The Examiner, and Journal of Political Economy/Volume 2/Number 12/The Genuine Book of Nullification/Introduction
INTRODUCTION.
The theory of those who deny the right of a State "to judge of infractions of the Constitution, and of the mode and measure of redress," and "of interposing (her Veto) to arrest the progress of the usurpation," is that these United States, are not independent and sovereign States—and that the Federal Constitution is not a compact of alliance between the several States (that is between the people of each State and the people of every other State,) as separate, pre-existing bodies, or Commonwealths—each ceding by that compact certain specific powers to a General Government, and reserving all others to themselves. But that it is a form of Government made and adopted by the people of North America, collectively—and that from this Constitution or form of Government these States (as corporations) derive all the powers which they possess, having no right to exercise any other powers than such as are thereby granted to them.
To expose the utter fallacy of such a theory, we need but adduce the simple and actual facts of the early history of our country.
From the dawning resistance of the colonies against the usurpations and tyranny of Great Britain, we find those colonies acting independently of each other.
As early as the year 1765 the colony of South Carolina forcibly resisted the Stamp Tax; her citizens in Charleston having in that year surprised the garrison of Fort Johnson, and seized upon the stamps which were there deposited.—(See Drayton's Memoirs of the Revolution, vol. 1, p. 45.)
In the same year (May 1765) Virginia adopted, in her House of Burgesses, the famous resolutions of Patrick Henry, which declared void (or nullified) the Stamp Act.
In December, 1773, Massachusetts resisted the Tea Tax—her citizens in Boston having destroyed the Tea which was at that time in their harbour.
In March, 1776, South Carolina, in consequence of the British Act for confiscating American property, formed a separate constitution, and established a General Assembly for her own separate government, holding herself thereby independent of Great Britain, and resolving that this constitution should remain in force until a reconciliation with Great Britain should take place, (an event which never occurred.)—(See Ramsay's South Carolina, vol. 1, p. 263, and Drayton's Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 174, 180.) This constitution forms the first general Act of Independence, in our country, as well as the first written frame of government, which either this country or the world has witnessed. It is drawn up with great ability, and is ascribed to the venerated John Rutledge, (who was elected under its provisions to the office of President and Commander-in-Chief.)
It commences thus:
"South Carolina—In a Congress begun and holden at Charleston, on Wednesday, the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, and continued by divers adjournments to Tuesday, the twenty-sixth day of March, one thousand seven hunder and seventy-six.
A Constitution and form of Government agreed to and resolved upon by the Representatives of South Carolina.
Whereas, The British Parliament, claiming of late years a right to bind the North American colonies by law, in all cases whatsoever, have enacted statutes for raising a revenue in those colonies and disposing of such revenue as they thought proper, without the consent, and against the will of the Colonists. And whereas, it appearing to them that (they not being represented in Parliament) such claim was altogether unconstitutional, and if admitted, would at once reduce them from the rank of freemen to a state of the most abject slavery, the said Colonies therefore, severally remonstrated against the passing, and petitioned for the repeal of those Acts; but in vain. And whereas the said claim being persisted in, other unconstitutional and oppressive statutes have been since enacted, &c." (proceeding to enumerate the various acts of oppression, amongst which are specified) "Statutes prohibiting the intercourse of the Colonies with each other, restricting their trade, and depriving many thousands of people of subsistence, by restraining them from fishing on the American coast." [See Drayton's Memoirs, vol. 2, page 186.]
In 1778, South Carolina formed another independent Constitution; and in 1790, another, (which is the one now in force.)
In May, 1775, the people of North Carolina in Mecklenburg county adopted, for that county, a Declaration of Independence which is the first on the records of our History, and by the terms of which they solemnly abjured all allegiance to the British Crown.
In June 1776, Virginia declared herself Independent, and adopted her Bill of Rights and first Constitution.
On 2d July, 1776, New Jersey adopted a separate and independent Constitution—and in December, 1776, North Carolina did the same.
On the 4th of July, 1776, the Thirteen States, or Colonies, in General Congress assembled, solemnly published and declared that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be Free and Independent States,—which Declaration was ratified and signed by the Representatives of each State, under the name of their respective States—and was merely a formal Annunciation or Proclamation to the world of the existing fact that these States had achieved their Independence. This Proclamation had, of itself, no power or efficacy to render them independent, if their own courageous love of liberty and invincible hatred of oppression had not enabled them to effect this glorious object. Had they been destitute of these exalted and efficient virtues all the parchment Declarations in the world, (however sacred they may be as records,) would have been but vain and empty boastings.
On the 9th of July, 1778, "Articles of confederation and perpetual Union" were adopted, "between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, &c.," to the number of thirteen States—which articles commence thus: "The style of this confederacy shall be the United States of America.
"Each State retains its Sovereignty, Freedom and Independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not, by this Confederation expressly delegated to the U. States in Congress assembled."
There had been since the year 1774, and annual Congress of Deputies from the Colonies held in Philadelphia, first (like the original Congress at New York in 1765) to remonstrate, and afterwards to concert measures of Defence. But none for the purposes of Government until the Confederation was formed in 1778.
The Congress of the old confederation soon finding itself put to great inconvenience and embarrassment for the want of a power to regulate the external relations—especially the commerce—of the country [which power was at that time under the almost entire control of the States individually,] made repeated representations to the State Legislatures of the necessity of enlarging their powers on these subjects by amendments of the Articles of confederation. In consequence of these applications, and under a conviction of their reasonableness and importance, several of the State Legislatures as early as the year 1786 recommended the holding of a general convention to consider these representations, and to "revise and amend the Articles of Confederation"—and a few of the States actually appointed Delegates to meet those of other states "that might be appointed" for this purpose, some time before the Federal congress passed the resolution calling for, and authorising the meeting of the said convention.
Thus, we find that Virginia (who appears to have been the first to adopt measures on the subject) recommended the holding of a convention first at Annapolis, "to consider the state of trade,"—at which (in Sept. 1786) only five of the States attended, to wit, Virginia, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, and Delaware. Finding, however, that their deliberations would be of little importance without a more general action of the states, Virginia again recommended a convention of all the states, "to revise and amend the Articles of confederation," to be held at Philadelphia the ensuing year. In pursuance of which on the 16th of October, 1786, the Virginia Legislature passed an Act for the "appointment of seven deputies by joint ballot at both Houses of Assembly" "to meet such deputies as may be appointed by other staets, to meet in Philadelphia, for the purpose of revising the Federal constitution"—(See the Act, Elliot's Debates, vol. 4, p. 30.) Which deputies were accordingly so appointed on 4th Dec. 1786.
So also the Pennsylvania Legislature on the 30th Dec. 1786, passed an Act appointing Deputies to the convention intended to be held in the city of Philadelphia, "for the purpose of revising the Federal constitution,"
So also the New Jersey Legislature appointed delegates for the same purpose on the 23d November, 1786.
So also the Delaware Legislature appointed delegates on 3d Feb. 1787.
On the 21st Feb. 1787, the Congress of the Confederation adopted the resolution which recommended and authorized the meeting of the said convention at Philadelphia.
The resolution is in these words: "Whereas, there is provision in the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the Legislatures of the several states; and whereas experience has evinced that there are defects in the present confederation; as a mean to remedy which several of the States, and particularly the state of New York, by express instructions to their Delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following Resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States a firm National Government.
"Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that on the second Monday in May next, a Convention of Delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the union."
In conformity with the Resolution, the States, which had not previously done so, appointed, by their Legislatures, Delegates to attend the said convention (except Rhode Island, who refused to appoint) each appointing separately as a State, without any rule, or standard, as to the number of Delegates, which was wholly immaterial as each was to be represented but as a State, and to have one equal vote, the smallest with the largest. Hence we find that whilst New York appointed but three delegates, Delaware appointed five.
The Credentials of each of these Delegates consisted of attested copies of the Acts of their several legislatures, so appointing them. Many of which Acts recite, or refer to, the terms of the said Resolution of the old congress; and all of them are similar in purport. The Act of Delaware, however, contained a specific proviso that no alterations or amendments should extend to deprive each State of an equal vote in deciding all questions in congress, according to the 5th Article of Confederation. And the Act of New York, (which uses the words "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation") bears the following teste, "In testimony whereof, I have caused the privy seal of the said State to be hereunto affixed this 9th day of May, in the Eleventh year of the Independence of the said State," (Signed) Geo. Clinton.
According to appointment the Convention met at Philadelphia, and the said Credentials of the members were read to entitle them to a seat,—and officers being appointed they proceeded to business, each State voting on every question as a State, and giving but a single vote, whether she had one representative, or six. By which means the seven smaller States outvoted and controlled the five larger States, though possessing but a third of their population.
On the 17th September, 1787, was drawn up, and agreed to, in this General Convention, the present Constitution, or frame of Government, by twelve of the thirteen "Sovereign, Free, and Independent States"—(Rhode Island refusing to alter the old compact)—which Constitution or frame of Government, did not, in any respect, alter the essential conditions of union on which the said Sovereign States had previously confederated. It did not, and could not, affect the distinct and separate nature of the parties; but was expressly declared to be for the purpose (not of changing the fundamental character of the Co-partnership) but merely, on account of certain defects in the existing frame of Government, "To form a more perfect Union, establish peace, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty, to ourselves and our posterity."
This Constitution, or form of Government, in its then state, was merely a recommendation or Report of the Convention, to be adopted or rejected by the States; its last article specifying expressly that it should be considered as ratified only when the conventions of "nine States" should adopt it. It had, therefore, no efficacy, and was but a draft of an agreement, until these nine States should so adopt and ratify it.
This ratification by the several States did not take place until 1788, the year after its formation by the said General Convention of the States,—and then with a requisition for the adoption of sundry suggested amendments and alterations, which were agreed to by Congress, and adopted by the State legislatures, in 1789.—The chief of which amendments [as expressed by Massachusetts] was, "That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid constitution, are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised"—or [as expressed by New Hampshire,] "That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly and particularly delegated by the aforesaid constitution, are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised"—or [as expressed by South Carolina,] "This convention doth declare, that no section or paragraph of the said constitution, warrants a construction that the States do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them, and vested in the General Government of the Union."
To this compact or constitution, however, the States of North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont, did not assent for several years after its original formation and adoption, and if they had never chosen to assent, they could not be compelled to do so.
In the separate conventions of the several States for adopting the federal constitution, the number of delegates in each bore no correspondence to the population of the different States—and this is another strong answer to the absurd doctrine, that the people of this Union, as one collective body, (instead of the people of each State acting as distinct sovereignties) adopted the federal constitution. For instance, the State of Connecticut had in her convention for adopting or rejecting the federal constitution, three times as many representatives as the State of New York in her convention, viz: 168 to 55. Massachusetts nearly five times as many as Pennsylvania, viz: 355 to 74. North Carolina upward of one-third more than Virginia, viz. 268 to 168—and South Carolina nearly ten times as many as Georgia, viz: 222 to 25.
Again, many of the States adopted that constitution with much reluctance, and by bare majorities of five, two, ten, eleven, &c., viz: New York, five; Virginia, ten; New Hampshire, eleven, and Rhode Island, two.\
On the second of July, 1788, the Congress of the Confederation received the ratification of the ninth State, (New Hampshire) when the President laid it before the members, proclaiming it to be the ninth ratification; and a motion was immediately submitted and carried, that the ratifications received be referred to a committee to consider the same, and "report an act of Congress for putting the said constitution into operation in pursuance of the resolutions of the late Federal Convention"—which committee reported an act accordingly, and it was finally resolved, that the first Wednesday in March, 1789, be the time for commencing proceedings under the said constitution. This resolution contains the following words: "And whereas, the constitution so reported by the Convention, and by Congress transmitted to the several Legislatures, has been ratified in the manner therein declared to be sufficient for the establishment of the same; and such ratifications, duly authenticated, have been received by Congress, and are filed in the office of the Secretary—therefore resolved, &c. (as above.)
From this it appears that the ratification of the ninth State alone gave validity (the moment it was received,) to that instrument which previously was regarded as a mere "Report" of the convention (as termed by the above resolutions of Congress.)
Now what is the evidence furnished by the above detailed facts of our early history, to establish the proposition of the independent sovereignty of the States, and of the formation of our Federal Government by such States, and not by the collective body of the people. The evidence is this:—
1st. That the several Colonies commenced with separate acts of resistance to the tyranny of G. Britain.
2d. That some of these Colonies adopted separate constitution and declarations of independence previous to the adoption of similar measures by a general action of the Colonies—for instance, South Carolina and Virginia established independent constitutions and forms of government several months previous to the general Declaration of Independence—upwards of two years antecedent to the "Articles of Confederation"—and twelve years before the adoption of the present Federal Constitution—acting, for all that period, as perfectly distinct and independent sovereignties.
3d. That the original Colonies, by the general Declaration of Independence, formally proclaimed themselves free and independent States, with all their rights of sovereignty unlimited and uncontrolled.
4th. That by their original Articles of Confederation, these free and independent States acknowledged and agreed that "each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence."
5th. That these sovereign rights have not been sacrificed or surrendered, beyond a certain limited portion, which, by their constitutional compact, the several States have bestowed upon their Federal Government—But have, by the very terms of that compact, expressly retained all others, undiminished and unimpaired.
6th. That the Federal Government, as established by the said constitutional compact, is, in fact, the creature of the several States, and not of the collective body of the people. 1st. Because the number of delegates to the Convention which framed that Government, were not in the ratio of population, the smaller States having, in many instances, a greater number than the larger. 2d. Because the votes in that Convention were taken by States, and not by members, or according to population—each State giving but one vote—(so that a minority of the people constitution seven States in the Convention, with a population of 936,700) may have framed the constitution against a majority of three to one (2,984600,) constituting the five remaining States which attended—or against a still larger majority, if all the States had attended. 3d. Because the adoption and ratification of the constitution was submitted, by its own provisions, to a majority of the States to effect, and not to a majority of the people; by which means the nine smaller States, containing a population of 1,760,200, may have ratified and given life to that instrument, which was previously a mere "dead letter," in opposition to the four larger States, with a population of 2,124,800; in other words, a minority may have overruled a majority of over 360,000. By this means also, if the five smaller States (with a population of 622,000) had refused to acceed, they could have prevented the adoption of that instrument by the eight larger States (with a population of 3,299,300)—in other words, a minority may have overruled a majority of five to one. 4th. Because the number of delegates in each State Convention for adopting the constitution, bore no proportion to their relative population, some of the States having ten times the number of delegates appointed by others. 5th. Because, when the constitution was adopted and ratified by the nine States, it had no virtue or efficacy in those States which did not adopt it, (as North Carolina and Rhode Island) and never could have such efficacy until they chose to accede—even though a majority of the people of five to one, had given it their assent.
In addition to these considerations, it is further evident, from the fifth article of this constitution, that it is the work of the separate States; for that article provides that no amendments or alterations shall be made (or ratified) but by three-fourths of the several States, either by their legislatures or conventions—and whilst this power is possessed by the States, not all the powers of the Federal Government can touch the constitution of the smallest State of the Union. So again, each of these States has an equal representation in the higher branch of the Federal Legislature, of which it cannot be deprived—and in this branch a majority of the States, forming, perhaps, a minority of the people may arrest (or nullify) the measures of a majority of that people in the same house, and of a vast majority of the people in the houses below.
From all these facts in the early history of our country, and from the true nature of the compact itself, it would assuredly seem to be beyond cavil or dispute, that our federal constitution is but a compact between sovereign and independent States, who thereby agreed to form a General Government with certain limited and specific powers, retaining all other powers to themselves.
If, then, this General Government be in reality the creature of the States, is it not preposterous to contend that certain judicial officers appointed by one department of this create, is to rule and govern its own paramount creators—and to decide upon their rights and privileges, when infringed too, by the very "approved good masters" of this deciding tribunal. Does it not, on the contrary, result inevitably from the very nature of the compact, that each of these creating sovereigns must judge for itself of every infraction of its own reserved rights, and of the "mode and measure of redress"—that it must, as its only remedy, (after employing argument and remonstrance in vain) put its sovereign veto or injunction upon the usurpation, in order to protect its own citizens, within its own limits, from tyranny and oppression, and to obtain from a convention of its fellow States, a restitution of its violated rights.
And what more (as I have heard it well asked,) is this right of injunction or nullification, than the power which, in the instance of jury trials, may be, and is in fact, enforced by a single juryman upon the verdict of his numerous companions, in every case in which the convictions of his conscience are firmly fixed in opposition to their verdict. Yet these cases do not, and will not, frequently occur: for in ordinary cases, it is ever found that juries are content to abide by the opinion of a majority—but in those rare cases in which an individual juryman finds himself bound, on principle, to resist to the utmost, and under every privation and suffering, a decision, of whose injustice he has a perfect conviction, he practises a rightful and a righteous nullification, which has often effected the most blessed results, and established the most sacred ends of justice.
Even thus it is with each State of our Union in similar cases of insidious and intolerable injustice—each has the power and the right to arrest the oppression of a majority, by her veto, until justice is vindicated, and the right prevails.
The operation of this remedy would be wholly through the juries of the country—and we consider the following to be a perfect definition of nullification, viz: the arresting of federal usurpation by carrying an entire case to a jury, under a State law, enabling that jury to give a verdict upon the blended fact and law (under the direction of the judge;) and thus, by defeating the ends of tyranny, to compel the call of a convention of the States, either to confirm or deny the power which is claimed.
All apprehensions of the too frequent assertion of this power, are surely idle and unfounded: for the odium of the world would not readily be encountered without abundant cause to justify, and ample grounds to sustain, its adoption.
But it has been said that this power in each state, of arresting within its own limits, the unlawful Acts of the Federal Government, would render that Government less powerful than even the little State of Delaware. To this we reply, that this peculiarity in our system (which is urged as a defect) is its greatest excellence—namely that the smallest State in our Union is more powerful for all Constitutional purposes, than the combined departments of the Federal Government for unconstitutional objects.
And in regard to the supposed danger of a civil War resulting from the employment of this remedy; such danger has already been shown not to exist, the Executive of this Union having no power by the Constitution, (from which alone he derives his powers) to resort to force—which fact is the more evident from that very power having been denied him in the Convention which formed the Constitution: for we find in the Journals of the Convention (page 68) that it was proposed to clothe the Congress with a power "to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil his duty under its articles." but the Convention refused to listen to the proposition—so, again, at page 126, it was proposed that "if any State, or body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such Acts, &c. the Federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the Confederated States, or as much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts." But the Committee who drafted the Constitution unhesitatingly rejected it as repugnant to the spirit of our Institutions and in derogation of the Sovereignty of the States.
Ineed the entire scheme of our government, on its very face, and from its very nature, is simply one of mutual benefits, and separate advantages. The idea of Force is utterly abhorrent to its character. Has it ever been pretended that the States which have entered into the Union and adopted the General Compact, were compelled by coercion to do so? Were they no, on the contrary, induced voluntarily to unite by the proffered advantages of great security and protection from foreign dangers? Has it not always been held out to the Territories that they will be allowed to join the Confederacy and enjoy its advantages upon certain specified conditions? Have we ever heard of a Territory, even though the soil belonged, by purchase, to the Country, being compelled to come into the Union and to yield up its entire Right of self Government? Most absurdly not! How then can it be pretended that the Executive Department of the Federal Government has a right to employ force against the Sovereignty of a State?
No, indeed, it is neither the Duty, nor the Right, of the President to attempt to use of force in these cases of disputed Right. It is, on the contrary, his solemn duty to recommend, either the abandonment of the usurpation or the call of the Convention of the States—And hence, if the Executive perform his duty, [and he has no power to do otherwise] there can be neither violence nor any risk of Disunion. It is, in fact, the very repugnance and aversion which we entertain to the idea of Disunion that causes us to revolt at the remedy of Secession which has been maintained by Col. Drayton to be the only rightful Remedy of the States, on the failure of reason and remonstrance. We desire no Secession—for that is of itself and "ex vi termini" Disunion. Our great end and aim is to preserve the Union in its purity—the Union according to the compact of the Constitution—by arresting every perverse and wilful violation of its sanctity—and this, we contend, is to be effected by the exertion of a legitimate and rightful Injunction without departing from the pale of that Union, to which, in its state of purity, we are too much attached to bear with patience its continued violation and abuse.
But it is object by Col. Drayton that, this Doctrine of Nullification asserts the right of a State's being in the Union and out of it at the same time. Let us allow this to be so; it assuredly, even then, is but half as dangerous and extreme a measure as Col. Drayton's Right of Secession, which professedly goes the whole length of Disunion—and if that gentleman contends that a State possesses the ultra right of Secession, why should he express such horror at the half way measure of Nullification? Sure here is an utter inconsistency. For whilst he advocates a Right of direct Disunion, he yet denounces what he thinks will lead to that result through the lawless despotism and perverse aggression of the original oppression. But it will be said that Col. Drayton would only resort to the remedy of Secession when argument and remonstrance have been utterly exhausted.—And what more, we will ask, has been claimed, for the Remedy of Nullification? No period but that has ever been fixed for its adoption—We have been contending solely for the Right—Our object has been the establishment of the Principle. It will be for our State, through her appropriate Representatives, in her Legislature, or in Convention, to determine, in their sound discretion, upon the fit time for its application. let all doubts but be satisfied as to the Right, and the question of expediency will be of lesser moment and easier solution. Though we cannot for ourselves see aught to be gained by continued delay, save the steady increase and permanent fixture of the usurpation and the gradual destruction of our powers and our spirit of resistance. We surely can have no hope of Relief from our oppressors, after the Declaration in the last message of the Federal Executive that "The Tariff is Constitution, and the abandonment of the policy in which it originated can neither be expected nor desired"—and the concurrent report of the committee on Manufactures, that "they perfectly agree with the president as to the constitutionality of the Tariff—that the States have delegated to Congress the whole power over imposts—and that it may be used either for the purposes of Revenue, or Protection, and that the happiness and prosperity of the United States depend upon its continuance."
We are told by our opponents, that the Northern States, with few exceptions, are equally opposed to the Tariff with ourselves, and that they equally suffer from its oppressions; as Consumers alone are the subjects of the Tax. To these assertions we have briefly, and [as we consider] conclusively, to reply that those States [with the exception of the importing Merchants in their cities] are eternally clamouring aloud for these taxes whilst we are clamouring against them—That even if it be the consumer alone who pays the Tax, those States receive back in the Bounty upon their Manufactures infinitely more than the tax paid upon the amount of their purchases; whilst the Southern States sustain the unmitigated burthen of this Tax in their extensive purchases. But we deny in toto this theory of the Consumer alone being the sufferer from this system, and aver it to be our perfect conviction that the tax upon the Consumer is comparatively insignificant, whilst the almost entire burthen falls upon the Southern Planter in the diminished value of his produce, resulting from this restriction upon its exchangeable values. In this respect we concur most fully with our distinguished Representative Mr. M'Duffie. For no sophistry [however ingenious] can blind our eyes to the simple and self-evident proposition that as much of the European Articles with which our produce is purchased, as is taken in Duty from the Merchant, so much the less can he pay the planter for that produce; nor can he, at pleasure, [as is asserted] repay this loss by enhancing his prices on the consumer, for he must necessarily sell at the market price, and that (though inevitably increased by the restriction,) is yet entirely regulated by the domestic competition.
But, as we have said, before it is not the precise extent of our oppressions, [great as we esteem them] that we regard; it is the principle, for which we contend—the principle of Liberty—and of resistance to usurpation. For, strip this question of all its technicalities—all its minor considerations; reduce it at once to its elements and substance; and what is the contest in which we are engaged? It is simply and essentially a Contest on the one side for the Principles of Despotism, and on the other, for the Principles of Liberty!
And how great would be the crowning Glory of our beloved State, were she not crippled by the obstructions of the Smith party, which now clog her noble efforts, to succeed by arresting Federal usurpation [whilst yet it can be arrested,] in restoring the violated charter of our Rights to its hallowed purity; and thus to reap the enviable and exalted Distinction of being the Redeemer of the Constitution, and, for all time to come, the Saviour of the Union!