Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Philosophical Remains (1883)/Letter to Sir W. Hamilton (Not Sent), 1851
LETTER TO SIR W. HAMILTON.
(Not Sent)
My dear Sir William,—There is an ambiguity or inconsistency in your doctrine of "presentative knowledge" which I have often intended to speak to you about, and request an explanation of. You say, Reid, p. 805, "In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one sole object." What is this one sole object? Our organism, you answer. From which it of course follows that everything beyond our organism is a mediate object of cognition. This is indeed expressly admitted. "The primary qualities of things external to our organism we do not perceive—i.e., immediately know," p. 881. And yet, in the face of that statement, I read, p. 810, "The primary qualities of matter or body, new and here—that is, in proximate relation to our organs—are objects of immediate cognition to the natural realists." These two statements are absolutely contradictory and irreconcilable. Of course, the primary qualities, when "in proximate relation to our organs," are "external to our organism," and are, therefore, according to passage in p. 881, not immediately known; and yet, according to passage in p. 810, they are "objects of immediate cognition to the natural realist." Does not this re quire some amendment? The truth is, that your distinction of presentative and representative knowledge is no distinction at all, both species of cognition being equally presentative and equally representative. Both in perception and in imagination the sole immediate object is our own organism; the only difference being that in perception the immediate object refers to, or implies, a present external object not immediately known; while in imagination the immediate object refers to, or implies, an absent external object not immediately known. Is not that your doctrine? What, then, becomes of the distinction between presentation and representation, between perception and imagination, if in both cases both a near and a remote object are or may be involved? You expressly state that the sole immediate object in perception is the organism; all that lies beyond is mediate. The organism is also the sole immediate object in imagination; all that lies beyond is mediate. How, then, can these two powers be discriminated as presentative (immediate) and representative (mediate)?
The argument by which you find an immediate non-ego in the organism I do not meddle with at present. But it seems to me that this argument, if sound, would be sufficient to establish your natural realism, without complicating the case with the distinction of presentative and representative knowledge, a distinction which seems to me to be untenable as you put it, and which, at any rate, requires some redding up at your hands. It is also very misleading; for I believe that unwary readers of Note B may be of opinion that you advocate an immediate knowledge of external objects beyond the organism, and are thus a champion of common sense.