which almost defines itself. By attending to its literal and primitive signification we obtain its exact meaning and force. It signifies the "absolved"—that is, the freed or emancipated in thought from the thought of anything else (quid absolutum, τὸ ἀυτοτελές), the self-complete, the detached, or rounded off, the totum, teres atque rotundum. Hence, looked at in its mere verbal character, it cannot with propriety be defined in any other terms than those which have been laid down as its definition.
Twentieth counter-proposition.3. Twentieth Counter-proposition.—"There is no absolute in cognition. Man's faculties are competent to apprehend only the relative; hence the absolute is unknown, and unknowable by us."
This counter-proposition is a reiteration of Counter-proposition XVI.4. This counter-proposition is merely a repetition, in another form, of Counter-proposition XVI., and it involves precisely the same contradiction. It is subverted by the demonstration of the present proposition, just as Counter-proposition XVI. was overthrown by the demonstration of its corresponding proposition. Such notices of the controversy respecting the absolute and the relative as may be deemed necessary will come in more appropriately under the next article, which is virtually identical with Proposition XVII. No apology, however, seems to be required for its introduction; for, as has been said, new verbal forms of error require to be corrected by new verbal forms of truth, if the hydra-heads of falsehood are to be crushed and the work of speculation done effectually and completely.