Royal Naval Biography/Glascock, William Nugent

by John Marshall

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WILLIAM NUGENT GLASCOCK, Esq.
[Captain of 1833.]

Went first to sea in Jan. 1800, as midshipman, on board the Glenmore frigate, Captain George Duff, on the Irish station, and followed that distinguished officer into the Vengeance 74, attached to the Channel fleet, early in 1801.

After the battle of Copenhagen, the Vengeance was sent to reinforce the Baltic fleet; and we subseqently find her employed off Rochefort, whence she was ordered to Bantry Bay, for the protection of that part of Ireland. Upon this station she continued until the signature of the preliminaries of peace, when she was selected to form part of a squadron under Rear-Admiral (afterwards Sir George) Campbell, destined to Jamaica, for the purpose of watching the movements of an armament sent from France, to attempt the recovery of the French part of St Domingo from the usurped government of the blacks. Previously to his departure for the West Indies, Mr. Glascock witnessed a mutiny in the Bantry Bay squadron, and the execution of the ringleaders at Spithead. On the renewal of hostilities, in 1803, Mr. Glascock joined the Colossus 74, Captain (now Sir George) Martin, whom he followed into the Barfleur 98, of which ship he was signal mate in Sir Robert Calder’s action with the combined fleets of France and Spain, July 22d, 1805.^[1] On that occasion, the master of the Barfleur and two men were killed, and her first lieutenant (Peter Fisher) and six men wounded. On the 22d of the following month, Mr. Glascock witnessed the brush between the van ships of the fleet under Admiral Cornwallis, and the rear of the French line in Bertheaume Bay, near Brest, of which we have made mention in Vol. I. Part II. p. 698, and Suppl. Part IV. p. 411, et seq.

Mr. Glascock passed his examination for lieutenant in Sept. 1808, and was promoted into the Dannemark 74, Captain (afterwards Rear-Admiral) James Bissett, on the 8th Nov. following. That ship formed part of the squadron under Sir Richard J. Strachan, at the attack and reduction of Flushing, in Aug. 1809,^[2] and Lieutenant Glascock subsequently suffered much from the Walcheren fever, of which he had several relapses. His next appointment was, about July 1812, to the Clarence 74, Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Henry Vansittart, employed in the blockade of Rochefort, on which station he participated in one or two boating affairs with the enemy.

After the close of the European war, in 1814, he joined the Tiber 38, Captain J. R. Dacres. We subsequently find him serving as first lieutenant of the Madagascar and Meander frigates (both commanded by Captain Sir James Alexander Gordon), and displaying much coolness and presence of mind when the latter ship struck on the Garbard Sand, near Orfordness, in a gale of wind, Dec. 19th, 1816.^[3] On that occasion, without waiting for orders, he directed the helm to be put up, to run the ship, if possible, over the shoal, had it not been for which she would, in all probability, have stuck fast and soon gone to pieces.

In the spring of 1818, Mr. Glascock was appointed first lieutenant of the Sir Francis Drake 38, flagship of Sir Charles Hamilton, governor of Newfoundland, from whom he received an order to act as commander of the Carnation sloop, Nov. 20th following. This appointment was confirmed by the Admiralty on the 31st Dec. in the same year. He commanded the Drake brig from May until Dec. 1819, when he was obliged to invalid. He subsequently was appointed to the Orestes ship-sloop, which vessel he joined at Lough Swilly, Aug. 12th, 1830, and paid off at Portsmouth, Oct. 1st, 1833, four months after his advancement to the rank of captain.

The Orestes was first employed in cruising on the coast of Galway, where she encountered a terrific storm on the 19th Nov. 1830. During this tempest many vessels were stranded, four of which Commander Glascock succeeded in getting off the rocks, and restoring to their owners, long after their total abandonment.

The following is an extract of his official report on this occasion:

“Galway Roads, Jan. 1st, 1831.

“Having upon the coming of the spring tides made previous arrangements, four parties, each commanded by an officer, the whole under my personal superintendance, were, on the 27th ult. severally despatched to perform the various duties of excavating rocks, cutting channels, laying out anchors, buoying with casks the bottom of each vessel, and bringing to the fore-foot of two of the largest the most powerful purchases which could be procured from H.M. sloop. The result of this arduous and truly laborious undertaking, which I need scarcely add, fell heavily upon so small a complement of men, has been, that by the persevering exertions and seaman-like conduct of the two lieutenants, the master, and three warrant officers, together with the cheerful alacrity and orderly demeanour of the crew of the Orestes, during five days and three nights of the most harassing and incessant labour, three valuable vessels^[4] have not only been rescued from plunder and total destruction, but have, in a perfectly uninjured state, been restored to their owners, and safely secured within the piers of this port.”

On the 25th Jan. Commander Glascock reported that the fourth vessel, a sloop belonging to Dumbarton, had, by the greatest exertions on the part of his officers and crew, been got off, and likewise safely secured in Galway harbour. The only reward which he received for these services, not having made any claim for salvage, was, the official approval of his commander-in-chief. Rear-Admiral the Hon. Sir Charles Paget.

Commander Glascock was next sent, in May 1831, to the river Tyne, to tranquillize the dissatisfied seamen of Newcastle and Shields. His situation there was beset with difficulties of a critical nature, arising from political causes, the prejudices peculiar to the seamen of the north, and the anomalous jurisdiction of the river, added to the circumstance of his possessing no definite official instructions to guide and govern his public conduct. After four months of unenviable service, however, he succeeded, to the satisfaction of all parties, in subduing the riotous, and restoring order, for which he received a public expression of thanks from the mayor and corporation of Newcastle. He was subsequently employed as senior officer on the Irish station.

Pending the civil war in Portugal, Commander Glascock was entrusted with the command of the naval force in the Douro, which he retained for nearly a year. During the greater part of this time, the city of Oporto was in a constant state of actual siege, and the British squadron as constantly exposed to the incessant cross-fire of both belligerents, and in hourly danger of explosion from the interminable succession of shells bursting and falling in the river. No instance stands on record of an officer of the same rank holding a command replete with such personal responsibility, and fraught with consequences of such international and political import. The following is an outline of the occurrences in that quarter during the period of his command:

The Orestes entered the Douro on the 23d Sept. 1832, in company with the Childers sloop, Commander Robert Deans, the then senior officer. On the 28th of the same month, the captain’s steward of the latter ship was mortally wounded by a shot in the loins, when standing on the forecastle. “The circumstance at the time,” says Commander Glascock “occasioned a great sensation, – for we were then strangers to the assassinating system of murdering individuals, by musketry across the river, and of course had not calculated that lookers-on were as likely as others to lose their lives. The accident originated in a foolish frolic on the part of some of the Oporto watermen, who had, early in the morning, capsized from the cliff abreast of the British sloops, a number of empty pipes, which it had been supposed the Miguelites had there placed, for the purpose of building a battery. Encouraged by their morning’s work, these brave barcadoes were again induced to ascend the hill: but hardly had they reached the summit before they were seen scampering down, flying from a handful of armed guerillas.” Taking to their boat, they sought shelter under the lee of the Britomart, a British bark, moored close to the Childers, and thus brought upon that sloop and her consort a most galling fire, the merchant vessel having just before given great offence by discharging on the constitutional side a cargo of heavy guns. On the following day, Mr. Emeric, E. Vidal, purser of the Asia 84, was dangerously wounded whilst on shore viewing a desperate attack made by the Miguelites upon Don Pedro’s lines near Oporto.^[5]

On the 11th Oct. three musket-balls were fired, and to all appearance purposely, at the Orestes, from the summit of a hill known by the name of the “Quarantine Ground.” The party firing were attired as soldiers. One shot fell close alongside. There being no object whatever then in the vicinity of the Orestes to provoke a fire, her commander was quite at a loss to conjecture the cause of such an egregious violation of neutrality – “particularly after the extraordinary forbearance which had been recently manifested by both of H.M. ships under circumstances so peculiarly annoying.” On the 19th, Commander Glascock was under the necessity of complaining to Colonel Hodges, commandant of the British brigade in the service of Don Pedro, that two privates of that corps had conducted themselves, when passing close by the Orestes, in a manner truly insulting to His Britannic Majesty’s flag.

On the 5th Nov., the Childers having quitted the Douro, Commander Glascock became senior officer of the squadron in that river, then consisting of the Orestes 18, Nautilus and Leveret 10 gun brigs, AEtna surveying vessel, and Echo steamer. About the same time part of Don Pedro’s naval force, under Vice-Admiral Sartorious, crossed the bar, and moored in positions best suited to defend the Foz, or to act as occasion might require. On the 9th, a mortar battery compelled some of these vessels to make a move; and next day the Sampaio, a formidable fortress commanding the mouth and lower extremity of the river, unmasked, opening a tremendous fire on one of the corvettes. The retreat of the constitutional squadron created no little confusion: then it was that the British men-of-war and merchantmen became in an awkward dilemma; for in taking up their new positions, Sartorious’s ships had mingled with both the former.

In a letter to Rear-Admiral Parker, dated Nov. 10th, Commander Glascock says: “Placed as I am in a situation of such responsibility – removing the whole squadron from side to side as the batteries open from contending parties – I trust you will excuse my not being able to enter into a full detail of the operations so suddenly commenced this day. Don Miguel’s general (the Visconde de Santa Martha) has opened batteries, which if not carried by a coup-de-main on the part of Don Pedro’s troops, must inevitably destroy his shipping in the river; and it will be extremely fortunate if the British vessels, men-of-war as well as merchantmen, escape the fire of the contending parties. At this moment, when I write, shell and shot are passing in all directions between and over the masts of H.M. ships.”

On the 12th, at 8 a.m., a shell was thrown so close to the Leveret that it burst under her bow, producing a concussion which threatened serious damage. The same day, a heavy gale of wind broke most of the ships in the river adrift; but, with the exception of a few spars, little or no damage was done to the British squadron. Don Miguel was then preparing, not only to bombard the city, but to cut off all communication by land as well as by sea, with a view of eventually starving the inhabitants of Oporto. On the morning of the 14th, at day-light, Don Pedro’s troops made a sortie from the Sierra convent, with a view of supporting Sartorious’s seamen, who landed from their ships to storm a mortar battery on the summit of the Quarantine Ground. The sailors were repulsed, and their leader. Captain Morgul, was mortally wounded; but the troops, (under Colonel Schwallbach, a fine old German soldier,) though only twelve hundred strong, took one hundred and sixty prisoners. Had three or four thousand men been sent instead of twelve hundred, the probability is, the troops of Don Pedro would have destroyed all the batteries on the southern side. From the heavy cross fire of musketry to which H.M. ships were exposed. Commander Glascock was apprehensive some damage would have ensued; but from keeping their crews below, he was happy to report, that with the exception of stranding a shroud here and there, of the lower and top-mast rigging, not a single accident occurred.

On the 17th Nov. a sortie was made by the British and French troops in Don Pedro’s service, on the north of their lines. A few Miguelites were made prisoners, and several huts in their camp destroyed ; but this was no compensation for the number killed and wounded on the constitutional side. On the morning of the 19th, an occurrence took place which might have led to political consequences of the most serious nature.

Previously to the blockade of the Douro, which was fully established by the opening of the Sampaio battery, the Raven cutter, tender to the AEtna, had been sent to complete a survey of soundings without the bar; but bad weather coming on, she was compelled to procure an offing, and consequently was ignorant of the existing state of things within. Not distinguishing the signal made to her to keep to sea, she attempted with the flood tide to run over the bar, and was deliberately fired at by the Miguelite batteries. Perceiving that he was the object of the fire from the fort, the lieutenant commanding the cutter hove in stays, thereby evincing the most ready disposition to put back to sea; but still the cannonade was provokingly continued until he got clear out of reach of shot. In reply to the joint remonstrance of Commander Glascock and the British Consul, the Miguelite General assumed somewhat of a lofty tone; yet, though he attempted to justify the act, it was manifest in his answer to their subsequent protest, that he did not altogether divest himself of that subtlety and subterfuge so characteristic of Portuguese diplomacy. The Visconde asserted that the continued fire of which the protest complained was not directed at the Raven, but at Don Pedro’s fort, St. John’s, on the opposite side of the entrance of the river, which fort, he said, returned a fire upon his battery with a view of protecting the British cutter. In addition to Commander Glascock’s testimony, as well as that of the officers of the Orestes, we have seen depositions on the subject from Commanders Lord George Paulet and Edward Belcher, of the Nautilus and AEtna; the former stating, that “to the best of his knowledge, the number of shot fired in the direction of the Raven must have amounted to fifteen, the greater number of which were fired after she had put about with an intention of returning over the bar;” and the latter, “firmly believing the shot were intended for the cutter, as they were not in the direct line for St. John’s, and struck the water near the cross rock between his boat and her whilst she was standing to seaward.” We should observe, that Commander Belcher, perceiving the Raven could not distinguish the signal to keep to sea, proceeded down the river in his boat, and reached alongside when the forts were still firing at the cutter, “whose blue ensign, pendant, and pilot-jack were during the whole time flying.” On the 20th Nov. the commander-in-chief of H.M. squadron in the Tagus wrote to Commander Glascock as follows:–

“Sir,– I have this morning received l»y the Leveret your several letters of the 10th, 15th, and 17th instant, the two former detailing the late important events between the contending parties on the banks of the Douro; and I have to express my entire approbation of the zeal and judgment manifested throughout by your correspondence during an anxious and delicate service. I am, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. Parker, Rear-Admiral.”

On the 23d Nov., two British brigs, having on board horses and forage for the constitutional army, forced the blockade in opposition to a heavy fire that was opened on them from a battery on the heights of the southern bank of the river. Both the brigs were struck by four or five shot – one was not in the least damaged, the other was hulled between wind and water, and had one horse killed. They attempted to take shelter under cover of his Majesty’s ships, a step which was not sanctioned by Commander Glascock, who consequently insisted upon their being warped a-head of the squadron. The Miguelites continued firing upon them, pointing their gims between the masts of the Orestes and AEtna, but without doing either ship any damage. On the 27th, the Pedroite schooner Gracioso, with colours flying, forced the blockade in excellent style, and ran up the river, returning with her pop-guns the fire of the Sampaio battery. On the following day, Don Pedro’s troops made some sixty or seventy prisoners, and massacred as many more when in the act of laying down their arms. The number of killed and wounded on the Miguelite side could not be ascertained. About seventy of the constitutionalists were seriously wounded. On the 30th, Oporto was bombarded for several hours; several hundred shells had previously been thrown into the town, but not more than five or six persons had perished. On the 1st Dec, Commander Glascock reported to the Admiralty as follows:–

“In consequence of the Visconde de Santa Martha leaving requested the removal of H.M. squadron higher up the river, for the purpose of enabling the batteries of Don Miguel to open an uninterrupted fire upon his opponents, H.M. ships were this day removed to the position proposed by me and agreed to by the Visconde; but scarcely had the Orestes taken up her anchorage^[6] before a heavy fire of musketry was not only opened upon her decks, but as well upon the boats which were employed in laying out the necessary stern-fasts to secure her. Three musket-balls were put into the bow of the barge, and several others in and about the masts and bulwarks of H.M. ship. Their Lordships will appreciate the great forbearance manifested by British seamen, when they are informed that the principal part of the fusilade proceeded from a fraternity of friars.”

This hostile proceeding called forth a strong remonstrance on the part of Commander Glascock, who, in his letter to the Miguelite General, thus expressed himself:–

“Luckily no lives have been lost; but I must now forcibly remind your Excellency, that there are limits beyond which patience and forbearance cannot be carried and I do therefore trust that prompt and decisive means will be resorted to by your Excellency to prevent even the possibility of the recurrence of such outrages, otherwise consequences may ensue for which I neither can nor will be responsible.”

To this, the Visconde de Santa Martha made an apologetic reply; and Commander Glascock, on the 2d Dec, informed Rear-Admiral Parker that his remonstrances with the contending parties appeared “for the present to have silenced the fusilade which had been so long kept up from both sides of the river.”

Dissensions had now for some time prevailed at Oporto; resignations consequently followed: the Duke of Braganza appeared to be quite at a stand still for want of money, ammunition, and a general-in-chief to whom he could intrust the execution of any important military measure. At the same time a most obstinate pertinacity prevailed amongst the owners and masters of British merchant vessels. Although the Consul, Colonel Sorrell, recommended as many as possibly could to depart the Douro, the masters appeared as it were callous to all reasonable advice, indulging in the opinion that his Majesty’s Government, to use their own vulgar expression, would “see the British flag righted.”

Between Nov. 29th and Dec. 2d, several hundred shells were thrown into the town, with a view, as the Miguelites gave out, of practising their artillery and ascertaining the range, preparatory to a regular bombardment and assault. A convent was burnt down to the ground, and some houses on the river side suffered considerably; but singular to say, there were not above three or four persons killed, and about as many wounded.

On the 3d Dec, the Visconde de Santa Martha wrote to Commander Glascock, complaining that the British flag had been worn by a large Portuguese boat in which was a Caçadore officer. In reply, his Excellency was acquainted that the boat alluded to had been retained for the use of His Britannic Majesty’s squadron, as the boats of the men-of-war were not at all times calculated to cross the dangerous bar of Oporto; and that the “Caçadore officer” was no other than the second lieutenant of the AEtna. On this occasion, the Visconde conveyed to Commander Glascock “a flattering expression of the sentiments he entertained of the British naval service, and the confidence he reposed in him with respect to the continued observance of a strict and honorable neutrality.”

On the 5th and during the night of the 7th Dec, Oporto was severely bombarded. Dissensions still continued; and the non-payment of the troops in Don Pedro’s service, particularly the British battalion, gave rise to much dissatisfaction and disorder. On the night of the 5th, two of Sartorious’s brigs left the Douro; the batteries opened upon them, but they escaped unhurt. On the latter day a most disgraceful deception was practised by a steam-vessel belonging to Mr. George Brown, of the Baltic Coffee House, London, as will be seen by the following extract of an official letter from Commander Glascock to Captain Markland, of H.M.S. Briton, the senior officer without the bar, dated Dec. 8th, 1832:–

“An occurrence happened yesterday of a very disagreeable nature – as a British officer I could not but feel highly indignant. The ‘Lord of the Isles,’ merchant steam-boat, (William Benson, master,) with three hundred troops from Brest, and several barrels of gunpowder on board, entered the Douro with a British red ensign and mast-head pendant, both flying until the latter was by my directions hauled down, with a view of prosecuting the party according to the act of 3 Geo. IV. Chap. 110, sect. 2.

“I regret that an abuse of the British flag, and such an usurpation of the pendant, should have occurred at this moment; but believing that it was one of H.M. packets, the officer commanding the fort at Sampaio permitted the ‘Lord of the Isles’ to pass perfectly unmolested. Upon investigating the circumstance, I discovered that the master of the steam-vessel was excessively drunk, and that an officer from the ‘Don Pedro,’ now cruising without the bar, had been sent on board the steamer to conduct her into the river. I shall take upon myself to protest officially against such an unjustifiable proceeding, and I hope that H.M. Government will approve of the measure. The British flag has been already so much abused, that it will be to me a matter of the greatest difficulty to remove from the mind of the Visconde de Santa Martha the impression that I, as senior officer in the Douro, have not participated in the deception practised.

“Upon the instant the deception was discovered, I sent Commander Belcher to communicate verbally with the General in command on the southern side of the Douro. He was not so fortunate as to see the Visconde de Santa Martha, but communicated with an officer of rank, who seemed to be satisfied with his statement. I trust the deception in question will not eventually affect the egress and ingress of H.M. steamer Echo. The position in which H.M. squadron are placed precluded the possibility of seeing the steam-boat usurping H.M. pendant until she had anchored.”

Commander Glascock’s prompt and unexpected disavowal of any participation in this gross deception, considerably tended to remove those suspicions and unfavorable opinions which, from the constant abuse of the British flag, the royalists had much reason to entertain; but, from that moment, he was stamped by the constitutionalists as a “rank Miguelite,” and rumours of the most malicious tendency were circulated to his prejudice throughout the city of Oporto. Previous to the arrival of the “Lord of the Isles,” for want of powder, the constitutional batteries were unable to return their opponents’ fire.

On the afternoon of the 7th Dec, a brig captured by the Pedroite cruisers, a schooner said to have had on board artillery from the Western Islands, and a French brigantine, were destroyed by the Miguelite batteries, when attempting to force the passage of the bar. On the 10th Commander Glascock wrote to the Visconde de Santa Martha as follows:

“Excellent Sir,– I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt ot your communication of the 8th inst,, and to return my acknowledgments for the prompt manner in which, through your Excellency’s medium, a contract for fresh beef has been effected for his Britannic Majesty’s squadron. I take the opportunity to inclose your Excellency a copy of a memorandum forwarded to me yesterday from an officer signing himself Ioao Pigott, Cheffe d’Estado Maior.

“To prevent any future mistake, I must take leave to apprise your Excellency that, as H.B.M. Government have decided that the British vessels of war in the Douro are to continue here for the protection of British persons and property, it becomes a matter of necessity that they be from time to time supplied with provisions from H.B.M. ships or transports without the bar; To effect this object, it may be sometimes necessary, particularly with so uncertain a bar, to use every means in my power to promote the utmost despatch in the transport of these supplies. I therefore must impress upon the mind of your Excellency, that the means afforded me to effect the above object, or any other on H.B. Majesty’s service, must be in no ways limited. Any impediment offered on your Excellency’s part, or on the part of any of your Excellency’s officers, will only tend to disturb the reciprocal relations which now exist between H.B. Majesty’s Government and the Government of Portugal; and I am sure your Excellency will agree with me in opinion, that at the present crisis, any unguarded step to affect the neutral position now existing between the two nations, would by no means tend to ameliorate the condition of the Government of Portugal. I have now to assure your Excellency, and I do so advisedly, that British forbearance has been carried to its utmost limit. I am the more induced to make this remark, from the perusal of the minutes of the court-martial which your Excellency had the goodness to transmit to me. Not one iota of truth appears in evidence relative to the statements made respecting H.B.M. ships under my command having fired artillery in the first instance, and musketry some hours subsequent. No artillery had been fired on the occasion alluded to, but a blank cartridge to enforce the signal for a pilot; and the fire of musketry was that which, at stated periods, namely, sunset, sunrise, and at eight o’clock at night, had always before been fired; a practice which will be continued, according to the custom of H.B.M. service, during the stay of the British vessels of war in the Douro. I have only to re-assure your Excellency, that I shall studiously endeavour to comply with your wishes, so long as they do not impede the promotion of those duties which H.B.M. Government have called upon me to discharge in this river; and I therefore repeat, that all means of communication with H.B.M. ships and vessels of war, without the bar, must be left open to my discretion. I may require the Echo, or one, or ten boats, to pass and re-pass the bar of the Douro on the same day.

“I have frequently assured your Excellency of my determination to preserve a strict and honorable neutrality, and from your Excellency’s courteous correspondence with me, I feel satisfied that you will still repose in me that confidence which your Excellency has more than once been pleased to express. With the highest consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. N. Glascock.”

On the 15th Dec, a shell from one of Don Pedro’s batteries burst over, and fell on board the Echo, but without doing any material damage. On the 17th, at 7 a.m., a considerable number of the constitutional troops were most unexpectedly discovered crossing the river in large boats, pulling directly for the landing place in close proximity with the neutral position taken up by the British squadron; a position purposely selected to guard against the wonted dangers of the winter “freshes.”

The assailing party were permitted to land unmolested, although thirty or forty expert marksmen, from the windows of the Quinta, situated close to the water side, and in which a strong picquet was constantly stationed, might have prevented the landing of double the number. From the many large boats, and particularly “river-men” employed on the occasion, it was obvious that the object in view was to embark a considerable quantity of wine stored in a neighbouring “Lodge” – the property of the “Portuguese General Company” – upon which it is said, together with the collateral security of the island of Madeira, Don Pedro expected to raise a loan.

Anticipating the result, a general signal was immediately made by Commander Glascock to “veer cable,” in order to afford sufficient room for the Pedroites to effect a landing clear of H.M. squadron. The half ports of the Orestes were shipped on both sides, – the hammocks stowed high, – the gratings and dead-lights placed over the hatchways and skylights, – the crew kept below, – and every precaution taken to guard against accident likely to result from both the belligerents’ musketry. As anticipated, after about forty minutes skirmishing on the southern heights, during which the convent of St. Antonio was broken open, and much sacerdotal property stolen and embarked by the boatmen of Oporto, the Pedroites had to retreat in the greatest disorder. A heavy fire of musketry was then opened on them; and the boats left the beach in the utmost confusion. Some took shelter under cover of H.M. ships, and two boatmen threw themselves on board the Orestes, affecting to be wounded. Upwards of forty soldiers, including several severely wounded, succeeded in getting on board of two English merchant brigs, lying close alongside the Orestes, and a boat full of troops attempted to take shelter on board the Echo; but being a neutralist, and in the face of one belligerent party, her commander. Lieutenant Robert Otway, felt it his duty to decline making her a place of refuge for the other party. For four hours and upwards (during which time one of the most beautiful convents on the river-side was burnt) a heavy fire of musketry was kept up from both sides of the river, as also from some of Don Pedro’s troops retreating in the boats. The damage done to the squadron by the incautious and promiscuous fire of the latter, particularly to the rigging, was very considerable. In a letter addressed to Captain Markland, dated 17th Dec. 1832, 9 p.m.. Commander Glascock says:

“In my letter of the 15th inst., I took occasion to mention the total absence of all precaution on the part of Don Pedro’s troops in throwing their ‘curved artillery;’ but the carelessness of his soldiery this day, in the direction of their general fire, great guns as well as small arms, was truly disgraceful to military men. The damage done to the rigging and bulwarks of the British squadron is sufficient to justify the assertion; nor can I refrain from remarking, that in almost every instance in which the troops of Don Pedro have become the assailing party, a neutral position has been somehow selected, as if to facilitate their purpose. Whether designedly or not, it is not for me now to decide; but I unhesitatingly assert, that H.M. ships have more or less suffered from the repulsed party availing itself of their neutral position to cover a hasty retreat.

“In consequence of fabrications of the most malicious tendency having been circulated throughout the town of Oporto, I deemed it expedient to address the British Consul upon the subject. How such falsehoods can possibly originate, I cannot conjecture. Every facility to convey the hospital stores of Don Pedro, sent from England and from Lisbon, has been afforded to the Duke of Braganza, through the medium of the British squadron; and medical aid, for the last two months, has been daily sent from the Orestes to his hospitals; – but the fact. Sir, is, any officer who observes a strict and honorable neutrality is suspected to be an enemy by the little-minded partizans of Don Pedro.

“This communication is kept open in order to ascertain, should time permit, the loss sustained by Don Pedro’s troops in the ill-conceived and badly executed attack of this morning. You will be surprised to learn that no naval officer in Don Pedro’s service was prepared to expect such an attack; nor had they the management of a single boat in conveying the troops across the river. The result was, that the boats which effected the transit of the troops, instead of being reserved for a ready retreat, were, by the drunken rivermen, filled with church property and pipes of wine. The scene of the soldiers’ retreat was of the most appalling nature, – some were seen swimming until they reached the chain cables of the two British merchant brigs already alluded to, where, ultimately, the heavy fire of their opponents caused them to sink, bleeding and lifeless, to the bottom: – several watermen were also drowned, and I apprehend it will be a matter of some difficulty to ascertain the exact loss in this unfortunate affair. I witnessed one field-officer killed, and other officers of inferior rank severely wounded. The loss sustained on Don Miguel’s side cannot be ascertained, but it is generally admitted to be comparatively trifling.”

Previous to his writing this dispatch. Commander Glascock had acquainted Captain George, the senior officer of the Pedroite vessels of war then in the Douro, of the number of the suffering troops on board the British merchant brigs, at the same time requesting their removal to the hospital on shore, several being dangerously wounded. After sending, at the suggestion of Commander Glascock, a couple of boats with silent and steady crews, to effect the removal of the sufferers – for the process became a business of stealth – Captain George called alongside the Orestes in his gig, and begged to speak to her commander. “Good heavens. Sir!” exclaimed he, on ascending the side, “how little does this act of humanity accord with the villainous reports now propagated in the town, by which you and the officers of the squadron are calumniated, and are made out to be the most diabolical monsters that ever existed in the forms of men! But when I go on shore I will give the lie to their vile inventions.” So anxious was Captain George to contradict the vile rumours then afloat, that, in his haste, he inclosed to Don Pedro’s Minister of Marine the original hurried note he had received from Commander Glascock. It ran thus:–

“Half-past 5 p.m., 17th Dec. 1832.

“My dear Sir,– Pray lose no time in sending boats for the unfortunate wounded now on board the two British brigs, Lusitania and Redport. Send silent steady hands (Englishmen), and not d___d noisy jabbering Portuguese. Yours, &c.”

In removing the wounded from these vessels, which were moored within a very short distance of the Miguelite piquet-house, silence was every thing – the least noise would have brought on a heavy fire.

On the night of the 17th Dec, Commander Glascock also wrote to the British Consul as follows:

“Sir,– I have to request you will be so good as to take the earliest opportunity to communicate with Don Pedro’s Minister for Foreign Affairs on a subject which has excited in me, as well as generally throughout the British squadron, the utmost indignation. I have no time to expatiate upon the system of invariably making all attacks under the shelter of British ships, and bringing upon them a galling cross fire. One of the seamen of H.M. sloop Orestes I fear has been mortally wounded, and the ship, in her masts, yards, rigging, and bulwarks, has suffered considerably. Most of the fire proceeded from Don Pedro’s side, bits of shell, grape, and canister-shot were picked up on the decks of the Orestes.

“But, Sir, the immediate subject of this communication is to request that the vile fabrication, now circulated so currently in the town, of the British ships of war having fired upon Don Pedro’s troops when retreating in their boats, may be distinctly and indignantly denied. This falsehood even surpasses in mischievous malignity the rumour of the Orestes having landed powder for Don Miguel’s service. I demand a public denial of both fabrications from the Government authority; and I call upon you, as his Britannic Majesty’s Consul, to assist me in obtaining this denial.

“Humanity led me even to risk my own men by sending medical aid on board the ‘Red-port’ and ‘Lusitania’ brigs, which received some of the wounded of Don Pedro’s troops. I even visited the wounded men myself, and was personally fired at, when going on board those vessels to see how far I could succour the party suffering. Time prevents my saying more upon this subject. I hope, however, you will see the propriety of immediately complying with my request. I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. N. Glascock.”

The rumour of the Orestes having landed powder for Don Miguel’s service, originated in this way. The squadron within the Douro being in want of provisions, the Echo was purposely dispatched to procure a supply from the Nimrod sloop, at anchor without the bar. So soon as the steamer had received her cargo, she re-entered the river, and, without anchoring, ran at once alongside the Orestes, to avoid the double trouble of loading and unloading boats. It was nearly dusk. The Echo’s decks were lumbered with bags of biscuit, and a considerable quantity of beef and pork in casks. These casks of salt meat were, by the people of Oporto, magnified into barrels of powder – and twelve river boatmen were ready on oath to attest before the ministerial authorities, that one hundred barrels from the Orestes had been landed on the south side, immediately abreast of the ship. On the 19th Dec, we find Commander Glascock addressing the Visconde de Santa Martha as follows:

“Excellent Sir,– As you may naturally suppose from the position in which His Britannic Majesty’s squadron had been placed on the morning of the 17th, the ships were exposed to a fire of no inconsiderable degree. From the careless manner in which the troops of your Excellency had directed their musketry, considerable damage has been done to H.B.M. ships; and I regret to state that, from the incautious fire of your Excellency’s troops, a seaman of H.M.S. Orestes has received, it is feared, a mortal wound. The damage done to the rigging and equipage throughput the squadron, will be reported to H.B.M. Government.

“I cannot pay so poor a compliment to your Excellency, as Commander-in-chief of the army of operations, as to anticipate so weak a plea in excuse as that of ‘uncontrollable troops;’ – because such a plea would at once amount to a libel upon your own authority – nor do I altogether complain of the conduct of your soldiery during the heat of action; but I must complain of that unmanly and unmilitary practice of keeping up a fire for hours after the retreating party had crossed the river. This fire of which I complain, was opened in the direction of H.B.M. ships; and your Excellency’s troops, long after any necessity existed, divided themselves, and were seen scattered behind trees and rocks, apparently taking deliberate aim at the Echo steamer. Fortunately, the commander of that vessel did not communicate to me the circumstance at the time, – a broadside from the whole British squadron would have been the result; and had but the British once commenced hostilities in the Douro, the example would have soon been followed by the line-of-battleships at Lisbon. I caution your Excellency in time, and must reiterate what I have already stated in a former communication – ‘British forbearance has been carried to its utmost limit.’ In conclusion, I have only to regret that the conduct of your Excellency’s troops, on the morning, and more particularly on the afternoon, of the 17th, should now compel me to adopt a tone so contrary to that which I have hitherto observed in all communications with your Excellency. I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. N. Glascock.”

On the same day. Commander Glascock made Captain Markland acquainted with a circumstance of which he was ignorant when writing to that officer on the 17th. He says:

“So soon as the Caçadores had ascended the decks of the Echo, they took possession of the paddle boxes and began loading their pieces, with a view to fire from that vessel on the troops of Don Miguel. Lieutenant Otway detecting that perfidy from a party affecting to seek shelter in his vessel, soon compelled them to return to their boats and depart from the Echo.”

In a letter to Rear-Admiral Parker dated Dec. 21st, Commander Glascock acquainted him that the town, as usual, daily underwent a bombardment for an hour or two; and in one dated Dec. 24th, he says:

“In my last despatch I omitted to mention my motive for addressing the Visconde de Santa Martha on the 19th instant.

“On receiving the official returns of the damage H.M. ships had respectively sustained, I immediately visited them, inspecting each minutely, making every inquiry into the cause and effect of the belligerents’ fire. Commander Belcher, and the officers of the AEtna, informed me, that for some hours after Don Pedro’s troops had retreated across the river, and were quite out of their opponents’ fire, the soldiers of Don Miguel dispersed themselves behind rocks and trees, taking deliberate aim at the AEtna. Lieutenant Thomas Mitchell, first of that ship, was slightly wounded by a musket-ball in the leg, and he avers he distinctly saw the soldier pointing at his person. The commander of the Echo, Lieutenant Robert Otway, together with those of his officers who were on deck, have also affirmed, that apparently the same premeditated aim, and a similar fire, of which Commander Belcher and the officers of the AEtna complain, had been taken and opened upon the Echo. Under these circumstances, I felt myself called upon to communicate with the Visconde upon the subject, animadverting in a tone consistent with the nature of the complaint – a tone which, I trust, will meet with the approbation of H.M. Government.

“Notwithstanding assurance had been given to the British Consul by Don Pedro’s Government, that the earliest opportunity should be taken to deny, in the official gazette, the malicious fabrications which had been circulated, and are still increasing ia mischievous tendency to the prejudice of the British squadron in the Douro, not a single syllable has yet appeared; and it is my own unbiassed opinion, that many of the partizans of Don Pedro use every endeavour to create an anti-British feeling in the town of Oporto. To expatiate upon the want of courtesy, to say nothing of the ingratitude of the Duke of Braganza and his ministers, might appear incompatible with the tone which ever should characterize an official despatch; but when it is recollected that, through the medium of H.M. ships, all the hospital stores for the party in question have been conveyed, and moreover, that the surgeons and assistant-surgeons of the British squadron in the Douro have, at considerable risk of their lives, daily visited and attended on the wounded troops of Don Pedro, in the town, for a period of nearly three months, and not even the slightest acknowledgment made, or notice taken, by his Government for such medical aid, some notion may be conceived as to the extent of amity the Duke of Braganza and his ministers entertain for all British subjects who here preserve a strict and honorable neutrality.

“The base fabrications in question not having been officially reported to you, it may be necessary, Sir, to apprise you of their mischievous and malignant extent.

“It has been insidiously and industriously circulated throughout the town of Oporto, that the British squadron not only fired upon Don Pedro’s retreating troops, when crossing the river in their boats, but that the seamen had been seen, hatchet in hand, hewing down the already wounded, helpless, and unfortunate creatures who had been clinging to the cables of one or two of H.M. ships. Never, Sir, has the sanctity of truth been more grossly and basely violated; nor should such falsehoods, purporting to calumniate the character of the British naval service, be treated otherwise than with indignant contempt, were it not that the silence observed by official authorities seem as it were to lend something more than a semblance of sanction to the propagation of slanders unparalleled in atrocity.^[7] I am happy to state, that the seaman who was wounded on board the Orestes still survives, and though the ball has not been extracted from his chest, some hopes are entertained of his recovery.”

On the same day that this report was made to Rear-Admiral Parker, the senior officer in the Douro addressed the Visconde de Santa Martha as follows:–

“Excellent Sir,– I regret that I am again compelled to complain of the misconduct of some Of your piquets in the vicinity of the convent of St. Antonio.

“Hardly had the fresh beef for the British squadron been brought down to the beach yesterday, by the contractor on the southern side, before some of your soldiers fired at the boat which had been purposely sent to bring it on board the Orestes. On some days your troops appear to conduct themselves with the greatest propriety; on others quite the reverse, taking every opportunity to fire from under cover of rocks and trees at boats passing in the direction of H.B.M. ships. On Saturday last, your Excellency’s piquets conducted themselves in a manner becoming a steady soldiery; but yesterday afternoon, and this morning, they appeared as if desirous to provoke a fire upon themselves, for the piquets at these periods were not firing at their enemies. The continuation of these provocations is not, I am persuaded, sanctioned by your Excellency; but I must again impress upon your mind, that a recurrence of such outrages will be met by measures (and I say it advisedly) little calculated to benefit your Government. In conclusion, I have only to remark, that the tone of your Excellency’s last letter has in no way influenced my determination to continue the same undeviating observance of a strict and honorable neutrality; and it shall not be my fault, should the reciprocal relations subsisting between our respective Governments be in any way disturbed. With the highest consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. N. Glascock.”

On the 30th Dec. at 8 p.m., Don Miguel’s batteries in the vicinity of Villa Nova commenced a heavy bombardment. Upwards of 130 shells were thrown into the town of Oporto by half-past ten o’clock. The custom-house was set on fire, and British property estimated at £12,000 sterling destroyed. Fortunately the conflagration was only of a partial nature: had the whole building been burnt, British property to the amount of £150,000 must have been inevitably destroyed. Several houses sustained considerable damage. A few days previous to this event, the “City of Edinburgh,” steamer, had arrived from Vigo, bringing accounts that upwards of 150 seamen had deserted from the constitutional squadron; and that the Spanish authorities had decided that Sartorious should leave the bay with his ships, and not again take shelter nearer than the anchorage under the Bayonne Islands. This decision, it was apprehended, would materially affect the Vice-Admiral’s means of procuring supplies for Oporto, as well as for the Pedroite vessels of war in the Douro. The city was then becoming seriously distressed for provisions, and it appeared to be the object of Don Miguel to adopt every means in his power to cut off his opponent’s supplies.

On the morning of January 5th, Don Miguel’s troops brought some field-pieces on the heights opposite to the Seminaria, and succeeded in sinking the Pedroite schooner Coquette, and two gun-boats. On the afternoon of the same day, the Fulminénsia, a large bark under Brazilian colours, having on board 118 soldiers discharged from the constitutional service, when going out of the river, was fired at by the Sampaio battery, and compelled to anchor immediately under that fortification. Five of these men were killed and three dangerously wounded.

On the 7th, Commander Glascock made the following report to Rear-Admiral Parker:–

“Captain George, of Don Pedro’s service, having communicated to me, that it was apprehended many were wounded on board the vessel in question, and that he had no medical aid to send to her assistance, I immediately sent Commander Belcher with an official intimation to the officer commanding the fort at Sampaio, acquainting him that, in the cause of humanity, I requested, when sending on board surgical assistance, no molestation might be offered to the boats of H.M. squadron. Though Commander Belcher communicated with the fort at 5 p.m., I did not receive a written reply till half-past two on the following morning. The surgeons of H.M. ships had, however, in the first instance, accompanied Commander Belcher, who had obtained verbal permission for them to proceed on board the Brazilian bark. On returning to the squadron, notwithstanding intimation had been given, our boats were fired at by the piquets of Don Miguel; and on the following afternoon, when medical aid was again sent to the same vessel, a battery on Don Pedro’s side of the river threw shells at the moment the boats of the British squadron were accompanying their own wounded on shore, Don Miguel’s General having insisted that they should be landed on the southern side, and conveyed up to his military hospital.^[8]

“Last night, I received a letter from the master of the Brazilian bark, appealing to my humanity as a British officer to send him on board provisions; stating that he had 92 Englishmen and 26 French on board, and that he had nothing to give them to eat. This application I immediately sent to Captain George, not believing it possible that a vessel having on board upwards of 130 persons, including her crew, could be sent to sea by Don Pedro’s Government without a necessary supply of provisions. The whole of the discharged troops have since been made prisoners by Don Miguel’s General.”

These men were sent over land to Lisbon, and eventually conveyed to their respective countries. They drew up a statement, which appeared in some of the English papers, expressive of the kind treatment they received at the hands of the Miguelites. In the same letter. Commander Glascock says:–

“The difficulty of communicating by boats in the Douro is almost inconceivable. Be the service of a nature consistent with that line of conduct which a strict and honorable neutrality would prescribe, or be it even in the cause of humanity, both belligerents appear to vie with each other in offering impediments to the prosecution of every measure which may not accord with their respective notions of neutrality. I, however, hope, since the command of the liberating army has now devolved upon a General of great experience, that the troops of Don Pedro will become better disciplined; for it will hardly be credited that this last week the volunteers of Oporto have stationed themselves at the Tour de Marco, amusing themselves in firing rifle balls at solitary individuals on the other side, and at the party bringing down fresh beef for the British squadron. On one of these occasions (Jan. 2d), three balls were lodged in the quarter-deck bulwarks of the Nautilus, and Lord George Paulet had a very narrow escape in coming on board to acquaint me of the circumstance. Finding that all the remonstrances hitherto made upon this unmilitary practice had no effect upon the authorities on Don Pedro’s side, I took the earliest opportunity to communicate with Marshal Solignac upon the subject, who immediately gave orders, and had them executed, that the practice should no longer continue.”

On the morning of the 10th Jan. Commander Belcher was sent to St. Ovidio, with a communication to the Miguelite General in command of the Villa Nova division, of which the following is a copy:

“Excellent Sir,– A most wanton outrage has just been committed by some of your troops in the vicinity of the St. Antonio convent. A boat of H.B.M.S. Orestes, with her ensign flying, has been fired into, and another man shot^[9]. I demand that you will take instant steps to give up the offender to me, or that you will satisfy me, and that immediately, that the party offending will be instantly punished. I wait your reply until two o’clock this afternoon. If not then received, I shall despatch a vessel direct to Admiral Parker, in the Tagus, acquainting him of this gross violation of neutrality. I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. N. Glascock.”

Long before Commander Belcher had reached St. Ovidio, the offender had been apprehended, lodged a prisoner in the guard-house, and the General’s aide-de-camp sent on board to learn the particulars of the case. On the night of the 11th, Commander Glascock received a letter from the Miguelite chief, Jose Antonio d’A Lemos, acquainting him that it was his intention to inflict corporal punishment upon the culprit, and intimating a desire that an officer of the British squadron should be present. Commander Glascock availed himself of this opportunity to visit the besiegers’ head quarters, accompanied by Commander Belcher.

“On my arrival at the camp,” says Commander Glascock, “General Lemos drew out his troops under arms, according to the customary mode when military punishment is about to be inflicted. Thinking it more becoming in a British officer to recommend an act of clemency (particularly at the present crisis, and having previously succeeded in obtaining the satisfaction demanded), than to exhibit any feeling manifesting a spirit of revenge, so soon as the prisoner was brought forward, I solicited the General to pardon him, which request, after making an impressive speech to the troops, was complied with, not more to my satisfaction than to that of General Lemos, who appears to be a truly humane and well-disposed man.”

Immediately after despatching Commander Belcher to General Lemos, on the 10th Jan., Commander Glascock had occasion to complain to Marshal Solignac of one of the Pedroite volunteers having drawn his bayonet upon a midshipman whom he sent on shore to ascertain the name of a person who had fired two musket-balls into the bow of the Orestes. He subsequently wrote to the Marshal as follows:

“I must do the Miguelite piquets the justice to say, that they have for some time past shewn great forbearance; and their return of fire has been invariably provoked by the volunteers of Don Pedro and crew of the vessel of war designated the “Twenty-third of July.” I have to return your Excellency my best thanks for the prompt manner in which you caused an investigation to be made into the complaint I had occasion to make to you yesterday.”

The poor of Oporto were at this period suffering considerably, and a subscription was set on foot by the English, in order, if possible, to administer to their wants. The weather was unfavorable for military operations, and both belligerents appeared to be at a stand still. Nothing of importance occurred previous to the 24th Jan., with the exception of Vice-Admiral Sartorious having appeared off the bar, and exchanged a few shots with the batteries.

On the afternoon of the 24th, Marshal Solignac marched out of the town of Oporto, with a large body of troops, towards the vicinity of Foz. His object was to take possession of the hill of Castro, to destroy a neighbouring battery, and ultimately to cut off the right wing of Don Miguel’s line from the main body of his force to the northward. The squadron under Sartorious had instructions to co-operate with Solignac, and it was said that the Marshal lost much time in waiting for the vessels of war, at anchor off the bar, to weigh. One frigate got under sail, but the crew of the “Reinha,” flag-ship, mutinied at a most unseasonable moment, and refused to lift the anchor. By this untimely revolt, the Vice-Admiral was prevented from co-operating effectually with the army. After a severe resistance, the hill of Castro was taken by the second British battalion, under Major Brownston. The French, at one time, were completely repulsed; but they again rallied, and came in time to the succour of the British. The Castello do Quejo battery on the beach in the neighbourhood of the hill of Castro, was not taken; and the captured eminence was abandoned before 9 p.m. The movements of Santa Martha are said to have been highly judicious, and his enemies gave his troops every credit for the brave and steady soldier-like manner in which they met the assault. As usual, the British and French were the principal sufferers. Two English officers were mortally wounded, and four or five severely. Many of Don Pedro’s tenth regiment went over to the Miguelites on the night of the 24th.

On the 1st Feb. 1833, the surgeons of the British squadron pronounced the appearance of the cholera in the city of Oporto, where three or four cases had already proved fatal. On the 2d, about 4-30 p.m., three shot were fired, in quick succession, from the Sampaio battery, at a boat belonging to the iEtna, returning from an ineffectual attempt to communicate with H.M. steam-ship, Rhadamanthus, then outside the bar. On the 6th, the crew of the bar-boat returned to their ship after an absence of twenty-four days. They had been caught outside m a heavy gale of wind, and compelled to bear up for Matozinhoz, a small Miguelite town northward of Oporto. Lieutenant Legard, of the AEtna, who had charge of the boat, nearly lost his life in beaching her; and was laid up on board his ship for several weeks afterwards. In making various attempts to return to the Douro, they were fired at by the piquets of both belligerents. The lieutenant, however, reported that his party had been well treated whilst at Matozinhoz. On the 15th Feb., an English merchant, named Wright, lost his arm by a cannon shot, when sitting at dinner in his house. The position of Don Pedro had now become extremely critical – his opponents were erecting batteries in all directions, with a view of completely cutting off his supplies – report said there was scarcely ten days’ provision in the town of Oporto. On the 18th, Commander Glascock reported that some large pieces of shell had lately fallen on board the Orestes and AEtna, but without doing any injury to their crews.

On the morning of Mar. 4th, at day-light, after bombarding the town during the night, the troops of Don Miguel made a grand attack in the direction of Lordello and St. John De Foz. A diversion had been made in the vicinity of Aguadante, but it soon became perceptible that the main object of attack was towards the Lordello line. The Miguelites Mere completely repulsed, and sustained considerable loss. On the constitutional side, the Scottish corps suffered most – one officer was killed, and almost every other, with the exception of its commander. Major Shaw, wounded. On the same day, the Migiielite piquets fired several shot across the water at the place where the British boats generally landed, and Commander Glascock nearly received a musket-ball in the arm.

On the 6th March, the Pedroite brig of war “Twenty-third of July,” secured to the quay on the northern side of the river, in a line with two British merchant brigs – one close ahead of her, and the bowsprit of the other over her taffrail – was sunk by a solitary gun on the heights over head. She attempted to return the fire, but not one of her guns (18-pounder carronades) could be elevated half the height required. Three of her crew were killed, and fourteen wounded. Her commander was a fine gallant fellow, and had lost an arm in the service of Donna Maria. On the 8th, Commander Glascock complained to General Lemos that a system of fusilade had again commenced on the banks of the Douro. On the night of the 10th, seventy-two boats, laden with cattle and other supplies for Don Pedro, landed their cargoes, without molestation, in the vicinity of the light-house. On the night of the 12th, a transport succeeded in disembarking 240 Irish troops: a considerable quantity of provisions was also brought safe on shore. On the 17th, at 11 a.m., the British merchant brig Avon, which had been for some days at anchor off the bar, watching an opportunity to land a cargo of flour, oil, and other supplies for the town of Oporto, slipped her cable, and, taking advantage of a squall, bore up for the river, carrying at her mast-head a British red ensign reversed, the usual signal of distress; “but,” says Commander Glascock, “I cannot persuade myself, notwithstanding the assurance of the master of that vessel, that in breaking the blockade distress was his only motive. The master complained that he was riding heavily at his anchor, pitching bows under, and the brig making water, but when he did slip he made no effort to stand to sea on the starboard tack, the wind being about N.W.b.N., to gain that offing which two other vessels at the same time had obtained. So soon as the British flag became within shot, the batteries opened upon the Avon, and hulled her several times. She had the wind right aft, and had her crew conducted themselves with any degree of coolness the vessel might have escaped comparatively unhurt: but, so soon as she arrived in the vicinity of the Foz, the master and crew abandoned her. She soon drifted over to the south side, and grounded immediately abreast of the Sampaio battery, on the top of high water. The Miguelito troops took possession of her before sunset, and burned her about 9 p.m. A small Portuguese vessel was also destroyed the same day in attempting to run over the bar.”

On the. 24th March, the Miguelites made an attack upon three of the Pedroite posts, and were repulsed with considerable loss. Two hundred and forty-seven constitutionalists were killed and wounded, including among the latter Major Sadler and Captain Wright, mortally, and several other British officers, severely. On the 25th, H.M. steamer Confiance had two men killed by accident, whilst weighing her anchor outside the bar. On the 26th, about 260 French troops, and supplies for the army at Oporto, were disembarked in the vicinity of the Foz. On the 27th, the boats of the Nautilus, returning from the Druid frigate, then outside of the bar, were fired upon from the Carsto and other batteries.

On the 4th April, the British Consul received a communication from General Lemos, requesting no time might be lost in separating the British merchantmen from the shipping of Donna Maria, only one of which then remained afloat, four vessels having been scuttled and sunk alongside the jetty, to save them from the fate of the “Twenty-third of July.” At this time there was a “fresh” in the river; and if the squadron had not assisted in weighing their anchors, warping them across the river, and securing them on the southern side, they must have remained exposed to the Miguelite fire. Their removal, however, gave great offence to Don Pedro’s Ministry; – an official correspondence took place upon the subject between them and Colonel Sorrell, part of which was transmitted to Commander Glascock, and forwarded by him for Rear-Admiral Parker’s perusal. The same Ministers afterwards addressed a letter to the Consul, declaratory of their determination to fire upon the vessels which had been removed, should they attempt to take in a cargo, though that cargo must have come from the town of Oporto. Whilst thus attempting to bully the British, they were permitting their opponents to build with impunity, on the Gaia hill, a formidable and commanding battery, which did more mischief to Oporto than all the others the Miguelites had before brought to bear upon the city.

On the evening of the 9th April, the Pedroites made an attack upon Monte Cabello, a hill about three hundred yards in advance of Aguardente. Their object was to secure that position, and to take from their opponents an unfinished redoubt which had been commenced a night or two previous, in which they succeeded. On the following morning, at 5 o’clock, the Miguelites attempted to regain their lost position, but were repulsed after several hours fighting, and a general skirmish along the lines. The number killed and wounded on the side of the constitutionalists was between 80 and 100 men, including two captains and two subaltern officers. About forty Miguelites were taken prisoners by the British brigade, but the amount of their loss could not be ascertained.

About this period, the Pedroite schooner Liberal, having been raised and re-equipped without molestation, effected her escape from the Douro. Whilst dropping down the river, with the first of the night ebb, she had one volunteer killed, and two seamen wounded, by the fire from theMiguelite batteries. On the 18th April, 316 French troops arrived off Oporto, 200 of whom were landed, with a considerable quantity of supplies, in the vicinity of the Foz. On the 21st, Commander Glascock waited upon Marshal Solignac, to complain of misconduct on the part of the officer commanding the battery of Torre do Marco. After his return to the Orestes, a shot was fired between the masts of that ship, and a most provoking fire brought on, to no possible purpose. Towards the end of April, the AEtna was ordered to Lisbon, for the purpose of subsequently undertaking a survey in the Mediterranean. On the 2d May, a shot from a carronade under the Torre do Marco, which was kept constantly firing at solitary soldiers, passed so close to the Orestes, that it was a matter of surprise her bowsprit had not been struck, or some of the men on the forecastle killed.

On the 3d June, 1833, the First Lord of the Admiralty wrote to Commander Glascock as follows:–

“Sir,– It has afforded me sincere pleasure to mark my high sense of your meritorious conduct and claims, by this day promoting you to the rank of captain in the royal navy. You will not, however, at present be relieved in the command of the Orestes, as we are desirous of the benefit of your services, in your present important station, a little longer. I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“J. R. G. Graham.”

On the 11th June, Vice-Admiral Sartorious was superseded in the command of Donna Maria’s fleet, by Captain Charles Napier, alias Carlos de Ponza. On the 5th July, the latter officer obtained a decisive victory over the naval forces of Don Miguel, in the neighbourhood of Cape St. Vincent.

On the 8th July, an officer of the Miguelite piquet at the Cavaço, perceiving a shore boat with an English gentleman going alongside the Orestes, snatched a musket out of the hand of one of the sentinels at the gate, walked deliberately to the beach, fired, and dangerously wounded the waterman in the side. This cowardly act was immediately represented by Captain Glascock to General Lemos, who took prompt steps to inquire into the misconduct of the lending party. On the 22d of the same month, about 3 p.m., a few of the piquets belonging to the Cavaço were bathing close to the Orestes, when a fire of musketry was opened from the carronade battery underneath the Torre do Marco, by some of the Pedroite troops. The officer commanding the battery was immediately made acquainted with this disgraceful conduct, but made no other reply, than that the fire was commenced by the troops on the southern side. On the following day, the piquet at the St. Antonio convent wantonly fired across the river at two little boys who were rowing in a canoe near the Orestes. In both instances. Captain Glascock made formal complaints to the belligerent Generals.

On the 24th July, Captain Glascock received a letter from the British Consul, inclosing a communication from the Marquis de Loulé, stating that a flotilla of boats was collecting on the south side, for the purpose of conveying the Miguelites, under General Lemos, across the river; and requiring H.M. squadron to change its position, and to take up an appointed anchorage, more exposed to a cross-fire than perhaps any other that could have been selected. Satisfied of the impossibility of any boats being launched in the vicinity the Marquis apprehended, and reflecting upon the very opposite conduct pursued by the Pedroite Government on the 17th Dec. 1832, when, without any intimation being given, or any anxiety manifested for the safety of H.M. vessels, the troops of the Duke of Braganza effected a landing under their immediate shelter, and thereby brought upon the Orestes and her consorts a most galling fire; Captain Glascock replied that it was not his intention to risk the lives of his officers and men by taking up any other anchorage. On the following morning, an attack was made upon the lines of Oporto; but, as the captain justly anticipated, no troops had been transported across the river. Fortunate it was that the squadron did not move. Had the anchorage under the Arabade hill, pointed out by the Marquis de Loulé, been taken up, the ships would have been directly in the face of two of the heaviest batteries the Miguelites brought to bear upon their principal points of attack, and much damage and loss of life must have been the consequent result. As it was, a considerable number of shells burst over the squadron, and one fell into the water and exploded between the Orestes and Echo, then only a few fathoms apart.

On this occasion, the Miguelites, under Marshal Bourmont, made four successive assaults in the vicinity of Lordello. In the last attempt, that position would have been forced, but for the indomitable courage of the British and Scotch brigades, who charged their opponents with the bayonet, and routed them in every direction. The loss sustained by the assailants was supposed to exceed 1000 men; the constitutionalists had about 200 killed and wounded, including Colonel Cotter, of the Irish brigade, and Captain Almaida, one of the aides-de-camp to General Saldanha.

On the night of July 26th, 1833, the Duke of Braganza and his Ministers embarked for Lisbon in the Britannia steam-vessel, leaving General Saldanha in command of the garrison of Oporto. Between this period and the middle of iugust, both belligerents, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of Captain Glascock, persevered in the reprehensible practice of firing across the river at unarmed individuals, thereby endangering the lives of the officers and men of the British squadron.

The last service performed by Captain Glascock during the civil war in Portugal, was the saving from conflagration upwards of 150,000 pounds worth of wine and brandy, the property of British merchants at Oporto. The following account of his proceedings on this occasion was officially addressed to Captain Lord John Hay, of H.M.S. Castor, senior officer without the bar, Aug. 17th, 1833:

“My Lord,– From the previous information I had given your Lordship, relative to the destruction of the Portuguese Company’s wine in the vicinity of Villa Nova, you will not be now surprised to learn that the threat of Don Miguel’s General has at length been put into execution. Several thousand pipes of wine were yesterday destroyed; the houses containing the wines were undermined, and the property in question blown up at one o’clock.

“When it is recollected that the ‘lodges’ belonging to the Portuguese Company were intermingled with those of the British merchants, it becomes a matter of astonishment how the property of the latter has escaped; but it seeing every precaution had been taken on the part of Don Miguel’s General, to prevent the possibility of doing injury to British property. The most expert engineer had been selected to undertake the destruction of the wines in question. The flames, however, extended beyond the calculation of the engineer, and two or three British lodges Mere in imminent danger; one store, the property of Mr. Ormerod, containing upwards of two thousand pipes of wine, was actually on fire.

“Upon being made acquainted with this circumstance, I considered it my duty to act with promptitude, satisfied that the protest officially forwarded from the British Consul to the General commanding on the southern side, would be of little avail in rescuing from destruction the property of Mr. Omerod, I therefore, without receiving the authority of the British Consul, took upon myself the entire responsibility of landing the crews of H.M. squadron in the Douro, for the purpose of extinguishing the fire, which had already reached one of the British lodges.

“I must acquaint your Lordship, that I took the precaution to send Lord George Paulet expressly up to the commanding officer at Caudal, for the purpose of acquainting him that it was my intention immediately to land the crews of the British squadron – that my only object was to save British property, then in imminent danger – and that there was nothing which might be even mistaken for an act of hostility contemplated on my part. I also took the precaution to request the officer commanding the piquet abreast of the British squadron would accompany the seamen and marines of H.M. ships, in order that he might explain our intentions to the officers commanding the inner piquets; but so much time had elapsed before Lord George Paulet could have an interview with Marshal Count d’Almar, that I was compelled to land, with a force of 130 men, and proceed direct to Villa Nova, before the sanction of the Marshal could be obtained. Fortunately I did not await the return of Lord George, or hesitate to put into immediate execution the project I had planned. Half an hour’s delay, and Mr. Omerod’s property must have been inevitably destroyed.

“Your Lordship may imagine that the easiest mode to have preserved from destruction the wines of the British subjects would have been to disembark the seamen of the squadron on the beach at Villa Nova; but this mode, for many reasons, was found to be impracticable. In the first place, the flames were so extensive that it would have been impossible to approach the lower lodges: in the next, the pathways leading to the British stores became impassable from the torrents of boiling wine that were then running into the river: and lastly (I am sorry I am compelled to record such an act of perfidy), the officer commanding at the Serra convent was directing a heavy fire of artillery at the vicinity of Villa Nova, even long after he must have perceived the people employed in extinguishing the flames were composed of the crews of H.M. squadron – nor could there be any excuse for this treachery, for the British blue ensign was displayed on the summit of Mr. Ormerod’s ‘lodge,’ and an officer had been previously despatched to General Saldanha, requesting his Excellency would give immediate directions to cause the fire at the Serra battery to cease.

“It may be necessary to apprise your Lordship that the delay on the part of Lord George Paulet entirely originated in a mere matter of etiquette. Count D’Almar protested against the British force being armed, and insinuated that he had several thousand men ready to repel what he was pleased to term an act of violation. Your Lordship, who is well acquainted with the locality of this country, and the intrigues and treachery on the part of its people, will, I am sure, accord with me in opinion, that I should have been highly culpable had I disembarked any body of men totally unarmed; and the result bears me out: for two Portuguese piquets, in the immediate vicinity of Villa Nova, attempted to arrest the progress of the party under my immediate command.

“To prevent any future caviling upon this point, I must acquaint your Lordship that the seamen of the squadron carried with them only a cutlass and a bucket each; the carpenters acting as pioneers, with crowbars and hatchets; and that the marines, twenty in number, were armed with their muskets, solely for the purpose of planting them as sentinels, should occasion require. I must also inform your Lordship, that a parley, commencing rather warmly, took place between Marshal Count D’Almar and myself, when in the very act of extinguishing the fire of Mr. Omerod’s store, upon what the Marshal termed the impropriety of landing with an armed force. I, however, soon succeeded in convincing him that my object was solely and undisguisedly the rescue of British property, then in such imminent danger. At length satisfied, the Count witnessed the departure of the seamen and marines, and I am happy to acquaint your Lordship that not a single accident occurred, nor was a single complaint alleged against any individual of H.M. ships; and this your Lordship will readily appreciate when I apprise you that the seamen and marines had to march to Villa Nova through villages crowded with an excited population, when wines were attainable in every direction.

“In conclusion, I feel it my duty to represent to your Lordship the ready assistance afforded to me by Lord George Paulet, whose activity upon this occasion, together with the arrangements made by his Lordship for disembarking the seamen of H.M. sloop Nautilus, are deserving of the highest encomiums. Nor should I be doing justice to Lieutenant Otway, of H.M. steam-vessel Echo, did I omit to mention the personal services of that officer, in assisting to extinguish the fire at Mr. Omerod’s ‘lodge.’ To Lieutenants Corbet and Montgomery, of the Orestes, and Lieutenant Dickson, of the Nautilus, every credit is due. These officers, in arresting the progress of the fire at Villa Nova, personally exposed themselves to imminent danger; and the orderly manner in which they conductcd the landing and re-embarkation of the seamen, was the general admiration of the population on both sides of the Douro The conduct of Mr. Jonas Coaker, acting master, who was left in charge of the Orestes, merits my approbation. This officer, in my absence, procured fire-engines from the town of Oporto, but failed in his efforts to transport them to the vicinity of Villa Nova. I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)⁠“W. N. Glascock.”

This disinterested and hazardous service, in the responsibility of which the British Consul refused to share, was not even acknowledged with one solitary expression of thanks on the part of the British merchants; Captain Glascock’s conduct, however, obtained him the official approbation of the commander-in-chief in the Tagus.

On the day after the destruction of the wines at Villa Nova, the constitutional General, Saldanha, resolved upon making a sortie. He accordingly left the town of Oporto at midnight, broke through his opponent’s line, destroyed part of his camp, pursued him as far as Valonga, took about 200 prisoners, and captured 600 barrels of gunpowder. On the night of the 19th August, the Miguelites on the southern bank of the Douro withdrew their piquets, and the entire force at St. Ovidio marched about nine leagues to the rear of that town. On the 20th, Villa Nova was in possession of the constitutionalists, the Douro was again accessible to vessels of all nations, and people were passing to and fro perfectly unmolested. Don Miguel was then, with the Spanish Infanta Don Carlos, at Coimbra, to which place a field officer was posting with accounts of the demise of the King of Spain. On the 18th of the following month, Captain Glascock departed from the Douro, after a truly arduous and most unenviable service, in that river, of nearly twelve months.

This officer is the author of the “Naval Sketch Book,” “Tales of a Tar,” and other professional publications. The following are the names of the officers who served under his orders during the siege of Oporto:

Commanders Lord George Paulet and Edward Belcher, of the Nautilus and AEtna. Lieutenants William Dickey, Kynaston Corbet, and

Alexander Leslie Montgomery^[10]; John Gibson Dickson and Langton Browell^[11]; Thomas Mitchell (b), James Anlaby Legard, and Henry Kellett^[12]; Robert Otway^[13]; William Frederick Lapidge^[14]; and William Arlett^[15]. Masters Jonas Coaker, acting^[10]; Andrew William Quinlan^[11]; and John Sheppard^[12]. Surgeons John Monteith^[10], Robert Wylie^[11], and John Kidd^[12]. Pursers Thomas Giles^[10], John Dennis^[11], and Henry Price^[12]. Assistant-Surgeons John Rees^[10], Henry Walsh Mahon^[11], David G. Miller^[12], Thomas Kidd (b)^[13], David Deas^[14], and William Graham^[15].

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1. See Vol. I. part I. p. 405.
2. See id. p. 290.
3. See Vol. II. Part II. p. 946.
4. Two Barmouth brigs and a Grangemouth schooner.
5. Naval Sketch Book, 2d series. Vol. II., pp. 159 and 165.
6. Under the walls of the convent of St. Antonio.
7. Don Pedro had the good taste, in reply to a spirited appeal from Lieutenant-Colonel H____, to remark, that “he was compelled to give credence to the statement of his own officers,” one of whom, a certain colonel, who had been the last to land and first to fly, was the inventor and chief propagator of the calumnies.
8. The surgeon of the Orestes had a narrow escape – a piece of shell fell at his feet.
9. John Connor – his wound was of a very slight nature, and he soon returned to his duty. It is a singular fact, that out of five men wounded in the British squadron, three were named Connor.
10. Orestes
11. Nautilus
12. AEtna
13. Echo
14. Leveret
15. Raven