The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades/The Test: World War I
Both [French and British] commissions were anxious for an American force, no matter how small . . . . I opposed this on the ground that the small force would belittle our effort; was undignified and would give a wrong impression of our intentions. I held out for at least a division to show the quality of our troops and command respect for our flag. Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott 1
World War I, an unprecedented conflict, forced fundamental changes in the organization of United States Army field forces. The infantry division remained the Army's primary combined arms unit, but the principles governing its organization took a new direction because of French and British experiences in trench warfare. Column length or road space no longer controlled the size and composition of the infantry division; instead, firepower, supply, and command and control became paramount. The cavalry division received scant attention as the European battlefield offered few opportunities for its use.
- 1 First Revisions
- 2 The Baker Board and Pershing's Staff Organizational Study
- 3 Plans To Organize More Divisions
- 4 Organizing the Divisions
- 5 Expansion of the Divisional Forces
- 6 Divisional Changes
- 7 Endnotes for Chapter III
Between 6 April 1917, when the nation declared war, and 12 June, when the first troops left the United States for France, the War College Division of the Army General Staff' revised the structure of the infantry division extensively. British and French officers spurred the changes when they visited Washington, D.C., to discuss the nation's participation in the war. They believed the American division lacked firepower and presented command and control problems because of its many small units. But they also had their own political-military agenda. Believing that time precluded organizing and training U.S. units, they wanted the nation's immediate involvement in the war to be through a troop replacement program for their drained formations, a scheme that became known as "amalgamation.."2
Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott opposed Americans' serving in Allied units, believing that the U.S. division could be reorganized to overcome any French and British objections. Such a unit would prove the quality of the American soldier and ensure that the Allies did not underestimate the nation's war efforts. Scott directed the War College Division to study a divisional structure comprising two infantry brigades, each having two large infantry regiments, as a means of reducing the span of control. It was also to include light and heavy artillery, signal and engineer troops, and service units. A small division, some 13,000 infantrymen, would allow greater mobility and enhance the ability to exchange units in the line and maintain battle momentum. The French and the British had found that for each unit on line-army corps, division, brigade, regiment, battalion, or company-they needed a comparable unit prepared to relieve it without mixing organizations from various commands. The French had tried relief by army corps but had settled on relief by small divisions. Scott felt that his proposal would ease the difficulty of exchanging units on the battlefield.3
By 10 May 1917, Majs. John McAuley Palmer, Dan T. Moore, and Brunt Wells of the War College Division outlined a division of 17,700 men, which included about 11,000 infantrymen in accordance with Scott's idea. In part it resembled the French square division. Planners eliminated 1 infantry brigade and cut the number of infantry regiments from 9 to 4, thereby reducing the number of infantry battalions from 27 to 12. But regimental firepower increased, with the rifle company swelling from 153 officers and enlisted men to 204, and the number of regimental machine guns rising dramatically from 4 to 36. To accommodate the additional machine guns, Palmer, Moore, and Wells outlined a new infantry regimental structure that consisted of headquarters and supply companies and three battalions. Each battalion had one machine gun company and three rifle companies. Given the reduction in the number of infantry units, the proportion of artillery fire support per infantry regiment increased without altering the number of artillery regiments or pieces. The new division still fielded forty-eight 3-inch guns, now twelve pieces per infantry regiment. The division was also authorized a regiment of twenty-four 6-inch howitzers for general support, and twelve trench mortars of unspecified caliber completed the division's general fire support weapons.4
Cavalry suffered the largest cut, from a regiment to an element with the division headquarters, a change in line with British and French recommendations. The Allies argued that trench warfare, dominated by machine guns and artillery weapons, denied cavalry the traditional missions of reconnaissance, pursuit, and shock action. Mounted troops, possibly assigned to the division's headquarters company, might serve as messengers within the division but little more. The Allies further advised that the Army should not consider sending a large cavalry force to France. Horses and fodder would occupy precious shipping space, and the French and British had an abundance of cavalry. Engineer, signal, and medical battalions and an air squadron rounded out the divisions. 5
To conduct operations, the French advocated a functional divisional staff, that would include a chief of staff and a chief of artillery as well as intelligence, operations, and supply officers, along with French interpreters. Although small, such a body would have sufficient resources to allow the division to function as a tactical unit while a small headquarters troop would furnish work details. Adjutants alone were to comprise the staff of the infantry and artillery brigades, which had no headquarters troop for work details. The next higher headquarters, the army corps, would provide planning and administration for active operations.6
Based on the report of 10 May, War College Division officers prepared tables of organization that authorized 19,000 officers and enlisted men for the division (Chart 3), an increase of about 1,300. No basic structural changes took place; self-sufficiency justified the additional men. On 24 May Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, the Acting Chief of Staff, 7 approved the tables, but only for the initial expeditionary force. He hoped, as did the staff, that Congress would authorize a larger infantry regiment, providing it with more firepower. Bliss also recognized that the expeditionary commander might wish to alter the division. With these factors in mind, he felt that time would permit additional changes in the divisional structure because a second division would not deploy in the near future. If a large expeditionary force was dispatched in the summer of 1917, its deployment would rest on political, not military, objectives.8
Early in May Scott alerted Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing, commander of the Southern Department, about the possibility of sending an expeditionary force to France and asked him to select one field artillery and four infantry regiments for overseas service. Pershing nominated the 6th Field Artillery and the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th Infantry. Following a preplanned protocol, the French requested the deployment of a division to lift Allied morale, and President Woodrow Wilson agreed.9
Shortly thereafter an expeditionary force was organized. The regiments picked by Pershing, filled to war strength with recruits, moved to Hoboken, New Jersey. On 8 June Brig. Gen. William L. Sibert assumed command and began organizing the 1st Expeditionary Division. Four days later its initial elements sailed for France without most of their equipment, as the French had agreed to arm them. Upon arrival in France, one divisional unit-the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry paraded on 4 July in Paris, where the French people enthusiastically welcomed the Americans. Following the reception, the division's unschooled recruits, except the artillerymen, underwent six months of arduous training at Gondrecourt, a training area southeast of Verdun, while the division artillery trained at a French range near Le Valdahon.10
The Baker Board and Pershing's Staff Organizational Study
Upon completion of the Army's first World War I divisional study the 1st Expeditionary Division was deployed. Even before that investigation was finished, however, two new groups initiated additional studies. Pershing, who had been appointed commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) on 26 May, headed one group; Col. Chauncey Baker, an expert in military transportation and a West Point classmate of Pershing, headed the other. Previously Majors Palmer, Moore, and Wells had consulted Pershing as they developed their ideas about the infantry division, and he found no fault with them. Nevertheless, Pershing's staff began exploring the organization of the expeditionary forces en route to France. Lt. Col. Fox Conner, who had served as the War College Division interpreter for the French mission while in Washington; the newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Palmer; and Majs. Alvin Barker and Hugh A. Drum assisted Pershing in this work.11
Independently, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker directed Colonel Baker and twelve other officers to study the British, French, and Belgian armies. After six weeks the secretary expected Baker to make recommendations that would help in organizing American forces. Colonel Baker himself met Pershing in England, and both agreed to work together after Baker conducted separate investigations in England, France, and Belgium. A single report, known as the General Organization Project, resulted from these efforts. Reflecting a consensus of the Baker and Pershing planners, it covered all aspects of the organization of the AEF except for the service of rear troops. 12
The General Organization Project described an infantry division of about 25,000 men consisting of two infantry brigades (each with two infantry regiments and one three-company machine gun battalion), a field artillery brigade (comprising one 155-mm. howitzer regiment, two 3-inch [approximately 75-mm.] gun regiments, and one trench mortar battery), an engineer regiment, a signal battalion, and trains. The trains included the division's headquarters troop and military police, ammunition, supply, ambulance, field hospital, and engineer supply units. The air squadron was omitted from the division. 13
During the course of their work, Pershing and Baker reversed the rationale for the division. Instead of an organization that could easily move in and out of the trenches, the division was to field enough men to fight prolonged battles. Both planning groups sensed that the French and British wanted that type of division but lacked the resources to field it because of the extensive losses after three years of warfare. To sustain itself in combat, the division needed more, not less, combat power. The infantry regiment reverted to its prewar structure of headquarters, machine gun, and supply companies and three battalions each with four rifle companies. The rifle companies were increased to 256 officers and enlisted men, and each company fielded sixteen automatic rifles.14 Because the law specified only one machine gun company per regiment, the General Organization Project recommended the organization of six brigade and five divisional machine gun companies. These were to be organized into two battalions of three companies each and one five-company battalion. Eight of these companies augmented the four in the infantry regiments, thus providing each divisional infantry battalion with a machine gun company. The three remaining companies were assigned as the divisional reserve; two were comparable to those in the infantry regiments, and the other was an armored motorcar machine gun company labeled "tank" company.15
The major dispute between Pershing's staff and the Baker Board developed over the artillery general support weapon. The board's position, presented by future Chief of Staff Charles P Summerall, was that one regiment should be equipped with either the British 3.8- or 4.7-inch howitzer because of their mobility, while Pershing's officers favored a regiment of French 155-mm. howitzers. The need for firepower and the possibility of obtaining 155s from the French undoubtedly influenced the staff, and its view prevailed. For high-angle fire, Baker's group proposed three trench mortar batteries in the division, but settled for one located in the field artillery brigade and six 3-inch Stokes mortars added to each infantry regiment.16
The report also recommended changes in cavalry and engineer divisional elements. An army corps, it suggested, needed two three-squadron cavalry regiments to support four divisions. Normally one squadron would be attached to each division, and the army corps would retain two squadrons for training and replacement units. The squadrons withdrawn from the divisions would then be reorganized and retrained. Divisional engineer forces expanded to a two-battalion regiment, which would accommodate the amount of construction work envisioned in trench warfare. Infantrymen would do the simple digging and repairing of trenches under engineer supervision, while the engineer troops would prepare machine gun and trench mortar emplacements and perform major trench work and other construction.17
Pershing sought a million men by the end of 1918. He envisioned five army corps, each having four combat divisions, along with a replacement and school division, a base and training division, and pioneer infantry, cavalry, field and antiaircraft artillery, engineer, signal, aviation, medical, supply, and other necessary units. The base and training division was to process incoming personnel into the theater, and the replacement and school division was to provide the army corps with fully trained and equipped soldiers. Because these support divisions did not need to be at full strength, Pershing foresaw some of the soldiers serving as replacements in combat divisions and others as cadre in processing and training units. He also anticipated that some surplus units would be attached to army corps or armies. Furthermore, Pershing wanted a seventh division for each army corps, not counted in his desired force of a million men, which was to be organized and maintained in the United States to train officers before they came to France. To assemble the first army corps, he asked the War Department to send two combat divisions, followed by the replacement and school division, the other two combat divisions, and finally the base and training division. When five army corps arrived in France, Pershing would have twenty combat divisions and ten processing and replacement divisions. Also, five more divisions were to be in training in the United States.18
The General Organization Project reached Washington in July, and Bliss noted the shift in divisional philosophy. Instead of a division that could move quickly in and out of trenches, Pershing wanted a unit with sufficient overhead (staff, communications, and supply units) and enough infantry and artillery to permit continuous fighting over extended periods. Because Pershing would command the divisions sent to Europe, neither Bliss nor the General Staff questioned his preference. Also, the lack of experienced divisional-level officers and staffs made a smaller number of larger divisions more practical.19
Using the General Organization Project, the War College Division prepared tables of organization, which the War Department published on 8 August 1917 (Chart 4). The tables for what became known as the "square division" included a few changes in the division's combat arms. For example, the five-company divisional machine gun battalion was reduced to four companies by eliminating the armored car machine gun unit. Pershing had decided to submit a separate tank program because he considered tanks to be assets of either army corps or field army. In the infantry regiment, the planners made the 3-inch mortars optional weapons and added three one-pounder (37-mm.) guns as antitank and anti-machine gun weapons. The supply train was motorized, and the ammunition and ambulance trains were equipped with both motor- and horse-drawn transport. The additional motorized equipment in the trains stemmed from the quartermaster general's attempt to ease an expected shipping shortage, not to enhance mobility. Crated motor vehicles occupied less space in an ocean transport than animals and fodder.20
The War College Division also provided a larger divisional staff than Pershing had recommended because the unit most likely would have both tactical and administrative roles. The staff comprised a chief of staff, an adjutant general, an inspector general, a judge advocate, and quartermaster, medical, ordnance, and signal officers. In addition, interpreters were attached to overcome any language barriers, particularly between the Americans and the French. As an additional duty, the commanders of the field artillery brigade and the engineer regiment held staff positions. A division headquarters troop with 109 officers and enlisted men would furnish the necessary services for efficient operations. The infantry brigade headquarters included the commander, his three aides, a brigade adjutant, and eighteen enlisted men who furnished mess, transportation, and communications services. The field artillery brigade headquarters was larger, with nine officers and forty-nine enlisted men, but had similar functions. Planners did not authorize headquarters detachments for either the infantry or field artillery brigade.21
Plans To Organize More Divisions
While Pershing and Baker investigated the organizational requirements for the expeditionary forces, steps were taken to expand the Army at home. These measures included the formation of all 117 Regular Army regiments authorized in the National Defense Act of 1916 and the drafting of the National Guard into federal service and of 500,000 men through a selective service system. Draftees were to fill out Regular Army and National Guard units and to provide manpower for new units. Organizations formed with all selective service personnel eventually became "National Army" units. Although the War Department was unsure of either the final structure of the infantry division or the number of divisions needed, it decided to organize 32 infantry divisions immediately, 16 in the National Guard and 16 in the National Army. The Army contemplated no additional Regular Army divisions. Although existing Regular Army regiments could be shipped overseas and organized into divisions if necessary, most regulars were needed to direct and train the new army. Unlike past wars, draftees rather than volunteers would fight World War 1.22
To organize National Guard and National Army divisions, the Army Staff adopted extant plans. For the Guard it used the Militia Bureau's scheme developed following the passage of the National Defense Act, and for the National Army it turned to a contingency plan drawn up in February 1917 to guide the employment of draftees. Divisions in both components had geographic bases. As far as practicable, the area that supported a Guard division coincided with a National Army divisional area.23
The thirty-two new divisions needed training areas, but the Army had only one facility large enough to train a division, Camp Funston, a subpost of Fort Riley, Kansas. Therefore, the staff instructed territorial commanders to select an additional thirty-two areas, each large enough to house and train a division. Early in the summer Secretary Baker approved leasing the sites. To save money, he decided to build tent cities for the National Guard divisions in the southern states, where winters were less severe, while camps for National Army divisions, which were to have permanent buildings, were located within the geographic areas that supported them.24
Establishing a tentative occupancy date of 1 September, the Quartermaster Corps began constructing the training areas in June. It designed each site to accommodate a three-brigade division as called for under the prewar tables of organization. When Bliss approved the square division in August, the camps had to be modified to house the larger infantry regiments. Although the changes delayed completion of the training areas, the troops' arrival date, 1 September, remained firm.25
The War College Division and the adjutant general created yet another system for designating divisions and brigades and their assigned elements. Divisions were to be numbered 1 through 25 in the Regular Army, 26 through 75 in the National Guard, and 76 and above in the National Army. Within the Regular Army numbers, mounted or dismounted cavalry divisions were to begin with the number 15. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for sixty-five Regular Army infantry regiments, including a regiment from Puerto Rico. From those units, excluding the ones overseas, the War Department could organize thirteen infantry divisions in addition to the 1st Expeditionary Division already in France. This arrangement explains the decision to begin numbering Regular Army cavalry divisions with the digit 15. The system did not specify the procedure for numbering National Guard or National Army cavalry divisions. It reserved blocks of numbers for infantry, cavalry, and field artillery brigades, with 1 through 50 allotted to the Regular Army, 51 through 150 to the National Guard, and 151 and above to the National Army. The designation of each Guard or National Army unit, if raised by a single state, was to have that state's name in parentheses. Soldiers in National Guard and National Army units were also to wear distinctive collar insignia showing their component.26
As the summer of 1917 advanced, the War Department announced additional details. In July it identified specific states to support the first sixteen National Guard and the first sixteen National Army divisions and designated the camps where they would train. At that time the department announced that the designations of the National Guard's 5th through 20th Divisions were to be changed to the 26th through the 41st to conform with the new numbering system. In August the adjutant general placed the 76th through the 91st Divisions, National Army units, on the rolls of the Army and announced the appointment of commanders for both National Guard and National Army divisions. In addition to the 1st Expeditionary Division in France, the War College Division adopted plans to organize six more Regular Army divisions. No plans were made to concentrate their divisional elements for training, but they were to be brought up to strength with draftees.27
When the initial planning phase for more divisions closed, the mobilization program encompassed 38 divisions-16 National Guard, 16 National Army, and 6 Regular Army. With these, exclusive of the 1st Expeditionary Division in France, redesignated on 6 July as the 1st Division, the War Department met Pershing's requirement for thirty divisions. The divisions in excess of Pershing's needs were to be held in the United States as replacement units.
Organizing the Divisions
Between 22 August 1917 and 5 January 1918, the Army Staff authorized one cavalry and three additional infantry divisions, for a total of forty-three divisions. But establishing these units proved a monumental task for which the Army was woefully unprepared. Besides unfinished training areas and the absence of a system for classifying new recruits as they entered service, the Army faced a shortage of equipment and officers. The quartermaster general claimed that the only items of clothing he expected to be available to outfit the National Army men were hats and cotton undershirts. Except for a handful of Regular Army officers, the National Army made do with newly minted officers fresh from twelve weeks of training.28
Formation of the new Army nevertheless began with the organization of the National Guard divisions. In August Guard units, which had been drafted into federal service and temporarily housed in state camps and armories, reported to their designated training camps and formed divisions in agreement with the 3 May tables. During September and October the division commanders reorganized the units to conform to the new square configuration as the 26th through 41st Divisions (Table 3).
TABLE 3 Geographic Distribution of National Guard Divisions, World War I
At that time division commanders broke up many historic state regiments to meet the required organizations in the new tables, a measure that incensed the states and the units themselves.29
The histories of the 26th and 41st Divisions were somewhat different. Deciding to send another division to France as soon as possible, on 22 August Secretary Baker ordered Brig. Gen. Clarence E. Edwards, commander of the Northeastern Department, to organize the 26th Division in state camps and armories under the square tables. Without assembling as a unit, the 26th departed the following month for France, where it underwent training. To accelerate the formation of the 41st Division, its training site was shifted from Camp Fremont, California, which needed a sewage system, to Camp Greene, North Carolina. Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett took over the camp on 18 September and the next day organized the 41st under the 8 August tables. In October its first increment of troops departed for France.30
Before the 26th Division went overseas in September, many states had wanted the honor of having their units become the first in France and pressed Baker and the War Department for that assignment. To stop the clamor, Baker proposed to Bliss that he consider sending a division to Europe representing many states. Maj. Douglas MacArthur, a General Staff officer, had earlier suggested that when Guard divisions adopted the new tables some militia units would become surplus and might be grouped as a division. MacArthur described the division as a "rainbow," covering the entire nation. After consulting Brig. Gen. William A. Mann, Chief of the Militia Bureau, the War College Division drafted a scheme to organize such a division with surplus units from twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. On 14 August the 42d Division was placed on the rolls of the Army, and six days later its units began arriving at Camp Mills, New York, eventually a transient facility for soldiers going to France. The following month Mann, who was reassigned from the Militia Bureau and appointed the division commander, organized the "Rainbow Division," which sailed for France a few weeks later.31
The organization of the sixteen National Army divisions also began in August when the designated division commanders, all Regular Army officers, and officer cadres reported to their respective training camps. Immediately thereafter the commanders established the 76th through the 91st Divisions and a depot brigade for each (Table 4).32
TABLE 4 Geographic Distribution of National Army Divisions World War I
On 3 September the first draftees arrived. The depot brigades processed the new draftees while the divisions began a rigorous training program. Many of these men, however, quickly became fillers for National Guard and Regular Army units going overseas, one of the reasons that National Army divisions were unready for combat for many months.33
One Regular Army infantry division, the 2d, was organized in France. When the first troops deployed, the U.S. Marine Corps wanted a share of the action, and Secretary Baker agreed that two Marine regiments should serve with the Army. The 5th Marines sailed with the 1st Expeditionary Division, and Pershing assigned them as security detachments and labor troops in France. Shortly thereafter he advised the War Department that the marines did not fit into his organizational plans and recommended that they be converted to Army troops. The marines, however, continued to press for a combat role. Eventually the Departments of War and the Navy agreed that two Regular Army infantry regiments, initially programmed as lines of communication troops, and the two Marine regiments (one serving in France and one from the United States) should form the core of the 2d Division. The adjutant general informed Pershing of the decision, and Brig. Gen. Charles A. Doyen, U.S. Marine Corps, organized the 2d Division on 26 October 1917 at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France. The division eventually included the 3d Infantry Brigade (the 9th and 23d Infantry and the 3d Machine Gun Battalion), the 4th Marine Brigade (the 5th and 6th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion [Marines]), the 2d Field Artillery Brigade, and support units.34
The 3d through the 8th Divisions, Regular Army units, were organized between 21 November 1917 and 5 January 1918 in the United States. Of these divisions, only the 4th and 8th assembled and trained as units before going overseas because the Guard and National Army units occupied the divisional training areas. The 4th replaced the 41st Division at Camp Greene, and the 8th occupied Camp Fremont upon its completion. To fill the divisions, partially trained draftees were transferred from National Army units, a process that eroded the concept of the three separate components-the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army.35
As the three-component idea deteriorated, Baker discussed the elimination of such distinctions altogether with Scott and Bliss. The officers opposed the action, believing it would undermine the local pride that National Guard and National Army units exhibited. General Peyton C. March, who had served as Army Chief of Staff since the spring of 1918, disagreed. He announced that the nation had but one army, the United States Army, and discontinued the distinctive names and insignia for the three components. After 7 August 1918, all soldiers, including those in divisions, wore the collar insignia of the United States Army. Nevertheless, the men still considered their divisions as belonging to the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the National Army.36
All-black units comprised a special category of troops. The draft of the National Guard included some black units, and the War Department directed the organization of additional regiments if sufficient numbers of black draftees reported to National Army camps. In October 1917 Secretary Baker ordered the units at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Sherman, Dix, Upton, and Meade to form the 92d Division. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Ballou organized a division headquarters at Camp Funston later that month, but the division did not assemble or train in the United States. The following June the 92d moved to France and first saw combat in the Lorraine area.37
After the organization of the 92d there remained the equivalent of four black infantry regiments in the United States, and the staff anticipated that their personnel would serve as replacements for the 92d or lines of communication troops in France. For administrative purposes, these black troops were organized in December 1917 as the 185th and 186th Infantry Brigades. Shortly thereafter the Headquarters, 93d Division (Provisional), a small administrative unit, was organized. Never intended to be a tactical unit, it simply exercised administrative control over the two brigades while they underwent training.38
Puerto Ricans comprised another segregated group in the Army, and the General Staff gave special consideration to them when organizing divisions. Initially it planned a provisional Puerto Rican division using the prewar tables that called for three infantry brigades, but that idea was soon dropped. Instead, the War Plans Division, which had succeeded the War College Division, endorsed the creation of a Spanish-speaking square division (less the field artillery brigade), to be designated the 94th Division. Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, Chief of Field Artillery, opposed the organization of the field artillery brigade because the Army lacked Spanish-speaking instructors and an artillery training area in Puerto Rico. He believed that a brigade could be furnished from artillery units in the United States. Others opposed formation of the division on ethnic grounds, arguing that Puerto Ricans might not do well in combat. Proponents countered that good leadership would guarantee good performance in combat. The staff worked out a compromise. The divisional designation was to be withheld, but the organization of the divisional elements was to proceed. The infantry regiments were assigned numbers 373 through 376, which would have been associated with the National Army's 94th Division. During the war the Army organized only three of those regiments, with approximately 17,000 Puerto Rican draftees, but never formed the 94th Division itself 39
Pershing ignored French and British recommendations that cavalry divisions not be sent to France. Himself a cavalryman, the general decided that he might use such a force as a mobile reserve. After all, both Allies still hoped for a breakthrough and maintained 30,000 to 40,000 mounted troops to exploit such an opportunity. Most of the Regular Army cavalry regiments, however, had been scattered in small detachments along the Mexican border and had furnished personnel for overseas duty. The cavalry arm needed to be rebuilt. That process began when the secretary of war approved the formation of the 15th Cavalry Division. On 10 December 1917, Maj. Gen. George W Reed organized its headquarters at Fort Bliss, Texas; the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; the 2d Brigade at Bliss, Texas; and the 3d at Douglas, Arizona. The division had two missions: to prepare for combat in France and to patrol the Mexican border.40
The breakup of the 15th Cavalry Division began shortly after its formation. Responding to Pershing's request for army corps troops, the War Department detached the division's 6th and 15th Cavalry and sent them to France. Because of the paucity of cavalry units, they were not replaced in the division. In May 1918 Maj. Gen. Willard Holbrook, the Southern Department commander, informed the chief of staff of the Army that the situation on the border required the remainder of the division to remain there. Holbrook further stated that border-patrol work could be improved if the divisional organization were abandoned. On 12 May the division headquarters was demobilized, but the division's three cavalry brigades continued to serve on the border until July 1919, when their headquarters were also demobilized. With the demobilization of the division, Pershing's hope for a cavalry division died. Baker informed him that all remaining mounted troops were needed in the United States.41
When the first phase of the mobilization ended on 5 January 1918, the Army had 42 infantry divisions, 1 short-lived cavalry division, and 1 provisional division of 2 infantry brigades. All divisions were in various stages of training. Shortages of uniforms, weapons, and equipment remained acute.
Expansion of the Divisional Forces
By the spring of 1918 Pershing had requested more divisions than he had outlined in the General Organization Project because the Allies' fortunes had drastically changed. Russia had been forced out of the war, and the British and French armies had begun to show the strain of manpower losses sustained since 1914. Although Germany also felt the effects of the long war, it was busy transferring troops from the now defunct Eastern Front to the West for one final offensive. Alarmed, the Allies wanted 100 U.S. Army divisions as soon as possible. Within the War Department the request caused considerable debate as to its feasibility, particularly with regard to raw materials, production, and shipping of war supplies. Only in July did President Wilson approve a plan to mount a 98-division force by the end of 1919, 80 for France and 18 in reserve in the United States.42
During the debate over force structure, the War Plans Division considered whether the additional divisions should be Regular Army or National Army units. Not all Regular Army infantry regiments authorized under the National Defense Act of 1916 had been assigned to divisions, thus raising the question of why those regiments should exist. The War Plans Division recommended that the Regular Army infantry regiments become the nuclei of the next group of divisions, which would be completed with National Army units. The National Army units would pass out of existence after the war.43
In July 1918 Secretary Baker approved the organization of twelve more divisions. Regular Army infantry regiments in the United States and from Hawaii and Panama formed the core of the 9th through 20th Divisions (Table 5).44 These divisions, organized between 17 July and 1 September, occupied camps vacated by National Guard and National Army divisions that had gone to France. Conforming to Pershing's fixed army corps idea, the 11th and 17th Divisions were scheduled to be replacement and school divisions, while the 14th and 20th were programmed as base and training divisions. The only change in these divisions from the others was in their artillery. The 11th and 17th had one regiment each of 3-inch horse-drawn guns, 4.7-inch motorized howitzers, and 6-inch motorized howitzers, while the 14th and 20th each had one 3-inch gun regiment carried on trucks, one regiment of 3-inch horse-drawn guns, and one regiment of 6-inch motorized howitzers. These artillery units were to be detached from the divisions and serve as corps artillery, except the 3-inch gun regiment carried on trucks, which was to serve as part of army artillery.45
As the Army Staff perfected plans to organize additional Regular Army divisions, steps had been taken to assure adequate military forces in Hawaii. On 1 June 1918, the president called the two infantry regiments from the Hawaii National Guard into federal service, and they replaced units that had transferred to the United States from Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter.46
TABLE 5 Expansion of Divisional Forces, 1918
The Philippine Islands also proved to be a potential source of manpower for fighting World War 1. When the United States entered the conflict, the Philippine people offered to raise a volunteer infantry division to be a part of American forces. The offer was declined, but Congress authorized federalizing the Philippine Militia to replace U.S. Army units if necessary. Nine days after the armistice President Wilson ordered nascent militia into federal service for training, and the 1st Division, Philippine National Guard, was organized under the prewar divisional structure. The division, however, lacked many of its required units, and its headquarters was mustered out of federal service on 19 December 1918.47
There were also two Regular Army nondivisional infantry regiments in the Philippine Islands. In July 1918 they joined an international force for service in Siberia. To bring the regiments to war strength, 5,000 well-trained infantrymen from the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, California, joined the Siberian Expedition.48
In July 1918 Secretary Baker approved final expansion of divisional forces, which involved black draftees. The plan required black units to replace sixteen white pioneer infantry regiments serving in France. These white units were to be organized into eight infantry brigades and eventually be assigned to divisions partially raised in the United States. By 11 November the War Department had organized portions of the 95th through the 102d Divisions in the United States (see Table 5), but the brigades in France had not been organized.49
The General Staff had approved several changes in the August 1917 structure when the Army began to organize the last group of infantry divisions for World War I. Changes included reducing the division's reserve machine gun battalion from a four-company organization to a two-company unit and increasing the infantry brigade's machine gun battalions from three to four companies. Although the total number of machine gun units remained the same, the realignment afforded better command and control within the infantry brigades. More Signal Corps men were added, and more motorized ambulances were provided for the sanitary trains. Usually each modification brought a change in the strength of the division, which by November 1918 stood at 28,105 officers and enlisted men.50
The demands of combat led to several changes in divisional weapons. The French agreed to replace all U.S. 3-inch guns with their 75-mm. guns in exchange for supplies of ammunition. The 3-inch Stokes mortars, optional weapons in the infantry regiment, were made permanent. To defend the division against enemy airplanes, antiaircraft machine guns were authorized in the field artillery regiments. The most significant change, however, involved machine guns and automatic rifles. In September 1918 elements of the 79th and 80th Divisions used new machine guns and automatic rifles invented by John M. Browning. The Browning water-cooled machine gun was a lighter, more reliable weapon than either the British Vickers or the French Hotchkiss, and the Browning automatic rifle (BAR) surpassed the British Lewis and French Chauchat in reliability. New Browning weapons, however, were not available in sufficient quantities for all divisions before the end of the war.51
Pershing formally modified the division staff during the war. In February 1918 he adopted the European functional staff, which he had been tentatively using since the summer of 1917. Under that system the staff consisted of five sections: G-1 (personnel), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (operations), G-4 (supply), and G-5 (training). Each section coordinated all activities within its sphere and reported directly to the chief of staff, thereby relieving the commander of many routine details.52
Pershing and his staff also changed plans for assembling army corps to meet conditions in France. When four divisions had arrived in France, the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) staff began planning a corps replacement and school division. After reviewing the readiness status of the divisions, the staff recommended that the 42d be reorganized as the replacement and school unit. Pershing disagreed. For political reasons, the "Rainbow" Division had to be a combat unit. Also, he did not agree that the army corps required a replacement and school unit at that time; he wanted a base and training division to receive and process replacements. For that job he selected the 41st Division, which had just begun to arrive in France.53
Shortly thereafter Pershing revised the replacement system for the AEF. Instead of relying on a replacement and school division and a base and training division for each army corps, he split the replacement function between the army corps and the "communications zone," the area immediately behind the battlefield controlled by the "Service of the Rear." In the communications zone a depot (base and training) division would process personnel into the theater, while a replacement (replacement and school) division in each army corps distributed new personnel to their units. He assigned the 41st Division to the Service of the Rear (later the Services of Supply) as a depot division, which was to receive, train, equip, and forward replacements (both officers and enlisted men) to replacement divisions of the corps, and designated the 32d Division as the I Army Corps' replacement unit. But when the German offensive began along the Somme (21 March to 6 April 1918), the 32d Division was assigned to combat duty. To channel replacements from the depot division to their assigned units, each army corps instead established a replacement battalion. The depot division processed casuals into the theater, and the replacement battalions forwarded them to the units. The 41st served as the depot division for the AEF until July 1918. No replacement division was organized during World War 1.54
The German offensive on the Somme upset Pershing's organizational plans. He offered all American divisions to the French Army. The 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d Divisions were sent to various quiet sectors of the line, and they and more recent arrivals did not come under Pershing's control until late in the summer of 1918. He also placed the four regiments of the black 93d Division (Provisional) at the disposal of the French with the understanding that they would be returned to his control upon request. The French quickly reorganized and equipped the regiments under their tables of organization. Although they were to be returned to Pershing's control after the crisis, they remained with French units until the end of the war. The headquarters of the provisional 93d Division was discontinued in May 1918.55
The Army and the nation did not have enough ships to transport forces to France, and this lack was a major obstacle to the war effort. After lengthy discussions in early 1918, the British agreed to transport infantry, machine gun, signal, and engineer units for six divisions in their ships. Upon arrival in France, these units were to train with the British. The divisional artillery and trains were to be shipped when space became available, and they were to train in American training areas. The British executed the program in the early spring of 1918, eventually moving the 4th, 27th, 28th, 30th, 33d, 35th, 77th, 78th, 80th, and 82d Divisions. By June 1918 the nation's transport capability had increased markedly. In addition, the adoption of the convoy system greatly reduced the effect of German submarines, allowing the number of divisions in France to rise rapidly (Table 6). 56
As more divisions arrived, Pershing revamped his ideas about the army corps. He made it a command consisting of a headquarters, corps artillery, technical troops, and divisions. The divisions and technical troops could be varied for each specific operation. Under his system, patterned after the French, the army corps became a more mobile, flexible command. The concept also took advantage of the limited number of American divisions in the theater, shifting them among army corps as needed. Eventually, Pershing organized seven army corps.
To maintain them, the 39th, 40th, 41st, 76th, 83d, and 85th Divisions served as depot organizations. The 31st Division was slated to become the seventh depot division but never acted in that role, having been broken up for needed replacements. Because depot divisions needed only cadres to operate, most of the personnel, except for men in the field artillery brigades, were also distributed to combat divisions as replacements. After additional training, the field artillery brigades assigned to the 41st, 76th, 83d, and 85th Divisions saw combat primarily as army corps artillery. Those assigned to the 39th and 40th were still training when the fighting ended.57
When the Services of Supply reorganized the 83d and 85th Divisions as depot units, some of their elements were used as special expeditionary forces. The 332d Infantry and 331st Field Hospital, elements of the 83d Division, participated in the Vittorio Veneto campaign on the Italian front during October and November 1918. The 339th Infantry; the 1st Battalion, 310th Engineers; the 337th Ambulance Company; and the 337th Field Hospital of the 85th constituted the American contingent of the Murmansk Expedition, which served under British command in North Russia from September 1918 to July 1919.58
TABLE 6 Deployment of Divisions to France
Heavy losses during the greatest American involvement in World War I, the Meuse-Argonne campaign that began on 26 September 1918, created a need for additional replacements. One week of combat left divisions so depleted that Pershing ordered personnel from the 84th and 86th Divisions, which had just arrived in France, to be used as replacements.59 The arrangement was supposed to be temporary, and at first only men from infantry and machine gun units served as replacements. Eventually all divisional personnel were swallowed up, except for one enlisted man per company and one officer per regiment who maintained unit records. The manpower shortage persisted. On 17 October the 31st Division, programmed as the depot division, was skeletonized and its men used as replacements. The 34th and 38th Divisions were also stripped of their men as they arrived from the United States. Nevertheless, the high casualty rate took a toll on all combat units, and Pershing slashed the authorized strength of infantry and machine gun companies from 250 to 175 enlisted men, thereby temporarily reducing each division by 4,000 men. Smaller combat divisions, however, conducted some of the fiercest fighting of the war-attacks against the enemy's fortified positions on the hills between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River.60
While scrambling for personnel, Pershing again reorganized the replacement system, trying to improve its responsiveness to the flexible army corps and army organizations. Army corps replacement battalions failed because divisions left the corps so rapidly that the battalions were unable to keep up with them. Therefore, he ordered the 40th and 85th Divisions to serve as regional replacement depots for the First and Second Armies, respectively, and the 41st and 83d as depot divisions in the Services of Supply. The other two depot divisions, the 39th and 76th, were stripped of their personnel. The replacement system, however, remained unsatisfactory to the end of the war.61
Divisions in France also suffered from a shortage of animals for transport. As the quartermaster general had predicted in 1917, units never had more than half the transportation authorized in their tables of organization for lack of animals. In some divisions artillerymen moved their pieces by hand. To overcome the shortage, Pershing's staff planned to motorize the 155-mm. howitzer regiments and one regiment of 75-mm. guns in each division. By November 1918, however, only eleven 155-mm. howitzer regiments had been thus equipped.62 Troop shortages also hit support units. During the fall of 1918 the commander of the Services of Supply, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, requested personnel from three combat divisions for labor units in his command. On 17 September Pershing's headquarters reassigned three divisions scheduled to arrive from the United States to Harbord. Only one of these, the 87th, reported before the end of the fighting, and it was broken up for laborers in the Services of Supply.63
Handicapped by the scarcity of men and animals, Pershing sought ways to make divisions more effective combat units. In October 1918 he advised new division commanders to use their personalities to increase the patriotism, morale, and fighting spirit of their men. One way to develop unit esprit, Pershing suggested, was for divisions to adopt distinctive cloth shoulder sleeve insignia. At that time the 81st Division had already begun using such insignia. On his return to the United States after visiting the Western Front in the fall of 1917, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles J. Bailey, had authorized a shoulder sleeve insignia for his unit. He instructed the men not to wear the patch until after leaving the United States. When the division arrived in France, the insignia came to Pershing's attention. Bailey explained that no official sanction existed for the emblem, but that it created comradeship among the men, helped to develop esprit, and aided in controlling small units in open warfare. Pershing apparently liked the idea for he ordered all divisions to adopt shoulder sleeve insignia. Within a short time the other divisions had their own shoulder patches, many adopting their divisional property symbols. Along with the insignia, the men began to adopt divisional nicknames, such as "Big Red One" and "Wildcat" for the 1 stand 81st Divisions, respectively.64
Combat, particularly in the Meuse-Argonne campaign, tested the assumptions that lay behind the large square division. Designed to conduct sustained frontal attacks, not maneuver, it was thought to possess tremendous firepower and endurance. The division's firepower, however, proved ineffective. The lack of wire and the continual movement of infantry units in the offensive hindered communications between infantry and artillery. In addition, the French transportation network could handle only so many men, guns, and supplies. Traffic congestion bogged down the movement of units and also prevented communication. When divisions were on the line they suffered from the lack of food, ammunition, and other supplies. Part of the logistical problems also rested with a division's lack of combat service troops to carry rations, bury the dead, and evacuate casualties.65
By Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, the Army had fielded 1 cavalry division, 1 provisional infantry division, and 62 infantry divisions. Of this total, 42 infantry divisions and the provisional division deployed to Europe (see Table 6), with one, the 8th Division, not arriving until after the fighting had ended. On the Western Front in France, 29 divisions (7 Regular Army, 11 National Guard, and 11 National Army) fought in combat. Of the others, 7 served as depot divisions, 2 of which were skeletonized, and 5 were stripped of their personnel for replacements in combat units, laborers in rear areas, or expeditionary forces in North Russia or Italy. The provisional black division was broken up, but its four infantry regiments saw combat. Starting from a limited mobilization base, this buildup, lasting eighteen months, was a remarkable achievement.
Despite the difficulties, World War I brought about more coordination among the combat arms, combat support, and combat service organizations in the infantry division than ever before. Infantry could not advance without support from engineers and artillery; artillery could not continue to fire without a constant supply of ammunition. Transportation and signal units provided the vital materiel and command connections, while medical units administered to the needs of the wounded. This complex type of combined arms unit became possible because of advances in technology, weapons, communications, and transportation.
The adoption of the unwieldy square division, however, proved to be less than satisfactory. Pershing's staff believed that a division of 28,000 would conserve the limited supply of trained officers, maximize firepower, and sustain itself effectively in combat. In practice, the square division lacked mobility. Its deficiencies became apparent during the important Meuse-Argonne offensive, when American divisions bogged down and suffered excessive casualties. The successes and failures of the infantry division's organization set the stage for a debate that would surround it for the next twenty years.
Endnotes for Chapter III
1 Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: Century Co., 1928), p. 552.
2 Scott, Memories, pp. 550-56; Frederick Palmer, Bliss, The Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1934), pp. 146-56.
3 Memo, WCD for CofS, 10 May 17, sub: Plans for a Possible Expeditionary Force to France, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. The WCD 10050 file is replete with background material on the development of the new division.
4 Memo, WCD, 10 May 1917, sub: Plans for a Possible Expeditionary Force to France; Draft of Memo prepared in May 1917, WCD for CofS, 7 Jul 1917, sub: The Organization of an American Army, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. The French used two types of divisions in 1917, one fielding about 17,000 men based on two brigades of two infantry regiments each and the other of 14,000 organized around three infantry regiments.
5 Ibid.; Draft of Memo prepared in May 1917, WCD for CofS, 7 Jul 17, sub: The Organization of an American Army, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA.
6 L. Van Loan Naisawald, The US Infantry Division: Changing Concepts in Organization 1900-39, Project Shop, I-ORO S-239 (Chevy Chase, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, 1952), pp. 12 and fig. 4; Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to France, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA.
7 General Scott had been sent to Russia with a presidential commission to establish contact with the revolutionary government that had overthrown the czar. Scott, Memories, p. 570.
8 Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to France, and Memo, CofB for WCD, 24 May 17, no subject, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA.
9 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1921) 1:2-3; Ltr, The Adjutant General of the Army (hereafter cited as TAG) to CG, Southern Department, 23 May 17, sub: Organizations designated for foreign service, and Lit, TAG to CG, Southern Department, 26 May 17, same subject, 1st Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; Society of the First Division, History of the First Division During World War 1917-1919 (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1922), p. 2.
10 Society of the First Division, History of the First Division, pp. 6-18; GO 1, 1st Expeditionary Division, 8 Jun 1917, 1st Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 146-47; John Whiteclay Chambers, II, To Raise an Army. The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 147.
11 Pershing, My Experiences, 1:38-40, 43-44, 100-101; Ltr, TAG to Col. Chauncey B. Baker, 28 May 17, printed in United States Army in the World War 1917-1919: Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 55 (hereafter cited as Organization, AEF); Memo, CofS for Maj Gen Pershing, 21 May 17, sub: Organizations higher than Divisions, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA; Memo, John McA. Palmer for Gen Pershing, 19 Oct 21, no subject, John McA. Palmer Papers, LC.
12 Organization, AEF, pp. 55-56, 91, 108; Lit, Baker to Pershing, 7 Jun 17, no subject, Pershing Papers, LC. The officers who accompanied Baker were Colonels William A. Graves, Dwight E. Aultman, Mark L. Hersey, and Charles P. Summerall; Lieutenant Colonels Hanson E. Ely, Edward D. Anderson, Kirby Walker, and Sherwood A. Cheney; Majors George S. Simonds. Morns E. Lock, and Frederick A. Ellison, and Captain John J. Quakemeyer.
13 Organization, AEF, pp. 97-98.
14 The automatic rifle and the machine gun were viewed as similar rapid-fire infantry weapons, and the Baker Board recommended the adoption of concise descriptions for them. It proposed that the automatic rifle be defined as a weapon where recoil was sustained by the body of the firer, while recoil from the machine gun would be sustained by some sort of solid mount clamped to the weapon. (See Organization, AEF, p. 75).
15 Organization, AEF, pp. 56-89 and pp. 93-114 passim.
16 Ibid., pp. 109-14; Ltr, Maj Gen John J. Pershing to Maj Gen Tasker H. Bliss, 9 Jul 17, no subject, Pershing Papers, LC; James W. Rainey, "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I," Parameters 13 (Sep 1983): 38; Pershing, My Experiences, 1:106-07.
17 Organization, AEF, pp. 83, 99-100, 105.
18 Ibid., pp. 93-96.
19 Palmer, Bliss, pp. 170-71; James G. Harbord, The American Army in France 1917-1919 (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1936), pp. 102-04.
20 Organization, AEF, p. 138; Tables of Organization (hereafter cited as T/O), Series A, Table 1, Infantry Division, 1917.
21 T/O, Series A, Table 2, Headquarters, Infantry Division, Table 3, Infantry Brigade, Table 12, Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters, 1917.
22 WD Bull 32, 1917; WD GO 88, 1917; Henry Jervey, "Mobilization of the Emergency Army," lecture at the Army War College, 3 Jan 1920, copy in DAMN Library, Washington, D.C,; Chambers, To Raise an Army, p. 140.
23 Memo, WCD for CofS, 20 Feb 17, sub: A plan for an expansible army of 500,000 men based on universal liability to the military service, localization of organizations, and decentralization of administration, TAG file 9433, RG 165, NARA (the memo offers the C/S three options to increase the size of the Army); Ltr, Ch of the MB, to TAGS of all States, Territory of Hawaii, District of Columbia, and inspector-instructors and officers in charge of militia affairs, department headquarters, 5 May 17, sub: Organization and entry in Federal service of National Guard. MB file 325.4, RG 168, NARA. Also see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, The National Defense Hearings. 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 May 1917, pp. 303-04.
24 Rpt of the Sec of War, AR WD, 1917, pp. 25-34.
25 Ibid.; Rpt of the Construction Div, ARWD, 1918, pp. 1283-86.
26 Memo, WCD for CofS, sub: Designation of force to compose the Army of the United States, 23 Jun 17, and Memo, WCD for Cold, sub: Designation of organizations, 23 Aug 17, WCD file 9876, RG 165, NARA- WD GOs 88 and 115, 1917; Special Regulations No. 41, Change 1, Uniform Regulations, 1917.
27 WD GOs 90, 101, 109, and 114, 1917; Army War College (hereafter cited as AWC) Statement, Proposed organization of the increased military establishment and proposed plan for providing the necessary officers, 9 Aug 17, CofS files 1917-1921, file 1080, RG 165, NARA.
28 Kreidberg and Henry, Mobilization, pp. 320-21; AWC Statement: Proposed organization of the increased military establishment, 9 Aug 17; Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917-19), Zone of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 79-80.
29 Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces, Divisions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 117-265 passim, hereafter cited as Divisions, and Zone of the Interior, part 2, Directory of Troops (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 1277-78, hereafter cited as Directory of Troops; Pennsylvania in the World War, 1:131-40, 2:141; O'Ryan, The Story of the 27th Division, 1:61-70; Frederick L. Huidekoper, The History of the 33d Division, A.E.F., 4 vols. (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1921) 1:1-7.
30 Ltr, TAG to Brig Gen Clarence R. Edwards, sub: Preparation of the 26th Division for service abroad, 13 Aug 17, and Ltr, CG, 26th Division to TAG, sub: Organization of the 26th Division, 22 Sep 17, copies in DAMH-HSO World War I order of battle file; Harry A. Benwell, History of the Yankee Division (Boston, Mass.: Cornhill Co., 1919), pp. 20-21; Rpt of the Ch of the MB, AR WD, 1978, p. 1104; William F. Strobridge, Golden Gate to Golden Horn (San Mateo, Calif.: San Mateo' County Historical Association, 1975), p. 3; Divisions, pp. 117, 256.
31 Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker, American at War, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1931) 1:356-57; Memo, WCD for CofS, 30 Jul 17, sub: Composition Division, National Guard for service in France, RG 165, NARA; Ltr, TAG to Dept Commanders, 1 Aug 17, same subject, TAG 322.07 ee in 42d Inf Div File, DAMN-HSO; Divisions, p. 275. Brig Gen William A. Mann was the brother of James Robert Mann, who was the second ranking Republican from Illinois. His brother's appointment was a bipartisan move for World War I.
32 Secretary Baker had authorized the camp commanders, who served as division commanders, to organize depot brigades as divisional elements. The depot brigade filled two purposes: one was to train replacements for the A.E.F. since the War College Division did not agree to Pershing's seventh division for the corps; the other was to act as a receiving unit for men sent to the camps by draft boards. David F. Trask, ed., Historical Survey of US Mobilization: Eight Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century, Study 6, Terrence J. Dough, "Equipment", pp. 6-7, Ms, DAMH-HSR.
33 Divisions, pp. 29121 passim; Memo, Office Chief of Staff (OCS) for TAG, 11 Aug 17, no subject, OCS 9876-59, RG 165, NARA,- WD GO 101, 1917; Jervey, "Mobilization of the Emergency Army," pp. 14-15; Memo, WCD for CofS, 19 Oct 17, sub: Plan for Organization and Dispatch of Troops to Europe, WCD file 10050-119, RG 165, NARA; also see Julius O. Adler, History of the Seventy-Seventh Division (New York: Wynokoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919), pp. 11-18; John G. Little, Jr., The Official History of the Eighty-Sixth Division (Chicago: State Publication Society, 1921), pp. 1-17; and The 88th Division in the World War of 1914-1918 (New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919), pp. 27-36.
34 Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to France, WCD file 10050-21, RG 165, NARA; Memo, WCD for CofS, sub: Organization of the 2d Division (Regular) for service overseas, approved 20 Sep 17, and Memo, TAG to multiple addresses, 21 Sep 17, Organization of 2d Division (Regular), both 2d Inf Div file, DAMN-HSO; United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Policy-Forming Documents American Expeditionary Forces, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948) p. 35, hereafter cited as Documents; United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Training and the Use of American Units with British and French, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948) pp. 491-92, hereafter cited as Training; Oliver L. Spaulding and John W. Wright, The Second Division, American Expeditionary Forces in France 1917-1919 (New York: Hillman Press, Inc., 1937), pp. 6-7; Thomas Shipley, The History of the A.E.F. (New York: George H. Dorm Co., 1920), p. 46; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), pp. 289-94.
35 Divisions, pp. 47-109 passim.
36 Edward M. Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Pevton C. March (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 129-30; WD GO 73, 1918.
37 Memo, WCD for TAG, 1 Aug 17, sub: Utilization of colored men drafted for the National Army, WCD file 8142-13, Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 Aug 17, same subject, Memo, OCS for TAG, 24 Oct 17, sub: Organization of the Division, Colored, WCD file 8142-24, RG 165, NARA; Divisions, pp. 431-35.
38 Memo, WCD for C/S, 13 Nov 17, sub: Utilization of Colored Units of the National Guard and Colored Draft, and Ltr., TAG to Brig Gen Ray Hoffman, 5 Jan 18, sub: 93d Division (Provisional), WCD file 8142, RG 165, NARA; GO 1, Provisional Division (Colored), 24 Dec 1917, 93d Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; Divisions, p. 437.
39 Memo, War Plan Division (WPD) for CofS, 9 May 18, sub: Organization of Troops of the Puerto Rico Draft, WPD file 9876-191, and Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 18, same subject, WPD file 9876-203, RG 165, NARA; Zone of the Interior, p. 661-62; Directory of Troops, p. 1400.
40 Memo, WCD for CofS, 23 Nov 17, sub: Organization of the Cavalry Division (Regular). Memo, WCD for TAG, 27 Nov 17, same subject, WCD file 6815-32, RG 165, NARA; Zone of the Interior, pp. 673-74; Palmer, Baker, 2:18-19.
41 Memo, WPD for CofS, undated, sub: 15th Cavalry Division, and Draft Telg, WPD to CG, AEF, 10 May 18, WCD file 6815-64, RG 165, NARA; Zone of the Interior, p. 671-74; Directory of Troops, p. 1270.
42 Zone of the Interior, pp. 52-55; Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword, pp. 85-90; Edward M. Coffman, The War To End All Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966)_ pp. 177-80; Kriedberg and Henry, Mobilization, pp. 3029.
43 Memo, WPD for Dir of Operations, 31 May 18, sub: Organization of the next 23 divisions, WPD file 8481-84, RG 165, NARA.
44 Because the 15th Cavalry Division was demobilized in May 1918, the number 15 was available in July for a Regular Army infantry division without a duplication of numbers.
45 Memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Jul 18, sub: Organization of the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Divisions, WPD file 8481-96, and Memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jul 18, sub: Organization of the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Divisions, WPD file 8481-97, RG 165, NARA; T/O 12, Field Artillery Brigade (Combat Division), 14 Jan 18, corrected to 26 Jun 18; Zone of the Interior, pp. 641-61. Motorized artillery during World War I referred to tractor-drawn field artillery.
46 Zone of the Interior, p. 629; Directory of Troops, p. 1405.
47 Rpts of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1917, printed in ARWD, 1918, pp. 1-5, and 1918, printed in ARWD, 1919, p. 6; Zone of the Interior, pp. 674-75.
48 Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces, General Headquarters, Armies, Army Corps, Services of Supply, Separate Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 386, hereafter cited as General Headquarters, Armies.
49 Memo, CofS for TAG, 23 Jul 18, sub: Disposal of the Colored draft (Organization of new divisions), AWC file 8142-185, RG 165, NARA; Zone of the Interior, pp. 662-70.
50 Changes in the tables of organization and weapons can be traced through the following sources: T/O Series A, 14 January 1918, corrected to 26 June 1918 (printed in Organization, AEF, pp. 335-88), and tables printed in Genesis of the American First Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 59-61.
51 George M. Chin, The Machine Gun, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), 1:173-86; Sevellon Brown, The Story of Ordnance in the World War (Washington, D.C.: James William Bryan Press, 1920), pp. 128-30.
52 AEF GO 31, 1918.
53 "Report of Assistant CofS, G-1, G.H.Q., A.E.F. and Statistics," United States Army in World War.' Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 150-52, hereafter cited as Reports of CINC.
54 Ibid.; AEF GOs 9, 46, and 111, 1918.
55 Pershing, My Experiences, 1:291, 353-65; Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 72; Divisions, pp. 4372.
56 Coffman, The War To End All Wars, pp. 168-71; Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 384; Documents, Training contains numerous documents pertaining to the agreement and training with British and French.
57 Hunter Liggett, AEF, Ten Years Ago in France (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1928), p. 28 General Headquarters, Armies, pp. 193, 220, 237, 268, 290, 316, and 329; Divisions, pp. 251, 269, 293, 363-64, 379.
58 General Headquarters, Armies, pp. 381-83; Joel R. Moore, "The North Russian Expedition," Infantry Journal 29 (Jul 1926): 1-21; Richard K. Kolb, "Polar Bears vs. Bols," 78 VFW Magazine (Jan 1991): 16-20; Divisions, p. 363.
59 In addition to combat losses, the fall of 1918 witnessed one of the most severe influenza epidemics in history, which spread to over 25 percent of the Army in France (see Coffman, The War To End All Wars, pp. 81-84).
60 "Final Report" and "Report of Assistant Cold, G-1, G.H.Q., A.E.F., printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 55, 147-52; Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 401.
61 "Report of Assistant CofS, G-1, G.H.Q., A.E.F.," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 147-52.
62 "Final Report of Assistant Chief of Staff (G-4)," and "Final Report of the Chief of Artillery, American Expeditionary Forces," printed in Reports of CINC, pp. 77, 205-06; McKenney, "Field Artillery," p. 188.
63 John Hagood, The Services of Supply, A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), pp. 317-20; Divisions, p. 389.
64 Ltr, Pershing to Maj Gen George Bell, Jr., 24 Oct 18, no subject, Pershing Papers, LC; 1st Endorsement 323.3 (GS) Military Department and Divisions, Hq, 81st Division to CinC, AEF, 4 Oct 18, no subject, GS file 323.3, and Memo, CofS AEF for TAG, 18 Oct 18, no subject, The Institute of Heraldry (TIOH) Library, Fort Belvoir, Va.; Ken Sawitzke, "The Shoulder Patch," Infantry 65 (Dec 1975): 40-42.
65 Conrad H. Lanze, "The Artillery Support of the Infantry in the A.E.F," Field Artillery Journal 26 (Jan-Feb 1936): 67-68; Timothy Nenninger, "Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF, 1917-1918," Military Affairs 51 (Oct 1987): 177-81; Robert H. Fletcher, Jr., "The 35th Division in the First Phase of the Meuse Argonne Operation, September 26-October, 1918," p. 21, Ms, 35th Inf Div file, DAMN-HSO.