The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades/Prelude To Combat
- “Military operations abroad constitute a great laboratory and proving ground for the development and testing of organization and materiel. These operations have been characterized by increasing use and importance of armored, motorized, and other specialized divisions and by concurrent effort for the development of means to counter armored (tank) divisions operating in close coordination with air and motorized units.”
- General George C. Marshall 1
The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 marked the beginning of World War II in Europe and the beginning of the gradual end of American isolationism. As the Axis threat grew ever larger, it soon became evident that paper units would no longer suffice for the nation's defense. In this new international environment, the Army began its rebuilding program. Initially an emphasis on protection of the Western Hemisphere drove mobilization, and the victories of the German Army and Navy and their possible threat to the Americas accelerated the expansion. As events in Europe unfolded, relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated, eventually culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Meanwhile, the Army steadily mustered forces, gaining fresh manpower from the first peacetime draft. Army leaders and their staffs worked overtime attempting to create an effective military force from the hollowed-out interwar Army. Along with new weapons and new concepts of warfare, new divisional tactical organizations appeared, most of which underwent several transformations before seeing combat.
Infantry and Cavalry Divisions Revisited
In 1939 the Army created a protective mobilization force for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The force included the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 6th Divisions, which were organized under the new triangular configuration. These forces, however, still needed to be manned and trained for war. Congressional increases in the size of the Regular Army, which began that year, provided much of the needed manpower, while the largest peacetime maneuvers ever undertaken by the Army to date provided a taste of war in 1940.2 Between 5 and 25 May 1940 the 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th Infantry Divisions joined the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, a provisional brigade of light and medium tanks, and other units for maneuvers near the Louisiana and Texas border, a step envisaged at the turn of the century to train an army corps. Not surprisingly, the exercises highlighted weaknesses in most units in almost every area of concern, including organization.3
To improve the infantry division, it was again reorganized, making it more powerful and easier to command and control. A headquarters and headquarters battery, which provided a fire direction control center and a brigadier general as commander of the division artillery, replaced the field artillery section in the division headquarters. Four field artillery battalions, three direct support and one general support, replaced the two regiments. The direct support battalions were to be armed with newly approved 105-mm. howitzers, while the general support battalion fielded 155-mm. howitzers and 75-mm. guns, the latter retained primarily as antitank weapons. Each field artillery battalion also was outfitted with six 37-mm. antitank guns. To counter operations such as the German blitzkrieg, which had proven so successful in Poland, antitank resources were centralized in the infantry regiments to form regimental antitank companies outfitted with 37-mm. antitank guns. In infantry battalions the number of antitank "guns"-the .50-caliber machine guns-was doubled. For targets of opportunity, more 81-mm. mortars were added to the heavy weapons company and three 60-mm. mortars were authorized for each rifle company. A reconnaissance troop appeared in the division, reflecting the growth in its operational area on the battlefield, and the number of collecting companies in the medical battalion was increased from one to three. Finally, new tables of organization eliminated the infantry section with its general officer in the division headquarters but provided an assistant division commander with the rank of brigadier general. These changes brought the strength of the division to 15,245 officers and enlisted men, with its combat power still focused in the three regimental combat teams (Chart 12).4
Despite the trend in foreign armies to replace horse cavalry with mechanized units, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, decided to table any organizational decisions affecting the cavalry. Until a definite theater of operations could be ascertained, the Army needed to prepare general purpose forces. The horse was capable of going where a machine could not, and the cavalry division appeared to have a place in the force. Among the questions Andrews wanted answered was, again, whether the division should be built on a triangular or square configuration. He also wanted to explore if and how horse and mechanized units could operate together within a cavalry corps.5
After the 1940 maneuvers Maj. Gen. Kenyon A. Joyce, commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, recommended retention of the square cavalry division. A division with two brigades, each with two cavalry regiments, was easily split into strike and reserve forces. If the division were organized along triangular lines, the regiments would have to be enlarged to maintain their firepower, but it would make them too large for effective command and control. Joyce suggested that the cavalry regiment comprise a headquarters; headquarters and service, machine gun, and special weapons troops; and two rifle squadrons of three troops each. He wanted to strengthen the two-battalion field artillery regiment by creating batteries of six rather than four 75-mm. howitzers and adding a truck-drawn 105-mm. howitzer battalion. To improve mobility, the division needed enough trucks to move horses and equipment to the battlefield. He suggested the elimination of only one organization-headquarters, special troops-which facilitated administration in garrison, but not in the field.6
Joyce decided that horse and mechanized units were compatible within a cavalry corps since the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) had successfully conducted joint operations during the maneuvers. He urged the Army to maintain a corps that included both types of units. The proportion of horse and mechanized units could vary to meet various tactical situations, but he thought the corps should be strong in artillery and engineers and contain sufficient support troops to enable it to operate with maximum speed, flexibility, and striking power.7
The revised cavalry division remained square and was to have 11,676 officers and enlisted men (Chart 13). Divisional cavalry regiments conformed to Joyce's recommendations, but instead of increasing the size of the field artillery regiment, one truck-drawn 105-mm. howitzer battalion and two 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions replaced it. As in the infantry division, the cavalry division received antitank weapons. The new wartime division tables authorized a divisional antitank troop fielding twelve 37-mm. antitank guns and a weapons troop having antitank guns and 81-mm. mortars within each brigade. The engineer, quartermaster (formerly the division train), and medical squadrons were enlarged to meet the needs of the bigger division. Draft, pack, and riding horses were limited to the cavalry brigades and the division artillery, while other elements of the division were motorized. Headquarters, special troops, was eliminated.8
As the 1940 Louisiana maneuvers drew to a close and the fall of France appeared imminent, the War Department authorized an increase in the number of active Regular Army infantry divisions and the adoption of the new tables. Between June and August 1940 the Army activated the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions.
Neither those divisions nor the other active divisions had sufficient personnel to meet the new manning levels. The 1st Cavalry Division did not adopt the revised configuration until early in 1941 when it concentrated at Fort Bliss for training.9
Organizing Armored Divisions
During the 1940 maneuvers the Army also had tested a provisional mechanized division. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee had called for "armored" divisions separate from both infantry and cavalry. Chaffee's 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), Brig. Gen. Bruce Magruder's Provisional Tank Brigade (organized in 1940 with infantry tank units), and the 6th Infantry made up the new unit. At the conclusion of the exercises, Chaffee; Magruder; Col. Alvan C. Gillem, Magruder's executive officer; Col. George S. Patton, commander of the 3d Cavalry at Fort Myer, Virginia; and other advocates of tank warfare met with the G-3, General Andrews, in a schoolhouse at Alexandria, Louisiana, to discuss the future of mechanization. All agreed that the Army needed to unify its efforts. The question was how. Both the chief of cavalry and the chief of infantry had attended the maneuvers, but they were excluded from the meeting because of their expected opposition to any change that might deprive their arms of personnel, equipment, or missions.10
Returning to Washington, Andrews proposed that Marshall call a conference on mechanization. The crisis in Europe had by then increased congressional willingness to support a major rearmament effort, and at the same time the success of the German panzers highlighted the need for mechanization, however costly. Andrews' initiative, made three days after the British evacuated Dunkirk, noted that the American Army had inadequate mechanized forces and that it needed to revise its policy of allowing both infantry and cavalry to develop such units separately. He suggested that the basic mechanized combined arms unit be a division of between 8,000 and 11,000 men. With the chief of cavalry planning to organize mechanized cavalry divisions, which mixed horse and tank units, such a conference seemed imperative. Marshall approved Andrews' proposal.11
From 10 to 12 June 1940 Andrews hosted a meeting in Washington centering on the organization of mechanized divisions. Along with the General Staff and the chiefs of the arms and services, Chaffee, Magruder, and other tank enthusiasts attended. Andrews disclosed that the War Department would organize an independent armored force, belonging to neither the Infantry nor Cavalry branches, in the form of "mechanized divisions." In such divisions the command and control echelon would consist of a headquarters and headquarters company and a signal company. A reconnaissance battalion with an attached aviation observation squadron would constitute the commander's "eyes," which would operate from 100 to 150 miles in advance and reconnoiter a front from 30 to 50 miles. At the heart of the division was an armored brigade made up of a headquarters and headquarters company, one medium and two light armored regiments, a field artillery regiment, and an engineer battalion. Using the two light armored regiment as the basis for two combat teams, the division was to conduct reconnaissance, screening, and pursuit missions and exploit tactical situations. An armored infantry regiment, along with armored field artillery, quartermaster, and medical battalions and an ordnance company, supported the armored brigade. Similar to the German panzer division, it was to number 9,859 officers and enlisted men.12
When approving the establishment of the Armored Force to oversee the organization and training of two mechanized divisions on 10 July 1940, Marshall also approved designating these units as "armored" divisions. Furthermore, he directed the chief of cavalry and the chief of infantry to make personnel who were experienced with tank and mechanized units available for assignment to the divisions. On 15 July, without approved tables of organization, Magruder organized the 1st Armored Division at Fort Knox from personnel and equipment of the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the 6th Infantry. Concurrently, Brig. Gen. Charles L. Scott, a former regimental commander in the 7th Cavalry Brigade, activated the 2d Armored Division at Fort Benning using men and materiel from the Provisional Tank Brigade. Marshall selected Chaffee to command the new Armored Force.13
Four months later the War Department published tables of organization for the armored division (Chart 14). It resembled the unit developed during the summer, except that the engineer battalion was removed from the armored brigade and assigned to the division headquarters, and the ordnance company was expanded to a battalion. To the surprise of Chaffee, who had supervised the preparation of the tables, the authorized strength of the division rose from 9,859 to 12,697, including attached personnel.
The division fielded 381 tanks and 97 scout cars when all units were at war strength.14 Chaffee envisaged the establishment of corps-size units commanding both armored and motorized divisions, the latter essentially an infantry division with sufficient motor equipment to move all its personnel. On 15 July 1940 the War Department selected the 4th Division, which had recently been reactivated as part of the Regular Army's expansion, for this role. Collocated with the 2d Armored Division at Fort Benning, the 4th's divisional elements had earlier experimented with motorized infantry. Eventually the department published tables of organization for a motorized division that retained the triangular structure but fielded 2,700 motor vehicles including over 600 armored half-track personnel carriers.15
Along with the reorganization and expansion of divisional forces, the Army increased unit manning levels and concentrated units for training. A peacetime draft, adopted on 16 September 1940, provided the men, and eventually the strength of all divisions neared war level. Prior to 1940 units were scattered over 130 posts, camps, and stations in the United States, but with mobilization Congress provided funds for new facilities. The Quartermaster Corps, during the winter of 19401, built accommodations for 1.4 million men, including divisional posts of the type constructed in World War I. 16
But as in World War I, equipment shortages could not be quickly remedied and greatly inhibited preparation for war. Among other things, the Army lacked modern field artillery, rifles, tanks, and antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Although acutely aware of the shortages, Marshall believed that the Army could conduct basic training while the production of weapons caught up. 17
Mobilization of National Guard Units
As the possibility that the nation might be forced into the European war increased, some members of the War Department favored federalization of the National Guard to correct deficiencies in its training and equipment. In August 1940, after much debate, Congress approved the induction of Guard units for twelve months of training. It also authorized their use for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands. 18
Induction of Guard units began on Monday, 16 September, with federalization of the 30th, 41st, 44th, and 45th Divisions, less their tank and aviation units. These latter units eventually served in World War II, but not as divisional organizations. The divisions were considerably understrength, each having approximately 9,600 men, but training camps were not prepared even for that number. To bring the divisions to war level, the War Department supplied draftees and within six months all eighteen Guard infantry divisions had entered federal service and were training at divisional posts. 19
Federal law required Guard units to be organized under the same tables as the regulars. But the Guard divisions had not yet adopted the triangular configuration, and the General Staff hesitated to reorganize them immediately as they were in federal service only for training. Furthermore, the staff feared political repercussions when general and field grade officers were eliminated to conform to the new tables.20
The National Guard also maintained two separate infantry brigades, the 92d and 93d, which did not fit into any war plans of 1940. At the request of the National Guard Bureau, New York converted the 93d to the 71st Field Artillery Brigade, and Minnesota reorganized the 92d as the 101st Coast Artillery Brigade, and the units entered federal service as such.21
Although war plans did not call for separate infantry brigades in the United States, the War Department authorized a new 92d Infantry Brigade in the Puerto Rico National Guard to command forces there. The new headquarters came into federal service on 15 October 1940, but served less than two years without seeing combat. In July 1942 the Caribbean Defense Command inactivated the brigade and replaced it with the Puerto Rican Mobile Force.22
Besides infantry divisions and brigades, the National Guard maintained four partially organized cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade. As these forces did not fit into any current war plans, the General Staff initiated a study in August 1940 to determine the Guard's requirements for horse and mechanized units. It concluded that the Guard needed both types of organizations, but not four horse cavalry divisions. At the time of the study it was rumored that the personnel from two cavalry divisions would form the nuclei of two armored divisions. The states, however, objected to the loss of cavalry regiments, and Armored Force leaders believed that armored divisions were too big and complicated for the Guard. On 1 November 1940 the National Guard Bureau withdrew the allotment of the 21st through 24th Cavalry Divisions, which in effect disbanded them. Some of their elements were used to organize mechanized cavalry regiments. After November the 56th Cavalry Brigade, a Texas unit, remained the only large unit authorized horses in the National Guard. It entered federal service before the end of the year.23
With 18 infantry divisions, 1 infantry brigade, and 1 cavalry brigade from the National Guard undergoing training in 1941, a crisis soon developed regarding their future. The 1940 law had authorized the federalization of the Guard for only one year, and that period was about to expire for some units. But the units were now filled with both draftees and guardsmen, and the release of the latter from federal service would completely break up these units. In the summer of 1941 the War Department thus prevailed upon Congress to extend the Guard units and men on active duty. This decision allowed Marshall to conduct the great General Headquarters Maneuvers in the summer and fall of 1941.24
Expanding Divisional Forces
Using the protective mobilization plan, in 1941 the Army also proceeded to increase the number of cavalry, armored, and infantry divisions in response to the growing threat of war. The Regular Army organized a second cavalry division against a backdrop of domestic politics. As a result of debates over increasing the size of the Army, Congress had provided "That no Negro because of race, shall be excluded from enlistment in the Army for service with colored military units now organized and to be organized." 25 In the midst of the 1940 presidential campaign prominent black leaders complained bitterly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the limited number of black units. Under political pressure the Army activated the 2d Cavalry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 1 April 1941, with one black and one white brigade.26
Armored divisions were viewed as far more essential than cavalry divisions. As early as 6 August 1940, Chaffee, commanding the Armored Force, planned more armored divisions, and he directed the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions to maintain a 25 percent overstrength as cadre for additional units. In January 1941 the War Department approved the establishment of two more armored divisions, and on 15 April the Armored Force activated the 3d and 4th at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and Pine Camp (later Fort Drum), New York, respectively. Shortly thereafter plans surfaced for two more armored divisions. The 5th Armored Division, added to the rolls in August, became a reality in October, and the 6th joined the force in January 1942.27
The European war clearly demonstrated a need to have antitank forces. Marshall had decided that all units had an antitank role, but he also recognized the requirement for specific counter-armor units. He did not want to assign them to an existing arm because their organization, tactical doctrine, and development seemed beyond the scope of any one arm. The problem struck the new Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 3, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, as similar to that of employing the machine gun during World War I. As an expedient, separate machine gun battalions had been established, although the guns were prevalent in all combat formations. Twaddle believed that antitank units, which would not be a part of any existing arm, should also be organized as an expedient to provide the strongest antitank capability possible; later the Army could sort out whether they were infantry or field artillery weapons.28
Twaddle's staff developed plans to provide four antitank battalions for each existing division. One battalion would serve with the division and the three others would be held at higher echelons for employment as needed. For the upcoming maneuvers the War Department authorized the formation of provisional antitank battalions in June 1941, using the antitank guns from field artillery battalions. The following December, after the maneuvers, the battalions were made permanent organizations and redesignated as tank destroyer units to indicate their offensive nature. They were not divisional elements, as recommended by First, Third, and Fourth Army commanders after the 1941 maneuvers, but assigned to General Headquarters (GHQ). This arrangement placed the units outside the control of the existing arms, thus creating basically a new homogeneous antitank force. The independent tank destroyer battalions would later prove an organizational error, denying division commanders a major resource that they habitually needed. It did, however, focus attention on an area that was a growing tactical concern.29
The possible theater of operations shifted from the Western Hemisphere to the Pacific in 1941 as relations deteriorated between the United States and Japan. To be prepared for that contingency, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, commanding the Hawaiian Department, requested permission to expand the square Hawaiian Division into two triangular infantry divisions with the primary mission of defending Oahu, the most populous of the islands and a major base of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Recognizing that the Regular Army lacked the units required for the reorganization, Short proposed that Guard units complete the two divisions. The department approved Short's proposal, and on 1 October he reorganized and redesignated the Hawaiian Division as the 24th Infantry Division and activated the 25th Infantry Division. Elements of the Hawaiian Division were distributed between the two new divisions, and, as planned, each had one Hawaii National Guard and two Regular Army infantry regiments. Divisional strengths hovered around 11,000 men.30
About the same time the Army introduced two new distinctions into its official lexicon. First, the word "infantry" was made a part of the official designation of such divisions. In the past the word infantry was understood, but, because of the expanding variety of divisions, the Army needed some way to distinguish among them. The adjutant general specified that unit designations thus include the major combat element or even the type of unit when the former was not sufficiently descriptive. Some divisions issued general orders introducing infantry as a part of the official name, and the adjutant general constituted the 25th specifically as an infantry division. The term, however, was not officially added to the tables of organization, documents that technically controlled the names of units, until 1942.31
The second change concerned the meaning of the term "Army of the United States." Before 1940 it had embraced the Regular Army, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Organized Reserves. With the growth of the force, the term Army of the United States was broadened to encompass units that had not been a part of the mobilization plans during the inter-war years. The 25th Infantry Division was the first division-size unit activated under the expanded definition.32
In the Pacific area, the defense of the Philippine Islands presented unique problems. They were too distant and too scattered for ground defense. Nevertheless, Marshall asked the local commander, General Douglas MacArthur, whether he wanted a Guard division to reinforce his ground units. MacArthur instead asked for authority to reorganize the Philippine Division as a triangular unit and to fill its regimental combat teams with Regular Army personnel. Since the division's formation in 1921, most of its enlisted men were Philippine Scouts, and he wanted to use them to help organize new Philippine Army units. Marshall approved the request and initiated plans to send two infantry regiments, two field artillery battalions, a headquarters and headquarters battery for the division artillery, a reconnaissance troop, and a military police platoon to the islands. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations in the Pacific on 7 December 1941 aborted the plan.33
At the time of the attack the Army had thirty-six divisions, excluding the Philippine Division (Table 12), and two brigades on active duty. The nation was thus much better prepared for war in December 1941 than in April 1917.
Reorganization of the National Guard Divisions
The Japanese attack and the ensuing American declaration of war on Japan, Germany, and Italy immediately shifted the focus of Army planning from hemispheric defense to overseas operations. The first priority was to streamline the square National Guard divisions. Even before the attack Marshall had asked Twaddle to explore that possibility, believing that the surplus units could be used overseas or to create new organizations as some divisions appeared to lend themselves to expansion. In November 1941 Twaddle took the 121st and 161st Infantry from the square 30th and 41st Divisions and reassigned them. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor he had replaced the 34th Infantry with the 121st Infantry in the 8th Division and had slated the 34th and the 161st for deployment to the Philippines. The day after the attack he attached one infantry regiment each from the 32d, 33d, and 36th Divisions to the Fourth Army to augment the forces protecting the West Coast. A week later the 124th Infantry from the 31st Division was assigned to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.34
On 31 December 1941, Marshall asked Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff, GHQ, to investigate bottlenecks that had developed during attempts to ship units overseas. Six days later McNair told Marshall that the Guard divisions used to organize task forces going overseas had "overheads" (noncombat personnel) that approached the "grotesque" and recommended their immediate reorganization as triangular divisions.35 Shortly thereafter Marshall directed the staff to prepare plans for reorganizing thirteen of the eighteen Guard divisions, omitting five because they already had orders for overseas duty. Ultimately either Marshall or his deputy approved the conversion to triangular formations of all Guard divisions except one, the 27th, which was targeted for Hawaii where that command was planning to receive a square division. Twaddle's staff prepared instructions for the reorganization, which he sent to the division commanders for comment. Units that the states had not adequately supported were to be eliminated.36
The reorganization began with the 32d and 37th Divisions on 1 February 1942. All infantry brigades were disbanded except the 51st, an element of the 26th Division. One infantry brigade headquarters company from each division was converted and redesignated as the division reconnaissance troop, except in the 28th and 43d Divisions. In the 43d both infantry brigade headquarters companies were disbanded, and in the 28th one brigade headquarters company became the reconnaissance troop and the other the division's military police company. The headquarters and headquarters battery of each field artillery brigade became the headquarters and headquarters battery, division artillery. Other divisional elements were reorganized, redesignated, reassigned, or disbanded. The reorganization was completed on 1 September 1942 when the 27th Division, which had arrived in Hawaii that summer, adopted the triangular configuration.37
In January 1942 the War Department created Task Force 6814 from surplus National Guard units to help defend New Caledonia, a French possession in the Pacific. Among these units were the 51st Infantry Brigade headquarters and the 182d Infantry from the 26th Division (Massachusetts) and the 132d Infantry from the 33d Division (Illinois). The units arrived in New Caledonia in March and others quickly followed. Eventually the Operations Division (OPD), War Department General Staff,38 instructed Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, commanding Task Force 6814, to organize a division. Because he lacked men and equipment for a complete table of organization unit, the staff decided that the division would carry a name rather than a numerical designation. Titles such as "Necal" and "Bush" surfaced, but Patch turned to the men assigned to the task force for suggestions. Pfc. David Fonesca recommended "Americal" from the phrase "American Troops on New Caledonia," and on 27 May 1942 Patch activated the Americal Division.39
With the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December the "great laboratory" phase for developing and testing organizations, about which Marshall wrote in the summer of 1941, closed, but the War Department still had not developed ideal infantry, cavalry, armored, and motorized divisions. In 1942 it again revised the divisions based on experiences gained during the great GHQ maneuvers of the previous year. As in the past, the reorganizations ranged from minor adjustments to wholesale changes.
The Chief of Infantry, Maj. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, proposed the principal change in the infantry division, the addition of a cannon company to the infantry regiment to provide it with artillery that could move forward as rapidly as the troops advanced on foot. The Chief of Field Artillery, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford, opposed the idea, contending that all cannon should be in artillery units. McNair, appointed Chief of Army Ground Forces (AGF) in March 1942 and responsible for organizing and training all ground combat units, also objected. For five years the division had been in a state of flux in an effort to make it light and therefore easier to handle. Command and control had replaced road space as the basic factor behind divisional size. Constant changes were destroying those goals. McNair advised Marshall that the division should have a maximum of 15,000 men with the arms being fixed accordingly and that it should not be increased in size at the insistence of arm-conscious chiefs. His view did not prevail. Hodges won the armament battle, and a cannon company became a part of each infantry regiment.40
The addition of regimental cannon companies was not the only change in the infantry division. To increase artillery firepower, the tables provided twelve rather than eight 155-mm. howitzers and eliminated the 75-mm. guns, which had been assigned to tank destroyer units, as antitank weapons. To protect the division from hostile aircraft, the number of .50-caliber machine guns rose from sixty to eighty-four. Improved reconnaissance capabilities were also added to the infantry division, with ten light armored cars replacing the sixteen scout cars in the reconnaissance troop. In the infantry regiments themselves, intelligence and reconnaissance platoons replaced intelligence platoons.41
The GHQ maneuvers of 1941 had also revealed a need for more trucks in the division. McNair, however, believed that the suggested number of trucks was excessive, requiring too much space on ships when sent overseas. Although the number of trucks was cut at his insistence, the division still had 315 more vehicles under the 1942 tables than those of 1940. Finally, the new tables split the division headquarters and military police company into two separate units, a headquarters company and a military police platoon. These changes together added about 270 men to the division (Chart 15).42
Modifications continued even after publication of the new tables of organization for the infantry division. Army Ground Forces withdrew the small ordnance maintenance platoon from the headquarters company of the quartermaster battalion and reorganized the unit as a separate ordnance light maintenance company to improve motor repair. After this change, food and gasoline supply functions became the responsibility of the regiments and separate battalions in the division, and the quartermaster battalion was reduced to a company to provide trucks for water supply and emergency rations and to augment the division's ability to move men and equipment.43
The cavalry division retained its square configuration after the 1941 maneuvers, but with modifications. The division lost its antitank troop, the brigades their weapons troops, and the regiments their machine gun and special weapons troops. These changes brought no decrease in divisional firepower, but placed most weapons within the cavalry troops. The number of .50-caliber machine guns was increased almost threefold. In the reconnaissance squadron, the motorcycle and armored car troops were eliminated, leaving the squadron with one support troop and three reconnaissance troops equipped with light tanks. These changes increased the division from 11,676 to 12,112 officers and enlisted men.44 CHART 15 The GHQ maneuvers also had a significant impact on the organization of the armored division. The exercises led to numerous situations that called for infantry, artillery, and armor to form combat teams, but the division lacked the resources to organize them. The division as organized was heavy in armor but too light in both infantry and artillery. The armored brigade complicated the command channel, while the service elements needed greater control. To correct these weaknesses, the Armored Force, under the direction of Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, dramatically reorganized the division (Chart 16). The armored brigade headquarters and one armored regiment were eliminated, and the remaining two armored regiments were reorganized to consist of one light and two medium tank battalions each. Three self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer battalions replaced the field artillery regiment and battalion, and control of the division artillery passed to an artillery section in the division headquarters. The infantry regiment was reorganized to consist of three battalions of three companies each, and trucks replaced armored personnel carriers. The engineer battalion was authorized four, rather than three, line companies and a bridge company. Two combat command headquarters were authorized but were to have no assigned units, allowing the division commander to build fighting teams as the tactical situation dictated yet still have units in reserve. Maintenance and supply battalions replaced ordnance and quartermaster battalions, the maintenance unit taking over all motor repairs in the division. For better control of the service elements, division trains were added and placed under the command of a colonel. A service company was also added to provide transportation and supplies for the rear echelon of the division headquarters company.45
The 4th Division had tested the motorized structure along with attached tank, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery units during the Carolina portion of the GHQ maneuvers in the fall of 1941. At their termination, the division commander, Brig. Gen. Fred C. Wallace, reported to General Twaddle that the force was "undesirably large." Furthermore, deficiencies existed in command and control, traffic control, administrative support, rifle strength, communications, motor maintenance, ammunition supply, and engineer capabilities. Also, the attached units-tank, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery battalions-needed to be permanently assigned to the division.46
When the War Department published new tables of organization for the motorized division in the spring of 1942 (Chart 17), it differed considerably from the structure tested by Wallace. In those tables, the hand of McNair, who almost always opposed "special" units, was evident. The division closely resembled an infantry division. Motorized infantry regiments were to have an organization similar to standard infantry regiments. Gone were armored half-track personnel carriers, but the regiment was to have enough trucks to move all its men and equipment. The division headquarters and headquarters company and the artillery were identical to their counterparts in the infantry division, and the reconnaissance battalion was the same as that of the cavalry division. A reconnaissance company was added to the engineer battalion. The ordnance unit remained company size, and a military police company was added. As redesigned, the motorized division fielded nearly 17,000 men. Following McNair's idea that a unit should have only those resources it habitually needed, the division, as other infantry divisions, lacked organic tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft artillery battalions.47
Before all the tables for the revised divisions were published in 1942, the War Department alerted the field commands about the pending reorganization of their units. Divisions were to adopt the new configurations as soon as equipment, housing, and other facilities became available. Most divisions adhered to the revised structures by the end of 1942.48
In the summer of 1942 the Army organized a fifth type of division. Between World Wars I and II it had experimented with transporting units in airplanes, and in 1940 the chief of infantry studied the possibility of transporting all elements of an infantry division by air. When the Germans successfully used parachutists and gliders in Holland and Belgium in 1940, the Army reacted by developing parachute units. The mass employment of parachutes and gliders on Crete in 1941stimulated the development of glider units. Both types of units were limited to battalion size because tacticians did not envision airborne operations involving larger units. Brig. Gen. William C. Lee, commander of the U.S. Army Airborne Command, which had been established to coordinate all airborne training, visited British airborne training facilities in England in May 1942 and following that visit recommended the organization of an airborne division.49
At that time the British airborne division consisted of a small parachute force capable of seizing a target, such as an airfield, and a glider force to reinforce the parachutists, leaving the remainder of the division to join those forces through more conventional means. Lee reported to McNair that the British had found the movement of ordinary troops in gliders wasteful because about 30 percent of the troops suffered from air sickness and became ineffective during air-land operations. Since the British were organizing airborne divisions, in which glider personnel were to receive the same training as parachutists, Lee suggested the U.S. Army also organize them. Heeding Lee's suggestion, McNair outlined to Marshall a 9,000-man airborne division that could have a varying number of parachute or glider units in accordance with tactical circumstances.50
Although the General Staff accepted the proposal, it had several reservations. The division selected for the airborne role had to have completed basic training but should not be a Regular Army or National Guard unit, as many traditionalists in those components wanted nothing to do with such an experimental force. For ease of training, it also had be stationed where air facilities and flying conditions were good. The 82d Division met the criteria. It was an Organized Reserve unit, training under Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, and located at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. McNair recommended that it be the basis for two airborne divisions with the existing parachute infantry regiments assigned to them. For the designation of the second airborne division, the staff selected the 101st, an Organized Reserve unit that was not in active military service.51
The Third Army and the Airborne Command executed McNair's recommendation on 15 August 1942. The 82d Infantry Division (less the 327th Infantry, the 321st and 907th Field Artillery Battalions, the 82d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, and the Military Police Platoon) plus the 504th Parachute Infantry became the 82d Airborne Division. Concurrently, the adjutant general disbanded the 101st Division in the Organized Reserve and reconstituted it in the Army of the United States, activating it as the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. The 502d Parachute Infantry, the 327th Glider Infantry, and the 321st and 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalions were assigned as divisional elements. Shortly thereafter each division was authorized an antiaircraft artillery battalion, an ordnance company, and a military police platoon. The parachute infantry elements did not immediately join their divisions, but by early October 1942 all elements of both divisions assembled at Fort Bragg for training.52
On 15 October 1942 the War Department published the first tables of organization for the airborne division (Chart 18). Reflecting the light nature of the unit, the parachute infantry regiment had only .30-caliber machine guns and 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars besides the individual weapons, and its field artillery battalions used 75-mm. pack howitzers. In the division artillery, however, a new antitank weapon was introduced, the 2.36-inch rocket launcher (the "bazooka"). Transportation equipment ranged from bicycles and handcarts to 2-1/2-ton trucks,
but the airborne division had only 401 trucks as opposed to over 1,600 in an infantry division. The new division numbered 8,505 officers and enlisted men, of whom approximately 2,400 were parachutists.53
The Airborne Command also trained smaller parachute and glider units and requested the authority to organize tactical airborne brigades in 1942. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, turned down the request, believing that only divisions should conduct operations involving more than a regiment. The Airborne Command, nevertheless, organized the 1st Parachute Infantry Brigade, a nondeployable unit, to assist in training parachute units.54
Increases in the Force Structure
After 7 December 1941 the General Staff also turned its attention to the future size of the Army and the number of divisions required to wage and win the war. Some officers believed that as many as 350 divisions might be needed, while others estimated considerably fewer. Outside considerations included the manpower needs of the other services and civilian industry as well as the speed at which divisions could be organized, equipped, and trained given the limited pool of experienced leaders and industrial limitations. On 24 November 1942, nearly a year after United States entered the war, the War Department published a troop basis 55 that called for a wartime force structure of 100 divisions-62 infantry, 20 armored, 10 motorized, 6 airborne, and 2 cavalry-to be organized by 1943 within a total Army force of 8,208,000 men.56
Meanwhile, the Army continued to expand the number of divisions. Working with tentative troop bases early in 1942, the General Staff decided to bring the Organized Reserve divisions into active military service. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order calling units of the Organized Reserves into active military service for the duration of the war plus six months. The order was a public relations document more than anything else because most Organized Reserve personnel were already on active duty.57
Members of General Twaddle's staff next examined the sequence for inducting infantry divisions. They considered such factors as the number of World War I battle honors earned by units; the location and availability of training sites, particularly in the corps areas where divisions were located; and the ability of the Army to furnish divisional cadres. Based on these considerations, the staff established a tentative order, beginning with the 77th Division, which had the most combat service in World War I, and ending with the 103d, which had not been organized during World War I.58
Meanwhile, corps area commanders prepared the Organized Reserve units for induction early in 1942 by placing the infantry divisions under the 1940 tables of organization. Infantry and field artillery brigades were eliminated, with the headquarters and headquarters companies of the infantry brigades consolidated to form divisional reconnaissance troops. As in the National Guard divisions, the headquarters and headquarters batteries of the field artillery brigades became the headquarters and headquarters batteries of the division artillery. Other units within the division were reduced, redesignated, reassigned, or disbanded to fit the triangular configuration. The six Organized Reserve cavalry divisions were dropped from the tentative troop program and disbanded.59
Induction of the infantry divisions began on 25 March 1942, and by 31 December, twenty-six of the twenty-seven divisions were on active duty (Table 13). The 97th Infantry Division was not inducted into active military service until February 1943 because personnel were not available for its reorganization. Since none of these divisions had reserve cadre or equipment, the Army Ground Forces had to rebuild them totally. That process started when the War Department assigned a commander and selected a parent unit to provide a cadre. Approximately thirty-seven days before reorganization of the division, the commander and his staff reported to the unit's station. Officers and enlisted cadre, about 1,400 men from the parent unit, followed some seven days later, and shortly thereafter the remaining 500 officers arrived. Within five days after the arrival of all officers and cadre, a stream of about 13,500 recruits began to report. The division was considered reorganized and active fifteen days after the first fillers reached the division. Fifty-two weeks of training followed, which included seventeen weeks of basic and individual training. The divisions, after their initial fill, were to rely on replacement centers for personnel.60
Along with the reorganization of the Organized Reserve units, the War Department expanded the number of divisions in the Army of the United States. Reversing a post-World War I policy, the staff planned to activate some all-black divisions to accommodate the large number of black draftees. On 15 May 1942 Army Ground Forces organized the 93d Infantry Division at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Although it had the same number as the provisional Negro unit of World War I, it had no relationship or lineal tie with the old 93d. Following its activation, the Army Staff chartered at least three more all-black infantry divisions the 92d, 105th, and 107th. The 92d Division, the all-black unit of World War I, was to be reconstituted, but the other two were to be new units. Under the plan, the 93d Infantry Division was to furnish the cadre for the 92d, the 92d for the 105th, and the 105th for the 107th. Army Ground Forces organized the 92d on 15 October 1942, but a shortage of personnel for worldwide service units prevented the formation of the others. Eventually the 105th and 107th Divisions were dropped from the activation list.61
To meet the number of divisions in the troop basis, the Armored Force activated nine more armored divisions in 1942, the 6th through the 14th. In organizing them, it followed the same cadre system as the Army Ground Forces used for infantry divisions.62
With the increased number of armored divisions, Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull, the G-3 on the General Staff, discerned a way to eliminate unwanted cavalry divisions. He suggested to Army Ground Forces that it consider converting the two Regular Army horse divisions to mechanized cavalry because there was no foreseeable role for horse-mounted units. Maj. Gen. Mark W Clark, Chief of Staff of Army Ground Forces, disagreed, as did Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. The latter opposed the conversion because the war was worldwide, and he believed that horse cavalry could be useful in many places, particularly in areas where oil was scarce, a reference to the other types of divisions that required large quantities of petroleum products. He also opposed the conversion because of the time required to train new horse cavalry units. Nevertheless, because of a shortage of men in the summer of 1942, the 2d Cavalry Division was inactivated to permit organization of the 9th Armored Division. White cavalrymen were assigned to the 9th, and the all-black 4th Cavalry Brigade became a nondivisional unit. Later, when preparing troops for operations in the North African theater, the engineer and reconnaissance squadrons and the 105-mm. howitzer battalion were withdrawn from the 1st Cavalry Division and sent to North Africa.63
With the activation of additional armored divisions, General Twaddle decided to convert some infantry divisions to motorized divisions. He selected the 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions for reorganization, which was accomplished by August 1942. The staff planned to form three more such divisions that year, but Army Ground Forces reorganized only the 90th because of shortages in personnel and equipment. On 9 April 1942 the adjutant general officially redesignated the 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions as motorized. The 4th Division issued general orders adopting the "motorized" designation under an Army Ground Forces directive.64
From the fall of 1939 to the end of 1942 divisional designs fluctuated as the nation prepared for war. The War Department revised infantry and cavalry divisions, developed and revised armored and motorized divisions, and created airborne divisions. During this period of organizational upheaval, the Army retained the basic idea of three regimental combat teams for the infantry division and adopted the same concept for the motorized and airborne divisions. The armored division was held to two fighting teams, as was the horse cavalry division. Many officers, however, wanted to eliminate the latter because they saw no role for the horse on the modern battlefield. The trend within all types of divisions was to increase firepower and standardize divisional elements so that they could be interchanged. Organizational questions remained, however, such as the nature and location of antitank weapons or the amount of organic transportation in any tactical unit. The period proved fruitful, for the Army organized the divisions needed to pursue the war. By 31 December 1942 the Army had fielded 1 cavalry, 2 airborne, 5 motorized, 14 armored, and 51 infantry divisions, for a total of 73 active combat divisions.
Endnotes for Chapter VI
1 Rpt of the Sec of War, 1941, p. 60.
2 Kreidberg and Henry, Mobilization, pp. 563-68. From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1944 General Headquarters (GHQ) and its successor, Army Ground Forces (AGF), conducted large-scale maneuvers to provide and evaluate training at the corps level, often pitting corps against corps. Each corps fielded two or more divisions and support units, and they also came under scrutiny. Maneuver areas were at times established in New York, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, California, Arizona, and Nevada. Over the years the Louisiana Maneuvers have received the most attention.
3 Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Continental Army Command (CONARC), 1969), pp. 26-37; History of the Third Army, AGF Study 17 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), p. 7; Army and Navy Register 61 (14 Sep 1940): 10.
4 T/O 70, Infantry Division (Triangular), 1 Nov 1940; T/O 6-80, Division Artillery, Truck Drawn, Infantry Division, I Oct 1940; T/O 7-11, Infantry Regiment, 1 Oct 1940; T/O 8-65, Medical Battalion, 1 Oct 1940; Field Manual (FM) 7-5, Infantry, 1940.
5 Rpt of the Sec of War, 1941, p. 60; Ltr, TAG to CG, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 Apr 40, sub: Report on Corps and Army Maneuvers, AGO 320.2 (4-150) file, RG 407, NARA.
6 Ltr, CG, 1st Cavalry Division to TAG, 9 Jul 40, sub: Report on Corps and Army Maneuvers, AGO 320.2 (4-150), RG 407, NARA.
8 T/O 2, Cavalry Division, 1 Nov 1940; T/0 2-11, Cavalry Regiment, Horse, 1 Nov 1940; T/O 6-110, Division Artillery, Cavalry Division, Horse, 1 Nov 1940; Ltr, TAG to Chief of all arms and services and other addresses, 13 Sep 40, sub: Cavalry Division, Horse, AG 320.2 Cav (9-1 I-40)P, AGO 320.2 Cavalry 8-1-40 to 4-30-41 file, RG 407, NARA; "Notes from the Chief of Cavalry," Cavalry .Journal 49 (Sep-Oct 1940): 408-11.
9 Ltr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 22 Jun 40, sub: Organization and Movement of Units and Cadres in connection with Augmentation to the Army to 280,000, AG 320.2 (6-180) M (Ret) M-C, Ltr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 20 Jul 40, sub: Organization and Movement of Units and Cadres in Connection with Augmentation of the Army to 375,000, AG 320.2 (7-100) M (Ret) M-C, Ltr, TAG to CG of all Corps and Corps Areas, 10 Sep 40, sub: Reorganization of Triangular Divisions, AG 320.2 (8-310) M (Ret) M-C, Lit, and TAG to CG of all Armies, Corps Areas, and other addresses, 13 Jan 41, sub: Constitution and Activation of Units, AG 320.2 (1-7-41) M (Ret) M-C, all AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO; Memo, G-3 for TAG, 8 Jan 41, sub: Concentration of 1 st Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas and method of filling lower border posts vacated thereby with elements of the 56th Cavalry Brigade, 8 Jan 41, G-4/43327, AG 320.2 (8-26- 40), RG 407, NARA; Bertram C. Wright, comp., The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1947), p. 3; Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 44- 47; See Historical Data Cards for 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions, DAMN-HSO.
10 Adna R. Chaffee, "Mechanized Cavalry," AWC lecture, 29 Sep 1939, AWC course material, MHI; Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt, pp. 109, 162-64; History of the Armored Force, Command, and Center, AGF Study 27 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), p. 7.
11 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 5 Jun 40, sub: Mechanization, G-3/41665, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40), RG 407, NARA. General Andrews' background was not with cavalry, infantry, or mechanized forces, but with the U.S. Army Air Corps.
12 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 5 Jun 40, sub: Mechanization; Notes on G-3 Mechanized Conference, G-4/23518-69, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40), RG 407, NARA.
13 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 23 Jun 40, sub: Mechanization, G-3/41665, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40), RG 407, NARA; Ltr, TAG to CG of all Armies, Corps Areas, and other addresses, 10 Jul 1940, sub: Organization of the Armored Force, AG 320.2 (7-5-40) M (Ret) M-C, AG Reference files, DAMN-HSO; Historical Data Cards, 1st and 2d Armored Divisions (Armd Divs), DAMH-HSO.
14 T/O 17, Armored Division, 15 Nov 1940; Ltr, Chaffee to Scott, 9 Sep 40, and Ltr, Scott to Chaffee, 12 Sep 40, Charles L. Scott Papers, LC.
15 Statement of Adna R. Chaffee, 14 May 1941, Document Collection, U.S. Army Armor School Library, Fort Knox, Ky.; Ltr, Scott to Grow, 3 Sep 40, Scott Papers, LC; Ltr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 20 Jul 40, sub: Organization and Movement of Units and Cadres in Connection with Augmentation of the Army to 375,000; T/O 77, Infantry Division (Triangular, Motorized), I Nov 1940.
16 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, July 1, 7939 to June 30, 1941, pp. 1-3; Rpt of the Sec of War, 1941, pp. 67-68.
17 Rpt of the Sec of War, 1941, pp. 62, 68-70; Erna Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, 2 vols., The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services ( Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 2:293
18 Kreidberg and Henry, Mobilization, pp. 575-77; WD Bull 22, 1940.
19 Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1946, pp. 24-27: Robert Bruce Sligh. The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 126-28.
20 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 6 Nov 41, sub: Triangulation of National Guard Divisions, and Memo, Mobilization Branch to G-3, 12 Nov 41, same subject, G-3/41741, AGO 320.2 (8-2-40), RG 407, NARA.
21 Memo, ACofS, G-3, 1 Aug and 1 Nov 1940, NG13 325.4 Gen.-6, DAMN-HSO; Rpt of the Chief ofNational Guard Bureau, 1946, pp. 220, 230.
22 92d Infantry Brigade, Organizational History From 25 August 1940 to 31 December 1941, Ms, Ltr, Puerto Rican Dept to TAG, 10 Jul 42, sub: Inactivation of unit, HHC, 92d Infantry Brigade, 320.2 Gen, and Ltr, Operations Division (OPD) to Caribbean Defense Command, 24 Jul 42, same subject, MR-OPD, all in 92d Infantry Brigade file, DAMH-HSO.
23 Rpt of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1941, p. 14; Ltrs, Chaffee to Scott, 5 Aug 40, and Scott to Chaffee, 8 Aug 40, Scott Papers, LC; Ltr, TAG to National Guard Bureau, 8 Nov 40, sub: Withdrawal of Certain Cavalry Units from Allotment to the National Guard, 325.4 (10-21-40) M (Ret), AG Reference file, DAMH-HSO; Rpt of the Chief of the National Chard Bureau, 1946, p. 217; WD Bull 26, 1940; Wright, The Ist Cavalry Division in World War II, p.3.
24 Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff:' Prewar Plans and Preparation, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 214-31.
25 WD Bull 17, 1940.
26 Ltr, TAG to CG of All Armies and other addresses, 10 Oct 40, sub: 2d Cavalry Division, AG 320.2 (10-"0) M (Ret) M-C, 2d Cav Div file, DAMH-HSO; Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 65-68, 122-28; Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 30-31.
27 History of the Armored Force, p. 50; Ltr, TAG to CG of all Armies and other addresses, 13 Jan 41, sub: Constitution and Activation of Units, AG 320.2 (1-7-41) M (Ret) M-C, Ltr, TAG to Chief, Armored Force, and other addresses, 28 Aug 41, sub: Constitution and Activation of 5th Armored Division, AG 320.2 (8-22-41) MR-M-C, and Ltr, TAG to Chief, Armored Force, and other addresses, 8 Jan 42, sub: Constitution and Activation of the 6th Armored Division, AG 320.2 (12-111), MR-M-C, all letters in DAMN-HSO; John B. Wilson, Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987). pp. 169, 187, 203, and 215.
28 Memo, OCofS for G-3, 14 May 41, sub: Defense Against Armored Forces, G-4/21103-6, and Memo, G-3 for CofS, 18 Aug 41 sub: Organization of Antitank Units in the Army, OCS 21103-6, AG 320.2 (8-161), RG 407, NARA.
29 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 18 Aug 41, sub: Organization of Antitank Units in the Army, and Ltr, TAG to CG all Armies, 24 Jun 41, sub: Organization of Provisional Division and GHQ Antitank Battalions for Use in Current Maneuvers, AG 320.2 (6-19-41) MR-M-C, RG 407, NARA; Ltr, TAG to CG of all Armies and other addresses, 3 Dec 1941, sub: Organization of Tank Destroyer Battalions, AG 320.2 (11-171) MR-M-C, Tank Destroyer File, DAMN-HSO; Christopher R. Gable, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 174-76; Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 82-84.
30 Ltr, CG, Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 26 Apr 41, sub: Reorganization of the Forces in the Hawaiian Department, AG 320.3/37, AG 320.2 (9-2710), and Ltr, TAG to CG, Hawaiian Dept, 26 Aug 41, sub: Constitution and Reorganization of Units, Hawaiian Department, AG 320.2 (8-1-41) MR-M-C, AG 320.2 (8-1-41), RG 337, NARA; GO 53, Hawaiian Department, 1941, Hawaiian Dept, RG 338, NARA.
31 Memo, G-3 for CofS, 19 May 41, sub: Designation of Divisions, Army Corps, and Armies, G-3/45832, Division General file, DAMH-HSO; WD Cir 197, 1941; "Army Designations," Army and Navy Register, 9 Aug 1941; author's notes, The use of the word infantry in divisional designations; T/O 7, 1 Aug 1942.
32 "Lineage and Honors: History, Principles, and Preparation," Organizational History Branch, Office, Chief of Military History (OCMH), June 1962; Ltr, TAG to CG, Hawaiian Dept, 26 Aug 41, sub: Constitution and Reorganization of Units, Hawaiian Department, 24th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
33 Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, United States Army in World War H (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 31-37.
34 Memo, G-3 for Cofs, 18 Sep 41, sub: Triangularization of Square Division to Removal of Elements for Bases, G-3/41741, AGO 320.2 (8-2-40), and Memo, G-3 for TAG, 22 Nov 41, sub: Assignment of the 121st Infantry from the 30th Division to 8th Division, G-3/43726, AGO 320.2 (8-2-40), RG 407, NARA; Ltr, TAG to CG, Third and Fourth Armies, 8 Dec 41, sub: Attachment of Three Infantry Regiments, Third Army to Fourth Army, AG 370-5 (12-8-41) MC-M-C, and Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 15 Dec 41, sub: Assignment of 124th Infantry, AG 352 Inf Sch (11-271) MR-M-C, AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO.
35 Memo, GHQ for CG, Field Forces, 6 Jan 42, sub: Triangulating Square Division, 322.13; 22 (1-6-42), AGO 320.2 (1-6-42), RG 407, NARA.
36 Memo, OCS for G-3, no subject, 8 Jan 42, OCS/20117-124, RG 407, NARA. Memos pertaining to the reorganization of the National Guard divisions in 1942 are in National Guard Induction and Reorganization file, 1938-1942, DAMN-HSO.
37 Letters of instruction for reorganizing the National Guard divisions and divisional general orders implementing those instructions are in National Guard Induction and Reorganization file, 1938-1942, DAMN-HSO.
38 On 9 March 1942 the War Department's General Staff was reorganized and many of the functions of the five assistant chiefs of staff (G-1 to G-4 and the War Plans Division) were realigned. Much of the responsibility for organizing and training combat units, formerly held by the G-3, was passed to Army Ground Forces (AGF), and the Operations Division (OPD), formerly the War Plans Division, focused on the employment of units. All three, G-3, AGF, and OPD, however, would continue to deal with divisional organization during World War II.
39 Francis D. Cronin, Under the Southern Cross, The Saga of the Americal Division (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1951), pp. 4-29; Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Army Forces in New Caledonia, 24 May 42, sub: Constitution and Organization of AMERICAL Division, 24 May 42, AG 320.2 (5-23-42) MR-M-OPD; and GO 10, US Army Forces in New Caledonia, 1942, 23d Infantry Division file, DAMH-HSO.
40 Memo, Lesley J. McNair for CG, Field Forces, 2 Feb 42, sub: Field artillery organization. triangular division, 320.2/37 (FA)-F (2-2-42), McNair Papers; T/O 7-11, Infantry Regiment, 1942. On 9 March 1942 the chiefs of the combat arms were abolished as a part of the reorganization of the General Staff (see Hewes, From Root to McNamara, pp. 67-76).
41 T/O 7, Infantry Division, 1942.
42 Memo, CG, AGF, for Requirement Division, AGF, 4 Apr 42, sub: New Infantry regiment, 320.2 Gen-(Clear), McNair Papers; Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 281-86; T/O 7, Infantry Division, 1 Aug 1942.
43 T/O 7, Infantry Division, 1 Aug 1942; WD Cirs 245, 267, and 274, 1942; Memo, AGF for TAG, 11 Sep 42, sub: Organization of Ordnance Light Maintenance Companies, Infantry Division, 320.2/43 (Ord) (R)-GNGCT/10922 AG 320.2 (9-112), RG 407, NARA.
44 T/O 2, Cavalry Division, 1 Aug 1942.
45 Gabel, The U.S. Army Maneuvers of 1941, pp. 176-79; Ltr, Hqs, Armored Force to G-3, 20 Sep 41, sub: Proposed Armored Division, 20 Sep 41, and Memo, G3 for CofS, 1 Sep 41, sub: Reorganization of Armored Division, 320.2 (G3/41665, both AG 320.2 (9-20-41), RG 407. NARA; T/O 17, Armored Division, 1 Mar 1942; History of the Armored Force, pp. 29-32.
46 Ltr, TAG to Third Army, 8 Jul 41, sub: Test of Motorized Division Organization, 320.2 (6-25-41) MR-M-C, 4th Infantry Division file, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, 4th Motorized Division to TAG, 9 Dec 41, sub: Test of Motorized Division Organization, 353-PMD, AG 320.2 (12-9-41), RG 407, NARA.
47 T/O 77, Motorized Division, 1 Aug 1942.
48 Lit, TAG to CGs, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and other addresses, 16 Jun 42, sub: Allotments of Grades and Ratings and Authorized Strength to Tactical Units, AG 221 (6-3-42) EA-M-C, AG Reference files, and Divisional Historical Data Cards, DAMN-HSO.
49 The Airborne Command and Center, AGF Study 25 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), pp. 1-12, 21; James A. Huston, Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Studies, 1962), p. 48.
50 Memo, AGF for CofS, 2 Jul 42, sub: Policy re Training of Airborne Troops, 320.1/26 (Inf) (GNTRG) (7-2-42), AG 320.2/3 Airborne, RG 337, NARA.
51 James M. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battle of an Airborne Commander, 1943-1946 (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 3; Memo, AGF for TAG, 29 Jul 42, sub: Airborne Division, 320.2/10 (AB Cmd) (R) GNGCT/06440 (7-29-42), AG 320.2 (7-292), RG 407, NARA.
52 Ltr, AGF to CG, Third Army, 30 Jul 42, sub: Activation of 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, 30 Jul 42, 320.2/9 AB Cmd (R)-GNGCT (7-30-42), (see amendments and revisions of this letter in the files of 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions), DAMH-HSO; The Airborne Command and Center, p. 21.
53 T/O 71, Airborne Division, 15 Oct 1942.
54 Ltr, AGF to CG, Airborne Command, 4 Jul 42, sub: Activation of HHC, 1st Parachute Infantry Brigade, AGF file, DAMH-HSO; Memo, AGF to CofS, 21 Nov 42, sub: Tactical Airborne Infantry Brigades, 320.2 (Airborne)(R) GNGCT (11-212), and Memo, G-3 for CofS, 14 Dec 42, same subject, WDCGT 320.2 Aetiv (11-212), 320.2 (11-2112), RG 407, NARA.
55 A troop basis was the list of military units and individuals required for the performance of a particular mission, by numbers, organization, equipment, deployment, and types of personnel.
56 Kreidberg and Henry, Mobilization, pp. 625-26; Greenfield et al., The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 164-84.
57 Memo, G-3 for JAG, 8 Jan 42, sub: Entry of Organized Reserves into active Federal service, G-3/645704, Memo, JAG for G-3, 12 Jan 42, same subject, 210.455, Military Affairs, and Memo, G-3 for CofS, 14 Jan 42, same subject, G-3/645704, all Reference Paper file, Army Reserve, DAMH-HSO; WD Bull 7, 1942.
58 Memo, AWC for ACofS, G-3, 30 Dec 41, sub: Order of divisions, and Memo, G-3 for Cofs, 17 Jan 42, sub: Order of activation of Reserve Divisions, G-3/6457-435, Reference Paper files, Army Reserve, DAMH-HSO.
59 Ltr, TAG to CG, All Corps Areas and Department 30 Jan 42, sub: Reorganization of Organized Reserve (less Army Air Force units), AG-320.2 OR (1-222) MR-M-C; GO 15, First Corps Area, 12 Feb 42; Lit, Second Corps Area to Executive Offices, First, Second, and Third Military Areas, 20 Feb 42; sub: Reorganization of the Organized Reserves (less Army Air Force units); GO 17, Third Corps Area, 12 Feb 42; Ltr, Fourth Corps Area to Commanding Officers all Posts and Stations, 13 Feb 42, sub: Reorganization of Units of the Army Reserves (less Army Air Force units), Fourth Corps Area; Ltr, Fifth Corps Area to TAG, 23 Feb 42, sub: Reorganization of the Organized Reserves (less Army Air Force Units); Ltr, Sixth Corps Area to TAG, Reorganization of the Organized Reserves, 31 Mar 42, sub: Reorganization of the Organized Reserves; Ltr, Seventh Corps Area to TAG, 22 Feb 42, sub: Reorganization of the Organized Reserves (less Army Air Force Units); GO 2, First Military District, 1942, GO 27, Second Military District, 1942, GO 11, Third Military District, 1942, Eighth Corps Area; 1 st Ind, Ninth Corps Area to TAG to Ltr, TAG to CG, All Corps Areas and Department, 30 Jan 42, sub: Reorganization of Organized Reserve (less Army Air Force units), all Reference Paper files, Army Reserve, DAMHHSO.
60 Historical Data Cards, Reserve Divisions, DAMH-HSO; Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 4341.
61 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 128, 407, 424; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 32-33. Also see unit files of the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions in DAMHHSO.
62 See unit files for the 6th through 14th Armored Divisions in DAMN-HSO.
63 Ltr, AGE to Brig Gen H. R. Bull, 5 May 42, sub: Cavalry Organization, 320.2/51 (CavGNTHG) (5-5-42), and Memo, SW for the Under Secretary of War, 21 Jul 42, AGF 321 Cavalry, RG 337, NARA; Ltr, AGF to CG, Second Army and Chief of the Armored Force, 3 Jun 42, sub: Activation of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, 320.2 (Armd Force) (R)-GNOPN (6-3-42); also AGF letters, same subject, 4 and 1 I Jul 42, 9th Armd Div file, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, TAG to CG, Task Force "A," 7 Sep 42, sub: Assignment of Units to Task Force "A," AG 320.2 (9-7-42) MR-M-GN, AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO.
64 Ltr, TAG to CG, Fourth Army, 18 Nov 42, sub: Reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division, AG 320.2 (10-151) MR-R-C, 7th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; Memo, G-3 for TAG, same subject, 28 Jan 42, G-3/43930, AG 320.2 (1-28-42), RG 407, NARA; Ltr, CG, Seventh Corps Area to TAG, 24 Mar 42, sub: Designation of the 6th Infantry Division, MRD 320.2 Designation, 24 Mar 42, 6th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, TAG to CGs, First, Second, and Fourth Armies, 8 Jan 42, sub: Equipment for Motorized Division, AG 320.2 (1-6-42) MR-M-C, Ltr, TAG to CGs, First and Second Armies, 27 Nov 41, sub: Motorization of Regular Army Division, AG 320.2 (11-14-41), Ltr, TAG to CGs Eastern and Western Defense Commands and Second Army, 9 Apr 42, sub: Redesignation of Infantry Divisions, AG 320.2 (4-2-42) MR-R-GN, and Ltr, AGF to CGs, Second and Third Armies, 7 Aug 42, sub: Armored and Motorized Divisions, 320.2/53 (R)-GNGCT (8-7-42), all AG Reference files, DAMN-HSO; GO 14. 4th Motorized Division, 1942, RG 407, NARA.