The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 11

by Ali Ahmad Jalali

CHAPTER 11: DEFENDING BASE CAMPS

Although guerrilla forces would like to retain the initiative andnever have to defend, there are times when the guerrilla force mustdefend. The guerrilla can conduct a mobile defense or a positionaldefense. Guerrilla mobile defenses are usually rear-guard actionsdesigned to preserve the main force or draw the attacker into aprepared ambush. Guerrilla positional defenses are normally associ-ated with the defense of a pass, bridge, populated area, base camp orsupply depot. The odds are stacked against the defending guerrilla.The attacker has the initiative, armored vehicles, air power, thepreponderance of artillery and overwhelming firepower. The guerrillatries to match this through use of terrain and prepared defenses.

In the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen spent a great deal oftime and energy in the defense. Mujahideen defense was associatedwith Mujahideen logistics. Early in the war, Mujahideen logisticsrequirements were primarily concerned with ammunition resupplyand medical evacuation of the wounded. The rural population will-ingly provided food and shelter to the Mujahideen, since theMujahideen were mostly local residents. The Soviets decided to attackMujahideen logistics by forcing the rural population off of their farmsinto refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran or into the cities ofAfghanistan. They did this by bombing and attacking villages, scat-tering mines across the countryside, destroying crops, killing live-stock, poisoning wells and destroying irrigation systems. TheMujahideen, accustomed to living off the good will of the rural popu-lation, were now forced to transport rations as well as ammunitionfrom Pakistan and Iran into Afghanistan. The Mujahideen created aseries of supply depots and forward supply points to provision theirforces. These depots and supply points had to be defended. TheMujahideen also controlled key passes, which forced the Soviets andDRA to either withdraw cut-off forces or resupply them by air. TheMujahideen defended these key passes zealously.

The rugged terrain of Afghanistan aided Mujahideen defenses.Defensive positions were another key component of the Mujahideendefens. Mujahideen built rugged, roofed bunkers which could with-stand artillery and airstrikes. The Mujahideen built elaboratecamouflaged defensive shelters and fighting positions connectedwith interlocking fields of fire, communications trenches, and redun-dant firing positions. The Mujahideen learned to rotate defensiveforces through a position to lessen the effects of combat fatigue andpsychological stress.

What follows are examples of successful and unsuccessfulMujahideen base camp defenses against ground attack or a combina-tion of ground and air assault.

VIGNETTE 1

SOVIET OFFENSIVE THROUGH SURKH RUD by Commander Mohammad Asef

During 1978-1979, the heavily-populated Surkh Rud Districtwas a hotbed of resistance against the communist regime and abase for Mujahideen actions in Nangrahar Province. Following theSoviet invasion, one of the early major Soviet operations wasconducted against Mujahideen bases in Surkh Rud. There are twomain roads running northeast to southwest in Surkh Rud Valley(Map 11-1 - Chaharbagh). Highway 134 runs through Chaharbagh,Watapur, Surkh Rud (the district headquarters), Khayrabad, andFatehabad. The other road runs along the bottom of Tor Gharmountain. It passes through Darunta, Katapur, Balabagh, and thenfollows the Surkh Rud River to the west. Most of the Mujahideenbases were located along these two roads and most Mujahideen basesalso maintained hideouts in the canyons of the Tor Ghar mountain.My home town of Bazetkhel was located between the two roads, butmy base was just to the east of Highway 134.

The Soviet forces concentrated in Jalalabad in May 1980. We weretipped off that the Soviets planned to advance along the two roads,destroying Mujahideen bases as they went. Their southern columnwould swing north at Fatehabad to seal the pocket. I left my base atChaharbagh and went to my village at Bazetkhel, where I had 80 men.I took 50 of these men north into a Tor Ghar mountain canyon. Weintended to stop the Soviet column on the northern route before theyreached the main Mujahideen base at Katapur. We also hoped to buyenough time to allow the civilians to escape into the mountains. Whenthe column approached, my force engaged them and we stopped thecolumn. The Soviets dismounted and began moving aggressively intothe mountains. They were a bit too aggressive and our fire cut themdown. The Soviets were badly bloodied. The Soviets responded by call-ing in massive artillery fire on my positions. When night fell, I pulledmy force further up the canyon to the mountain ridge and then crossedover into the next canyon to the west. We moved down the canyon andinto the town of Katapur.

Mohammad Asef was initially a Hezbi-lslami (HIH) commander until 1984 when he joinedNIFA. He was in high school when the communists came to power. He graduated fromschool and then joined the resistance. He is from Bazetkhel in Surkh Rud District south-west of Jalalabad in Nangrahar Province. [Map sheet 3085].

At Katapur, the local Mujahideen told us that Soviet troopshad chased the civilians into the mountains just north of Katapurand killed many of them. During the fighting near Katapur, theSoviets had left two of their dead behind. The Mujahideen expectedthat the Soviets would return for their dead. My Mujahideen joinedother Mujahideen and we went to defend a canyon to the north ofKatapur. We laid an ambush on the high ground. Soon, a Sovietdetachment appeared looking for their dead. We opened up on theSoviets and they left seven more dead behind. However, they retali-ated on the villagers and massacred civilians and even animals inBalabagh and Katapur and then moved on to Fatehabad. The Sovietscould not dislodge the Mujahideen from the mountains and could notfind us in the valley, so they killed everything in sight. They estab-lished three bases—at Balabagh, Fatehabad and Sultan Pur. TheSoviets launched search-and-destroy missions from these basesagainst the adjacent villages. Many civilians had to flee west whileMujahideen detachments went to their hideouts in the Tor Gharmountain. Mujahideen commanders calculate that the Sovietsmassacred some 1,800 people during 12 days in the Surkh Rud. Mostof these were innocent civilians. The Soviets expected that they couldreadily flush out the Mujahideen. Their lack of success led to frus-tration and the Soviet soldiers ran amok—killing and looting. It wasthe first Soviet operation in the area. They came looking for U.S. andChinese mercenaries and instead found frustration and an opportu-nity to murder and loot. COMMENTARY: During this stage of the war, the Mujahideen lived intheir own houses in the midst of the population. Their food, water andshelter was willingly supplied by the populace. As a result, many civil-ians died when the Soviets launched their operation. The largenumber of reported civilian deaths could be a result of lack of officers'control and unit discipline or deliberate policy. The apparent Sovietplan was to separate the guerrilla from the populace by forcing thepopulace out of the countryside. Later, most of the populace desertedtheir homes in this area and fled to refugee camps in Pakistan. This is too large an area to block and sweep as a single action andthe Soviets failed to segment the area and clear it a piece at a time.This allowed many of the Mujahideen and civilians to escape thecordon. The Soviet emphasis on the primacy of the large operationinstead of the well-executed tactical action worked to the Mujahideenadvantage. Mujahideen command and control was fragmented and Page 272 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War worked through happenstance and chance encounters. Withoutadvanced warning, the Mujahideen would probably have sufferedmuch more in this sweep.

VIGNETTE 2

DEFENDING SURKHAB BASE CAMP by Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif

In 1980, the Mujahideen began establishing bases in the moun-tains near the village of Surkhab in Lowgar Province. There wereperhaps 150 Mujahideen in the area belonging to several factions.Mawlawi Mohammad Yusuf of the ANLF, Mawlawi Mohammadin of the IRMA and small groups from JIA and IUA established basesthere. My base was in the mountains east of Surkhab in a canyoncalled Durow. We had 82mm mortars, DShKs and RPG-7s. Early inthe morning of the 5th of June 1980, a mixed DRA/Soviet columncame from Kabul and exited highway 157 at Pule-e Kandahariheading east. They were coming for us. They deployed their artilleryand began shelling our bases. Most of the Mujahideen were intheir villages at that time. They came out of their villages and occu-pied defensive positions while other Mujahideen joined them fromtheir mountain bases. In order to block the advance of the enemy into our mountainbases, we occupied blocking positions on Spin Ghar mountain over-looking Dara village (Map 11-2 - Surkhab). Other Mujahideen occu-pied positions south of Durow Canyon on Lakay Ghar mountain. Ouroriginal plan was to defend the forward slopes of Spin Ghar andLakay Ghar. We set an ambush forward of our main defenses. Itinflicted casualties but was eventually overwhelmed. After theirartillery preparation, enemy tanks and infantry moved along thevalley road from Korek and attacked Mujahideen positions at thecanyon's western mouth. Fighting was heavy. This was our firstexperience fighting the Soviets. Their helicopters came in to evacu-ate their dead and wounded. Our civilians suffered horribly. Thepeople began leaving their homes and fleeing to the mountains.Fighting continued all day long, but the enemy was unable to breakthrough the Mujahideen positions. On the second day, there were fewer Mujahideen fighting, assome had left the area overnight. The enemy firing kept tremendouspressure on the remaining Mujahideen and many had to withdrawfrom their fighting positions. There is a covered approach to SpinGhar mountain from the north using the Tobagi plain. This plain is Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif is from Logar Province. [Map sheet 2885, vic grid 2577]. Page 274 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 11, Vignette 2 Page 275 higher than Surkhab village and it is easier to climb Spin Gharmountain from the Tobagi plain than from the Surkhab Valley. Iwas climbing the mountain with two others carrying ammunition. Iintended to climb over the mountain to the north face. As wereached halfway up the ridge, enemy aircraft flew over the area. Theenemy usually marked their infantry positions for the aircraft byfiring smoke or signal rockets. We saw rockets being fired on theother side of the mountain. This meant that enemy infantry were onthe other side of the mountain and were trying to encircle theMujahideen bases by a flanking movement from the Tobagi plain. Ihad all our spare ammunition with me and at that time ammunitionwas as precious to me as my faith. We climbed back down the moun-tain and saw that the other Mujahideen were retreating into theirbases. The people of Surkhab came to the Mujahideen and demand-ed that we move our baes lest Surkhab be invaded everyday. TheMullas had refused to move the bases earlier, but now they werepanicked and hiding in caves. The people taunted them with "Youtold us this was Jihad, but now you are trying to flee." Some of theMullas came out, but everyone was still panicked. I had all of thisammunition and no one to help me move it. I thought of abandoningthe ammunition and saving my skin, but then I thought how vitalthe ammunition was and what would happen if I was later called toaccount for my actions. Finally, a group of us decided to make a suicidal last stand andcalled for volunteers. Lieutenant Sharab, a DRA deserter, volun-teered. We had suspected him earlier, but he proved himself now.Lieutenant Sharab said, "They are not used to mountains. It will takethem a long time to climb them and they are afraid of these mountains.If you fire at them from one position, they will stop and return fire fora long time at that position." We fired mortars at the north slope andpositioned some Mujahideen on the top of Spin Ghar mountain to drawfire. This was the turning point. All of a sudden, helicopter activityfell off and firing tapered off in the valley. We thought that it was atrick to make us believe that the fighting was over so the Mujahideenwould come out of their hideouts and then they would take us frombehind. We did not expect that such a powerful enemy would abandonan almost certain victory and retire empty-handed. It was late after-noon when I saw civilians coming from Surkhab. They told us that theenemy had withdrawn. The enemy evidently did not want to have tofight to take the mountain. This was not our doing, but the hand ofGod. We lost 10 KIA and six WIA in my group. I do not know the casu- Page 276 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War alties in other groups. All the wounded who could walk, walked toPakistan for treatment. The other wounded were treated by localdoctors. Doctors from Kabul hospitals would come to help us also. Dr.Abdur Rahman from a hospital in Kabul would often treat our wound-ed. I do not know what the enemy losses were, but they must havesuffered a lot to quit on the brink of victory. COMMENTARY: The DRA/Soviets had the opportunity to attack theeastern and western canyon mouths simultaneously. The Mujahideendefenses were oriented to the west. Even on the second day, when theDRA/Soviets tried to envelop the Mujahideen position from the Tobagiplain, they did not hook around the mountain, but tried to go over themountain. The Mujahideen were used to the mountains, whereas theSoviets were not and their equipment was not designed for climbing inmountains. Later in the war, the Soviets issued better equipment forfighting in the mountains and began training their soldiers at moun-tain warfare sites. At this point, the non-nimble Soviets and the reluc-tant DRA were no match for the Mujahideen in mountain maneuver.They should have taken the canyon from both ends.. Further, if theDRA or Soviets had covertly moved some artillery spotters onto highground before the offensive, they could have unhinged the Mujahideendefenses before they were established. The Soviets had not yet developed their air assault tactics for coun-terinsurgency. The mountain tops of Spin Ghar and Lakay Ghar canhandle heliborne landings and the Mujahideen air defense posture wasnegligible at this point. A small Soviet force, reinforced with mortars,artillery spotters and forward air controllers and machine guns couldhave created havoc from the mountain tops.

VIGNETTE 3

FALL OF SURKHAB BASE CAMP by Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif

In early September 1983, we laid an ambush at Pul-e Khandari onHighway 157, the major road between Kabul and Gardez. At thattime, Mujahideen ambushes were hurting the DRA/Soviet efforts tokeep Gardez supplied. The enemy convoys always left Kabul in themorning. We would get into position in the morning and wait untilafternoon. If no convoys had shown by afternOon, we would quit andgo back to base or go take a nap in the villages. The enemy finallyfigured out that we were reacting to their pattern and changed theirpattern. They started moving their convoys in the afternoon on theassumption that we Mujahideen would have abandoned the ambushsites, since it was long past time for the convoy to arrive. As usual,we set up our ambush in the morning and waited. No convoy came.We left the ambush site and, by late afternoon, most of theMujahideen had left the area. Then the column of some 180 trucksarrived. What Mujahideen were left in the village ran to the road andengaged the supply convoy which was hauling ammunition, fuel andfood. We got part of the convoy and divided the booty among theMujahideen groups that had representatives at the ambush. Mygroup managed to capture some ammunition trucks, which we droveto our base near Surkhab in Durow Canyon. A few days later, a major enemy force moved against our basecamps to retaliate for this attack. They kept the area under seigefor eight days. We had a total of about 300 Mujahideen from variousgroups in the area at this time. Our heavy weapons were DShKmachine guns and mortars. We had expected some retaliation, sowe had prepared defensive positions on the ridges on both sidesof the canyon mouth and laid some antitank mines in the area. Wealso laid an antitank minefield on the trail to the Tobagi plain(Map 11-3 - Surkhab2). The enemy column came through Pule-eKandahari. They attacked and lost some Soviet armored vehicles tomines on the northern and southern approaches to the canyon.Mujahideen fighting positions on the high ground overlooked theseminefields, so we could fire on the advancing enemy as they tried to Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif provided the previous vignette, [Mapsheet 2885, vic grid2577]. Page 278 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 11, Vignette 3 Page 279 get through the mines. This slowed the enemy, but we also tooklosses from their aerial bombardment. We held on and managed tostop the enemy advance. The enemy evacuated their damaged tanksand armored vehicles. After one week of fighting, the enemy reinforced his effort. Someof the Mujahideen had left since the enemy was stopped andthey had to take care of their families. The enemy employed airassault forces, which they landed on the Tobagi plain and atChinosar at the eastern mouth to our canyon. They had outflankedus. Now the enemy renewed his offensive with an attack againstthe western and eastern mouths of the canyon and over the SpinGhar mountain. We could not hold and withdrew from our westernpositions on Spin Ghar and Lakay Ghar mountains. We torched thetrucks that we had captured to prevent their recapture. The enemyreached our canyon village of Durow and found the burnt-out hulks.We moved east into the mountains and harrassed the enemy withmortar fire, but they now controlled our base camps. They destroyedwhat they could and left. As they left, they scattered mines insome areas. COMMENTARY: By 1983, the Soviets were using their air assaultforces more aggressively, but still not landing them directly on theobjective. In this case, Soviet air assault forces landed on Tobagiplain and then climbed to the top of Spin Ghar mountain. By 1986,Soviet air assault forces would be landing directly on the objectives. The Mujahideen were tied to their bases and had to defend them.This logistic imperative provided some advantages to the DRA andSoviets, who knew that the one way to get the Mujahideen to stay inan area where they could concentrate air power and artillery againstthem was to locate the Mujahideen logistics base and attack it. Still,the Soviets and DRA seldom did anything to "close the back door" to the base while they attacked it. Consequently, many Mujahideenlived to fight another day. Long range reconnaissance patrols,scatterable mines, helicopter-landed ambush forces and conventionalforces in backstop positions are ways to prevent the escape ofguerrilla forces. The Mujahideen appear to have done little to improve theirdefenses since this same base camp was almost overrun in June of1980. The DRA and Soviets knew where this base camp was and howit was defended, yet the Mujahideen established no eastern defenses.The Mujahideen's one improvement appears to be mining the Page 280 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War approach to the Tobagi plain, but they had no force guarding thatminefield. The Soviets flew over that minefield anyway.

VIGNETTE 4

Loss OF THE TOR GHAR BASE CAMP by Commander Sher Padshah

Tor Ghar mountain lies eight kilometers northwest of Jalalabad.Adam Khan and Rasul Khan established the Tor Ghar Mujahideenbase but were killed in early fighting. In 1980, the overall comman-der of the base was Qari Alagul. The base held some 200 Mujahideenfrom four or five factions. I was a subgroup commander underCommander Abdullah at the time. We had bases at both Chaharbaghand Tor Ghar and regularly launched attacks against the Soviets fromTor Ghar. Our contacts in the DRA had told us that the Soviets wouldsoon attack Tor Ghar in retaliation. Late one afternoon in July 1980,our DRA contacts told us that the Soviets were coming that night. Iwas with my group in Chaharbagh on the southeast side of the moun-tain. Commander Abdullah was at the Tor Ghar base. We immedi-ately sent him a note to warn him and asked him to bury the ammu-nition and everything else since the Soviets would come in strengthand Abdullah's force could not expect to hold them. Abdullah sent anote back to us. "As long as you hear my 20-shooters,1 you know thatwe are holding. We will swear on the Koran not to leave our position."Abdullah had 25 men armed with RPGs, Kalashnikovs, Bernaus andbolt-action rifles. The Soviets attacked from several directions (Map 11-4 - Tor Ghar)launching advances from Sorkh Rud, Jalalabad and Darunta. I with-drew my group from Chaharbagh. Soviet tanks deployed along theroad on the north-west side of the mountain and fired on the base.BM-21s fired from Jalalabad. Artillery and BM-21s fired from multi-ple artillery sites. Helicopters strafed the area. They set the mountainon fire. Then the Soviets climbed the mountain, reached the base andfought for three days. In places, it was hand-to-hand combat. Wecould not break into the area to help, since the Soviets had sealed thearea. Our Mujahideen fought until their ammunition was gone anddied to the last man. The Soviets destroyed the bases and infested thatmountain with mines. COMMENTARY: Mujahideen insistence on holding base camps cost them Commander Sher Padshah is from Laghman Province. Map sheet 3085.1 Bernau M26 Czechoslovak light machine' guns. -13S3)CDCD N303N3 CDCD 0 CDCD (/)CD0 CDCD 0 C.. C. CDCD Ate)O C7CA CD 0.CD CQ fv a) Chapter 11, Vignette 4 Page 283 dearly. At this point in the war, base camps were not essential toMujahideen logistics and Abdullah's base camp was not the only onewhich the Soviets overran. It was a pointless battle which could havebeen avoided by the Mujahideen. When the Mujahideen held realestate, it allowed the Soviets to concentrate their superior firepower onthe Mujahideen. Page 284 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War 44.- FA R A H SHARAFAT Map 11-5 0 1 2 3 4 5 KM

VIGNETTE 5 BATTLES FOR SHARAFAT KOH MOUNTAIN FORTRESS. by Engineer Mohammad Ibrahim Sharafat Koh is a large mountain southeast of the city of Farah.It is located between the paved road running between Kandaharand Herat (Highway 1) and the Daulatabad-Farah road (Highway517). The real name of the mountain is Lor Koh, but we Mujahideenrenamed it Sharafat Koh (Honor Mountain).2 The mountain is aroughly rectangular-shaped massif with a plateau on top. It risessome 1,500 meters above the surrounding desert and its sides aresteep. It covers over 256 square kilometers and is often snow capped.Many large and small canyons (kals) cut into the mountain. On thenorth side is the Shaykh Razi Baba Canyon (Map 11-5 - Sharafat-red and blue graphics apply to last battle). To the northwest is theKale-e Amani Canyon. This canyon was populated by ancient peoplesand you can see their drawings of hunters with bows and arrowson the rocks. To the west is the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. The Jare-eAb Canyon faces southwest and links with the Kal-e KaneskeCanyon at the top. To the south is the Tangira Canyon which had themost water, but which the Mujahideen usually avoided since it wasthe only canyon wide enough for armored vehicles to enter. Facingsouth, and further to the east is the Khwaja Morad Canyon near theKhwaja Morad shrine. There is access to all the canyons from themountain plateau. The Kal-e Kaneske Canyon was the strongest base at SharafatKoh. It takes 35-40 minutes to walk from its entrance to the end.The canyon mouth is an opening in solid rock and is only two orthree meters wide. When you walk into the canyon, you cannot seethe sky above you, but later it widens into a. three or four hectarearea at the end of the canyon where there are trees. A stream runsintermittently through the canyon. There is even a water fall with Engineer Mohammad Ibrahim is a graduate of Kabul University in the College ofAgriculture. He was a group commander in Farah Province and doubled as medical offi-cer and facilitator. Initially he was with Mawlawi Mohammad Shah but left in 1985 whenhis Barakzai tribe had a falling out with the Achakzai tribe of Mawlawi Mohammad Shah.He then fought for Haji Ghulam Rasul Shiwani. He now works with the UNHCR. [Mapsheets 1581 and 1582]. 2 The communists called it Mordar Koh (Filthy Mountain) after the Mujahideen moved theirbases there in 1979. Page 286 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War •, a 40 meter drop. The canyon had a water reservoir, a supply dumpand 16 caves holding 60 people. We defended the canyon with DShKmachine guns on the high ground on both sides of the canyon. In the early days of the war, the Mujahideen had very strongbases around the province centers of Farah and Nimruz, but lateron Soviet/DRA pressure forced them outward from Farah to Shara-fat Koh. The Mujahideen had their first base at Sharafat Koh in theTangira Canyon in 1979. The Mujahideen were organized into tribalgroups and initially the Achakzai, Norzai, Barakzai and Alizai alljoined together and moved to a new base in Jare-e Ab Canyon. TheSoviets attacked this base in 1980 and the Mujahideen then movedto Kale Kaneske Canyon. The Mujahideen had bases within thecity of Farah until 1982. As the DRA and Soviets tightened theirsecurity around Farah, these Mujahideen moved out and some fellback on Sharafat Koh. After the Mujahideen left Farah, they losttheir contact with the city population. The city population was nottribal and looked down on the Mujahideen as rustics. In turn, theMujahideen looked down on the city dwellers for their easy life. Sharafat Koh lies about 12 kilometers from Highway 1 and 20 kilo-meters from Highway 517. We attacked convoys near Karvangah,Charah and Shivan and the Soviets manned posts at Karvangah,Charah and Velamekh to protect the convoys. SKY WARRIORS STRIKE THE CANYON In 1982, the Kal-e Kaneske Canyon was our primary base. Ourleader was Mawlawi Mohammad Shah from the Achakzai tribe.3Mohammad Shah liked to brag about his base and would often escortvisitors through the canyon. Once he brought a DRA officer into thecanyon and gave him a tour. The DRA officer was also an Achakzaiand he told Mohammad Shah that he was stationed in Shindand andwanted to establish secret contact with Mohammad Shah and workwith him. Evidently, while the DRA officer was in our canyon, hemanaged to steal a map showing our base defenses. At noon in July, about a month after the DRA officer's visit, threeSoviet helicopter gunships suddenly flew down the canyon and firedat the caves and structures of our base. Our DShK machine gunswere all positioned on the high ground and could not engage aircraftflying below them in the canyon. The gunships were severely damag- 3 Mawlawi Mohammad Shah was one of the famous commanders of the war. He was amember of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA) of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 287 ing our base. Khodai-Rahm was one of the DShK gunners. Physically,he was a weak person, but he took the 34 kilogram (75 pound) weaponoff the mount, hoisted it on his shoulder and fired down into thecanyon. He hit two of the helicopters, one of them in the rotors. Thathelicopter gunship climbed to the top of the mountain and then therotors quit turning. The pilot bailed out, but he was only 50 metersabove the mountain and he and the helicopter crashed onto the moun-tain southern wall near the interior mouth of the canyon. The seconddamaged helicopter managed to escape, while the third helicopterattacked the Mujahideen DShK gunners. Khodai-Rahm was killedby the third helicopter. The cheering Mujahideen rushed to the helicopter. There werefive dead Soviets—the pilot, two crew members and two passengers.One of the passengers was a woman. One of the Mujahideen cut offthe pilot's head and brought it to Mohammad Shah. Suddenly Sovietfighter-bombers flew over our base and began bombing us. Towardlate afternoon, Soviet transport helicopters flew in and landedsome three kilometers from the canyon mouth. Soviet troops dis-mounted and took up blocking positions—presumably to prevent usfrom taking the downed crew out. Early the next morning, Sovietarmored vehicles arrived and surrounded the area. (Map 11-6 -Kaneske 1) Soviet infantry pushed forward, supported by armor.The Soviet infantry moved on the high ground along the Tora Para4toward the crash site. Some Soviets moved along the canyon floorand the opposite canyon wall, supported by troops on the high groundof Tora Para. As the Soviets advanced, they marked boulders androcks with numbers for orientation. After seven days of fighting, theyreached the helicopter crash site. We retreated to higher ground bythe waterfall. On the eighth day, the Soviets left, taking their dead,including the headless torso, with them. They left the hulk of thehelicopter behind. COMMENTARY: One of the more successful Mujahideen air defenseambushes involved digging in heavy machine guns into caves incanyon walls. When the Soviet/DRA helicopters flew down thecanyon, the machine guns would fire across the canyon filling the airwith bullets. The helicopters could not attack the machine guns andwere hard pressed to avoid the bullets. This ambush would haveworked well in Kaneske Canyon. 4 Para means ridge. SPINA PARA (RIDGE) SHNA PARA (RIDGE) ABPARAN (WATERFALL)KANESKI 1 MAP 11-6 Page 288 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War NOT TO SCALE Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 289 The Soviets painted numbers on boulders and rocks to providereference points during their attack. This is a good technique as it aidsadjusting air and artillery fire and keeping track of the progress ofunits as they advance. Still, the Soviet attack was a frontal attackwhich allowed the Mujahideen to concentrate their fires against theSoviet advance. A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE In March 1983, our group leader, Mawlawi Mohammad Shah,took the bulk of our Mujahideen to Nimruz Province. Iran hadsupplied him with weapons and encouraged him to join theMujahideen in Nimruz Province in attacking the DRA 4th BorderGuards Brigade at Kang Wolowali (District) near the Iranian border.Along with the Iranian weapons, Mohammad Shah took most of ourDShK machine guns. The attack on the border post failed andMohammad Shah lost 35 men. His own son lost a leg in the fighting.It was a heavy blow to our group and we felt that Iran had conspiredin our defeat. At the time, Mohammad Shah was about to form analliance with the Maoist Gul Mohammad and Parviz Shahriyari.Both were from Harakat (IRMA) and receiving arms from Iran.Under the alliance, we would leave Sharafat Koh and move toChahar Burjak. This would have strengthened the Mujahideen andIran wanted to weaken us and make us dependent on Iran. As aresult of the disastrous attack, the Sharafat Koh Front was nowweakened and we only had 25 men in our base. After the disaster, Iwas preparing to leave the base and visit my home, but as I movedout I saw that the Soviets were fighting in Shiwan, so I returned to the base where I made radio transmissions supposedly sending 50men to this ridge and 40 men to that ridge. This radio deception wassupposed to keep the Soviets at bay. I was sleeping at Nizam Qarawol, the gate security post at themouth of the canyon, when, early in the morning, we heard a heli-copter flying over. (Map 11-7 - Kaneske 2) We put our ears to theground and heard the noise of tanks approaching. We quickly movedthrough the darkness to our base, pausing only to lay some antitankmines Mohammad Shah's deputy, Haji Nur Ahmad Khairkhaw, wasin charge. We had gathered in the darkness discussing what to dowhen Malek Ghulam Haidar and his Mujahideen from Shiwanjoined us. They had noted the Soviet preparations and guessed thatwe were the target, so they came across the desert to join us. They KANESKI 2 Map 11-7 NOT TO SCALE BPARAN (WATERFALL) PINA PARA (RIDGE Page 290 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 291 arrived hours before the Soviets. We vowed to resist and to kill any-one who tried to flee. We took up positions on the high ground onboth sides of the canyon on the ridges of Tora Para, Shna Para andSpina Para. We also put five men on the rear approach to the canyonand put some men on Tor Tsalay to watch the approach from Jar-e AbCanyon. It was raining, but not enough to stop the Soviet aircraft.Observation aircraft flew over and then fighter-bombers flew over ingroups of three. They made bombing runs on us. We only had twoDShK machine guns left and they were not enough to keep the air-craft away. The enemy intensified his bombing. They also began fir-ing artillery at us and kept it up all night, depriving us of sleep. Before sunrise on the second day, the enemy ground attackbegan. There were probably two battalions in the attack. One batta-lion attacked Tora Para and the other attacked Spina Para. Tankssupported the dismounted infantry, who tried to approach the canyonbut failed. During the afternoon of the second day, Malek GhulamHaidar was killed deep inside the base area. We had several Afghanprisoners in our base, who we detained for disputes and crimescommitted in the area controlled by the. Mujahideen. A Haji from ZirKoh was one of our prisoners. He described how a lone Soviet cameinto the camp and pointed his rifle at the prisoners. Through signlanguage, they indicated that they were prisoners, so the Sovietherded them into the prison cave and stood outside for awhile. Thenhe disappeared. Nabi, who was carrying food to our front linesreturned to the camp and saw the Soviet. Since he was unarmed, heran and the Soviet followed him. Nabi ran to the arms depot whereMalek Haidar was. Nabi told him that Soviets had penetrated thebase from the mountain top. Malek took his American G3 rifle andhis Soviet TT pistol and walked out of the depot cave. The Soviet waswaiting behind a rock. He fired two shots and killed Haidar. Thenhe took Haidar's G3 and pistol and left. I was sitting at the first aidstation near the front lines when I heard Abdul Hai yell "Who areyou? Who are you? Stop!" at the Soviet. Another Mujahideen wasgoing to shoot him, but didn't since the Soviet was far away and theythought that he might be a prisoner carrying supplies to the forwardpositions. The Soviet was in uniform, but he was down in the canyonand we were high above him on the canyon walls and couldn't reallytell. Since the Soviet aircraft were still bombing us, we did notbelieve that a single Soviet had snuck into our base and was nowleaving. Timurshah Khan Mu'alim, who was at Shna Para, alsoaimed at the Soviet, but Bashar, Mohammad Shah's nephew, talked Page 292 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War him out of it, convinced that the stranger was one of our own. Later,we learned that the Soviets had invited some local elders to theattack site to impress them with their strength. The elders laterdescribed how the Soviet soldier came running into the site proudlyholding his trophy weapons over his head. The Soviets again firedartillery at us all night. Early on the morning of the third day, the Soviets again attacked.They figured that we had no forces on the canyon floor, so they firedsmoke rounds into the canyon. We thought they were using poisongas and tied handkerchiefs over our faces. The Soviets moved intothe canyon under the cover of the smoke. At first, we fired blindlyinto the smoke from the high ground until we saw them signalingeach other with flares. We fired at the flares and then realized, fromthe flares' positions, that they had penetrated far into the base. TheMujahideen in the base were shouting "The Russians are here!" andfiring at close range. We abandoned our positions in the heights andcharged down the canyon walls. The fighting was heavy. The Sovietswithdrew in the late afternoon, taking their dead and woundedwith them. They left blood trails, bloody bandages and many RPG-18s behind. Again, Soviet artillery fired at us all night. On the fourth day, the Soviets advanced with tanks leading andthe infantry sheltering behind the tanks The infantry was reluctantto leave the shelter of the tanks, but they finally moved into somefolds on the canyon wall and sheltered there while the tanks with-drew. The infantry would not move out from the protection of thefolds and finally the tanks came forward again and the infantryretreated behind the tanks At noon, they quit firing and the Sovietsbroke camp and moved out in the afternoon. We lit bonfires andcheered from the heights. The bonfires were welcome since it hadrained throughout the battle and we couldn't light fires earlier asthat would have disclosed our positions. COMMENTARY: Again the Soviets conducted a frontal attack, but thistime relied on a smoke screen to aid their advance. The advance wasinitially successful, but the Soviets failed to clear their flanks as theyadvanced. Once the Soviets began to take casualties, they withdrew,abandoning ground they would unsuccessfully try to retake the follow-ing day. The Mujahideen, who lacked communications, were hardpressed to control the battle. Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 293 AN UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE In 1985 we had disputes over leadership and distribution of spoilsand the Mujahideen split into tribal units and moved into the variouscanyons. Haji Abdul Kheleq and his Mujahideen from the Noorzaitribe moved to the Shaykh Razi Baba Canyon. Haji Ghulan RasulShiwani Rasul Akhundzada and the Mujahideen from the Alizai andBarakzai tribes moved to the Kale-e Amani Canyon. I went with thisgroup. Mawlawi Mohammad Shah and his Mujahideen from theAchakzai tribe stayed in the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. After the groups had moved to the different canyons, the Sovietsreturned. The Soviets concentrated on Mohammad Shah and hisMujahideen in the Kal-e Kaneske Canyon. He had six DShKmachine guns, one ZGU-1 machine gun, three 82mm recoillessrifles, 25 RPG-7s and some medium machine guns. Soviet troopcolumns with up to 200 tanks and APCs moved from Shindand toFarah and surrounded the area.5 Soviet aircraft flew from Shindandairbase and bombed the base from high and low altitudes. Sovietartillery moved into position and hammered his positions for severalhours with heavy fire (Map 11-8 - Kaneske 3). The Soviets spent thefirst day with artillery and air preparations. On the second day, theylaunched an attack against the canyon with infantry supported bytanks. Mohammad Shah's force repulsed the attack. On the thirdday, the Soviets attacked the canyon mouth again, but they alsosnuck a force up the Jar-e Ab Canyon and then landed air assaultforces on the mountain top. These forces crossed over into the Kal-eKaneske Canyon and took Mohammad Shah's force from the rear.Mohammad Shah's son was killed while firing his ZGU-1.Mohammad Shah's force was pinned between the two Soviet forces asnight fell. Mohammad Shah gathered his force and said "Either westand and die here to the last man or we take a risk and charge theattackers and try to break out. We should break out as a group. Ifthey see us, we will have enough firepower to fight them. If theydon't see us, we will all leave together." All his Mujahideen agreed.Some 70 Mujahideen slipped out between the Soviet forces, up thecanyon and into the mountain. Only a few old men remained. Thenext day, the Soviets continued to pound the canyon with air and 5 Troops were from the Soviet 5th Motorized Rifle Division. If the number of tanks andAPCs is correct, this was a regiment (probably the 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment) rein-forced with air assault forces. Page 294 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 295 artillery, not knowing that the Mujahideen had escaped. On the fifthday, they entered the base, mined the caves, looted what they couldand left. The Soviets then turned their attention to Kal-e Amani Canyon.They came across the high ground from Kal-e Kaneske and airassault troops attacked down into the canyon from the high ground.Most of us were unable to escape and we lost some 50 Mujahideenthere. The Soviets then turned their attention to Shaykh Razi BabaCanyon, but these Mujahideen had already left. This was the end of the Mujahideen stronghold of Sharafat Koh. We now knew that wecould not hold these large bases in Afghanistan indefinitely againstthe Soviets, so we moved our bases, staging areas and rest areasacross the border into Iran. COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen maintained bases at Sharafat Kohfrom 1979-1985. It was no secret that they were there and theSoviets and DRA had ample opportunity to work against the base.The Mujahideen were tied to these bases and had to maintainsufficient defenders at Sharafat Koh at all times. This limited thenumber of Mujahideen who could strike at the Soviets and DRA.Once the Mujahideen split up into several canyons, they lackedcommunications between the canyons and were unable to providewarning or coordinate 'actions against the Soviets. The Soviets wereable to defeat each group piecemeal. However, the Soviets were not successful in attacking Sharafat Kohfrom the desert floor up. It took the Soviets a good deal of time beforethey would land air assault forces on mountain tops far from link-upforces. Once they started doing so, they were often successful.However, some heliborne forces were isolated and destroyed in themountains by the Mujahideen. In this case, the Soviets were success-ful when they used helicopters to land troops on the heights and attackdown to link up with ascending forces. -a CDco CO CD CD 0 CDCD 0)CD 0CD Osi) N CDCD C)CD coC./) O . CD CO A7 Al

VIGNETTE 6 QALA-E NAW BASE CAMP DEFENSEby Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch Nimroz Province lies in the southwest corner of Afghanistan. It isfairly flat, lightly populated and mostly desert. The population livesin the green zones along the river banks. The Khash Rud is one ofthree rivers which run through the province. It runs northeast tosouthwest. My base was 10 kilometers southwest of the LowkhaiDistrict capital in Khash Rud District. (Map 11-9 - Khash) It is awooded area at the village of Qala-e Naw near the banks of the KhashRud River. Highway 606 runs from Delaram and Zaranj—the provin-cial capital. It parallels the river and used. to run through thegreen zone. We would often block the highway and intercept convoystraveling on it. Sometimes we would attack the provincial capital. Ihad about 200 men in my main base at Qala-e Naw and had a for-ward base at the Pul-e Ghurghori bridge, where the highway crossedover the Khash Rud. I often mined and destroyed that bridge to denypassage to columns going to Zaranj. My main base On the river wassplit between the southeastern and northwestern banks. Duringflood stage, it was impossible to cross the river and the Mujahideenon each bank fought in different regions throughout the year. Laterin the mid-1980s, when our resistance became very costly to theenemy, they built a detour route on the plain between Zaranj andDelaram. This detour arched about nine kilometers away from mybase. When the detour route was built, I could only field reducedgroups of 15-20 men against small enemy columns since the area isvery arid, very open and water supply is a major problem. We had tolet the big convoys pass unmolested. The new road rejoins the old atthe village of Radzay. This is about 17 kilometers to the southwest.I started moving our ambushes to the Radzay area. There is a moun-tain to the east of Radzay with the same name. The road crossesbehind the mountain on the southeast side. This is an excellentambush site since there are also hills which restrict movement to theroad as it goes between the hills and the mountain. Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz Province. His base was at Lowkhai, the dis-trict capital of Khash Rud District on the Khash Rud River. He was initially with MawlawiMohammad Nabi Mohammadi of the Harakat-e Incielab-e Islami (HAR). Later on heswitched to HIK (Khalis). [Map sheet 1579 and 1580]. Page 298 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War In the fall of 1984, Khan Mohammad (my deputy) and I were bothaway from our base at the same time. I was in Iran. Informants toldthe government that we were both away and so the governmentattacked our base in our absence. However, the day that the enemyforces attacked our base, Khan Mohammad returned to our base. Itwas five days before the feast of sacrifice (Eid-al-Adha). The enemymoved from Delaram to the plain some 15 kilometers north of us—just north of the main road. They established a base there. Since itis desert, they could move in any direction. They attacked our basethe next day. There were only 70 or 80 Mujahideen in base at thetime Our SOP for defense against an attack was to spread the forcesover a large area at strong points in some 20 villages. The enemywould usually attack from the northeast to the southwest throughthe green zone to the base area. He would also send a flankingdetachment to the Pul-e Ghurghori bridge and lodge in the RadzayMountain to encircle my force and pin us in the green zone. Myforce had to fight in the green zone because the surrounding desertwas too flat and exposed for combat. We fought the enemy in thegreen zone by confronting him with multiple pockets of resistanceanchored in fortified fighting positions. When the enemy tried toconcentrate against one pocket, Mujahideen from the other pocketswould take him in the flanks and rear. The enemy could not frag-ment his force to deal with all the pockets, but had to stay togetherfor security. We would let the enemy chase us from strongpoint tostrongpoint and attack him whenever we could. Eventually, theenemy force would become exhausted. When their water and sup-plies ran out, they would break contact and go home. The enemy attack developed as usual and, by the end of the day,the enemy force retired. Unfortunately, my deputy was killed duringthe fighting. In Iran, I heard about the enemy attack, gathered whatMujahideen were available and started back to our base. TheMujahideen at the base evacuated their casualties to Qala-e Naw,Sheshaveh and Radzay. Informants told the enemy that the basecommander was killed. They thought that I was dead and decidedthat it was the time to destroy all the Mujahideen in the greenzone. I arrived on the third day after the opening battle. That night,another enemy column arrived and deployed in the desert north ofus. I realized that they were going to attack us. We had one BM-12,one single-barreled 107mm rocket launcher, six 82mm recoillessrifles, five DShKs, three ZGU-1s, and 15 RPG-7s. I now had 120men. In addition to my Mujahideen, there were HIH Mujahideen in Chapter 11, Vignette 6 Page 299 the area and they helped defend the base camp area. I sent 20 ofmy men to the Ghurghori bridge with four RPG-7s and Kalashnikovs.I told their commander to put 10 men on each bank to block theenemy tanks which would make the encircling sweep. However, thatgroup didn't reach the bridge on time. They stopped short of thebridge to avoid falling into an ambush. The enemy seized control of the bridge at dawn. His other groups deployed at Qala-e Naw,Radzay, Sheshaveh and other points in the area. The enemy attacked, as usual, from the northeast and southwest.The main attack was from the northeast and involved some 150-200vehicles. My bridge group attacked the enemy group at the bridge,but the enemy pushed them back and began advancing toward thenortheast from Radzay. Six enemy jet aircraft were attacking ourpositions, while four helicopters adjusted their strikes for them. Thehelicopters fired smoke rockets to mark the strikes. The fightingcontinued for two days. Then they broke contact and withdrew.During the fighting, 16 DRA soldiers defected to us. They weresoldiers drafted from Farah and Nimroz Provinces. They were fromthe 21st Mechanized Brigade in Farah and the Sarandoy regiment inNimroz. There were also DRA deserters from the 4th Border GuardsBrigade. Mujahideen casualties were three KIA and several wound-ed. Enemy losses are unknown except for the 16 deserters. COMMENTARY: When asked what made him successful CommanderBaloch said, "We intended to fight to the last man and they didn't.This is a wide area and we were widely dispersed, which reducedthe impact of the enemy air force. Air power was fairly ineffective inthis desert. Many of their bombs failed to explode, but buried them-selves in the sand. We had covered shelters and covered fightingpositions in each village. The enemy was very stylized and neverdid anything different. We knew from where they would come, howthey would act and how long they could stay. Our defensive positionswere connected with communications trenches while the enemywas always in the open. We had two kinds of maneuver. One was thedispersal maneuver forcing the enemy to chase all over to find us.The second was internal maneuver within a strong point where wecould shift between positions without being observed. We had thesepositions in all the villages and throughout the area. There are alsomany canals and ditches in the area, which we improved intofighting positions." "Once the enemy offered me a deal. 'Don't attack us and we will Page 300 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War pay you a toll of 50,000 Afghanis ($250) per vehicle passing throughthe area.' I turned the deal down with the words 'As long as Sovietsare here, we make no deals.' The enemy infantry was the weakestpart of their armies—DRA and Soviet. Their sequence of attack wasvery predictable. They would start with an artillery and air prepa-ration, then they would lay a smoke screen and then their infantrywould attack. Their tanks would support the infantry, but as soon asthey sustained casualties, they would stop. Their tanks were verywary of antitank weapons. The mere presence of RPGs and recoillessrifles in an area would keep the tanks at bay. We would wait untiltanks came within 20 or 30 meters of our antitank weapons beforeopening fire. I would not allow my people to try long-range shots.They would hold steady in their positions with patience and courage.The tanks could not see us at long range so they couldn't hit us. Wecould see them and hit them at close range. Most of the time we werefighting an enemy strong in fire power and very weak in the assault.During the two days of fighting, the enemy seldom came withinKalashnikov range. The only innovation that the enemy showedduring this attack was that they launched it during the Festival ofSacrifice, when they expected that the Mujahideen would be at homeinstead of the base. Second, they returned sooner to the area thanusual. This broke their pattern. I did not really fight a guerrillawar—I knew the enemy's position and he knew mine. A guerrilla isevasive and attacks from an unexpected direction and time. Here,the enemy kept attacking me at the same place and in the same fash-ion. Is this guerrilla war?" "Our ambulance was two sticks and a piece of cloth. Theirs was ahelicopter. The secret of our success was that it was a popular cause.Everybody knew that we were hurting the occupiers. This was not awar but an uprising. Therefore, it was not a guerrilla war. We neverbothered about the food supply. The locals supplied us with whateverthey had. I had two pickup trucks—the enemy had two hundred vehi-cles. I used the pickups for ammunition and food resupply. We movedthem secretly along the river in the wooded area to supply the fightingpositions in the evening. Their rations would sustain them until thenext night. We basically had a mutton and nan6 diet that the localpopulace furnished us free. A normal full day's ration was .a portion ofcooked mutton wrapped in nan. Water supply was simple since. ourfighting positions were near the river and my men all had canteens." 6 Nan is flat Afghan unleavened bread. It is oval-shaped and about the thickness and sizeof a small or medium pizza.

VIGNETTE 7

DEFENDING THE SUBURBS OF KANDAHAR by Sultan Mohammad of Topkhana

The supporters of the HI faction, mostly Shia, were located primarily in the southwest of Afghanistan. The HI's main base was inthe Khakrez southern mountains. This base was near the HIK base of Islam Dara.7 This was about seven hours on foot from Khakrez, whichis some 60 kilometers north of Kandahar. The HI fought in Khakrez, Girishk, Uruzgan and Kandahar. The HI faction had four units in theKandahar area. We had about 300 Mujahideen. Our overall comman-der was Ali Yawar who was killed by a mine later in the war. We hadtwo bases in the Kandahar area—Char Dewal in the Malajat suburbs south of Kandahar and Char Bagh in the Arghandab River Valley northwest of Kandahar. I commanded a group at Char Dewal as did Ghulam Shah and Shah Mohammad. Gul Mohammad commanded at Char Bagh. We used to harass convoys and block Highway 1 near theKandahar prison at Pashtoon Bagh—about a half kilometer from the Sarpooza ridge. Unlike some other areas in Afghanistan, all theMujahideen factions cooperated with each other in the Kandahar area. Whenever there was any fighting, all the Mujahideen wouldmove to the area to help out. All large Mujahideen operations werecombined and were coordinated by the Mujahideen Council. The Malajat area lies to the south of Kandahar. It is a well-irrigated suburb of the city full of villages, irrigation canals,orchards, farms and vineyards. The Mujahideen moved freelythroughout this area despite the best efforts of the DRA and theSoviet forces in the area.8 Frequently, the DRA and Soviets wouldthrow a cordon around the Malajat area and try to enter it to destroy

Sultan Mohammad of Topkhana is a member of the minority Shia religious community inAfghanistan. He belonged to the moderate Harakat-I Islam' (HI) faction founded by Ayatollah Asef Muhsini in neighboring Iran. He fought from the communist overthrow of thegovernment until the withdrawal of Soviet forces. [Map sheet 2180].

7 Islam Dara was the Mujahideen name for their base behind Shawadan mountain. TheSoviet 103rd Airborne Division launched an attack on this base in 1985 and this isdescribed in Vignette 25 of The Bear Went Over the Mountain. The site location in TheBear Went Over the Mountain is wrong.

8 The Kandahar area was heavily garrisoned by the DRA 2nd Corps Headquarters, the15th Infantry Division, the 7th Tank Brigade, the 3rd Border Guards Brigade, the 366thFighter-Bomber Regiment and the 379th Separate Bomber Squadron. Soviet forcesincluded the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and a Spetsnatz battalion.

Page 302 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan WarMALAJAT MAP 11-10912345 KM Chapter 11, Vignette 7 Page 303

the Mujahideen and their bases. Throughout the war, these effortsnever succeeded. There were always at least 1,000-1,500 Mujahideenin Malajat from the various factions. These Mujahideen were allfrom mobile groups and none were stationed permanently in Malajat. Mujahideen forces would rotate in and out of the Malajat area andthus maintained a high state of readiness. The Malajat mujahideenwere well prepared with supply bases and well-fortified bunkers andfighting positions (Map 11-10 - Malajat).

In the fall of 1984, the enemy threw a wide cordon around theMalajat occupying their normal southern positions from Zaker Gharin the east to Qaitul in the west. Thus they surrounded the Malajat with Kandahar to the north and Highway 4 to the east and a ridge ofhills to the west. This encompasses a lot of space and the Mujahideenwere still able to maneuver freely within the Malajat area. At 0700hours, an enemy mechanized column of 30-35 tanks and APCs movedfrom Sarpooza while another column of 15-16 tanks and APCs movedfrom the 15th Division headquarters past the Governor's house alongthe Mahkama road near Poolan toward our defensive position. Ourdefensive position stretched some three kilometers from Char Dewal to Spin Ziarat and we could always see the enemy defenses from here.We held this position with some 450 Mujahideen from various fac-tions. There were I-IIK units from Sarkateb, the Gulagha Son of Haji Latif's unit and two of our HI groups. The enemy columns werecovered by helicopter gunships who fired at our positions. However,the enemy was unable to advance because we were well-protected byour defensive positions. The enemy would not dismount from hisarmored vehicles, but deployed his vehicles in a firing line and firedat us for two or three hours. Even the green trees caught on fire. Ourdefensive positions were three meter by two meter pits which heldtwo-to-three men. They were roofed with heavy wooden beams whichhad 1.5 meters of dirt and rock tamped down on top of it. During lullsin the enemy firing, our men would pop out of the shelters and fireRPG-7s and recoilless rifles at them. The enemy would promptlystart shooting again. I said that the Soviets surrounded us, but that isn't completelytrue. Throughout the war, the Soviets always left one side unguarded.At around noon, 100 to 120 Mujahideen reinforcements arrived from Zalakhan and Walakan, which are south and southeast of Spin Zirat. These villages were in the sector that the Soviets left unguarded. Thearrival of the reinforcements turned the tide and eventually promptedthe Soviets to withdraw about 1800 hours. We destroyed three armored vehicles on the Sarpooza front and two on the Mahkama front.

Sometimes the bombs and artillery fire would block the exits toour bunkers. We would have to go out at night to dig them out. Thishappened often to our positions near the Panjao Pul bridge. Threetimes I had to go out at midnight to locate the bunkers and unearthour men. Sometimes they would be trapped in these bunkers from 0500 hours until past midnight, but these bunkers were essential tostopping the enemy in the Malajat.

Commentary: Soviet cordon and search operations usually involveda large force surrounding a large area. The area contained withinthe cordon was usually large enough to allow the surroundedMujahideen freedom of maneuver. Once the cordon was established,the Soviets seldom split it up into manageable areas, but pushedthrough the entire cordoned area if possible. This failure to fragmentthe area allowed the Mujahideen to move and maneuver against theSoviets. In this case, the Mujahideen were able to reinforce during ahotly contested fight. Many Soviet combat examples show an unguarded flank in acordon and search.9 This might work if an ambush were set along theescape route, but this did not seem to be the case. This might also bea time-honored act to allow their enemy to escape and minimize thecasualties on both sides. Finally, there was an apparent reluctance by the Soviets and DRAto stay in the Malajat area at night. If they would not dismount fromtheir armored vehicles during the day, they would have to dismount atnight to secure the vehicles. The arrival of the Mujahideen reinforce-ments may have kept the Mujahideen in the fight, but may not havebeen the prime reason that the Soviets withdrew at 1800 hours. 9 As an example, see vignette 5 in The Bear Went Over the Mountain.

VIGNETTE 8

DEFENDING THE MALAJAT by Mohammad Shah Kako and Abdul Ghani

The Malajat, the southern suburb of Kandahar, was a continuousbattlefield. The Malajat is a large green zone full of orchards,villages, irrigation canals, and vineyards. The Mujahideen deployedmobile bases throughout it. Many Mujahideen commanders withbases elsewhere would maintain mobile bases in the Malajat as theirforward elements in the Kandahar area. Despite belonging to differ-ent factions, there was an exemplary cooperation among these mobilegroups. The DRA/Soviets tried to force the Mujahideen out by cordonand search operations of the Malajat area. They would occupy thehigh ground and villages north of the Tarnak River—Shorandam, Zaker-e Sharif, Loy Karazak, Anguryan, and Bala Deh which arenorth and west of the airfield. Then they would establish the west-ern blocking positions on the Girowal Ghar, Suf Ghar, Zarah Gharand Chehelzena Ghar mountains (Map 11-11 - Mala). They used thecity of Kandahar as the northern blocking position. Kandahar wasoccupied by DRA forces. Then the Soviets and DRA would pushinward into the Malajat area from these blocking positions search forthe Mujahideen. They were usually unsuccessful, but they continuedto do it over and over again. The blocking positions were also part of the Kandahar security belt, but it was well-penetrated by theMujahideen. We would fight them initially in the Malajat area andthen exit to the south in the Loy Karazak area and Anguryan and inthe southwest in the Hendu Kalacha area. The Soviets had troublecontrolling these areas.

The Mujahideen prepared blocking positions along major axes andturned this area into an impregnable stronghold. A typical blockingposition would be built near a mobile base and include several build-ings in a village or orchard, where the mobile group would live. Thepersonnel in the mobile group would be relieved and replaced fromtime to time from their main bases. Some Mujahideen would staypermanently in the Malajat area. Mobile bases and blocking positionswere connected by communications trenches. The blocking positionswere dug into the ground and had firing positions for machine guns,

Mohammad Shah Kako initially fought with HIK and then switched to IUA. Abdul Ghani fought with the ANLF. [Map sheet 2180].

recoilless rifles, and RPGs. We covered the fighting positions with berry-tree branches which we then covered with earth and packed itdown hard. The bases had covered bunkers to protect our Mujahideenfrom artillery fire and air strikes. These bunkers were two-threemeters in width and six to eight meters long and were covered withtimber and a meter-thick layer of well-packed earth which resistedartillery fire and most air strikes. Whenever the enemy would cordonoff the Malajat area and launch infantry attacks into the green zone,the Mujahideen would occupy their blocking positions. Most fightingpositions were redundant so that the loss of a fighting position wouldnot adversely affect the defense. In the beginning, the Mujahideen were unprepared and unable toresist beyond two or three days but, after they developed their fortifi-cations, they could withstand and push back the Soviets and DRA.Once the area was cordoned, the Soviets usually launched their attackalong the main road from Zaker-e Sharif and further south from Loy Karazak. In the north, the usual line of contact was Hokomati Dand, Pakha Polan, Yakh Karez and Deh Khwaja. This was just outside thebuilt-up area. Later on, the Soviet and DRA forces established perma-nent, well-fortified and well-protected security outposts. The Sovietshad Shorandam hill, Zaker-e Sharif hill and Mala Kala hill. The DRAhad Suf Ghar, Zarah Shar Ghar and Chehelzena Ghar mountain sites.Once every two months, the Soviets would launch a major cordon andsearch against the Malajat area in order to keep it contained. In November 1987, the Soviets launched an 18-day cordon andsearch operation. In the cold dawn, the Soviet and DRA troops movedfrom their garrisons and, by 0800 hours, had occupied their normalblocking positions. Mohammad Shah Kako's base was at Sher-e Surkh where he commanded some 30 men. There were some 350 Mujahideenin the Malajat area from his party. The Mujahideen divided the frontline facing western Kandahar into four sectors. Each sector had about50 men. The northwest sector was a Hizbe-Islami sector. The Pakha Polan area was held by Mujahideen from Sher-e Surkh, Zaker-e Sharif and Kukhabad. This meant that Mohammad Shah Kako's sector hadthree commanders since there were three factions involved, but coop-eration among the commanders was easy since they were all local andknew each other. Regi was the third sector and Abdul Razak com-manded this sector. Yakh Karez was the fourth sector and Saranwal commanded it. Ghafur Jan coordinated the four sectors. The DRAattacked from the city, but this time the Soviets did not move fromtheir blocking positions. The DRA infantry were accompanied by troops carrying chain saws. They planned to cut their way through theorchards, destroy them and deny this refuge to the Mujahideen. Wehad planted mines in front of our positions which deterred the poorly-trained DRA soldiers. We maintained a steady fire from well-situatedpositions. We kept a reserve of 160-200 men in reserve resting Everyevening, the relief group would move forward, carrying rations andrelieve the force who would go back and rest for two days. Then theywould rotate forward again. It was usually calm at night when we car-ried out the relief. In this manner, we kept up the defense for 18 days.We did not resupply during the day, but brought food, water andammunition forward only at night. The DRA could not break through,but they did cut some trees before we shot them down. It was winterand it was cold. Our positions were good, although resupply wastough. Throughout the fighting, the enemy bombed and shelled allsuspected bases in the area. One bomb, intended for our position in Pakha Polan, missed the target and hit the western city gate, killingmany civilians. They could not hit us at the front line positionsbecause we were so close to their line and so our front line was safefrom air and artillery attack. COMMENTARY: Throughout the war, the Soviets and DRA were neverable to bring Kandahar under complete control. Mujahideen urban groups fought sporadic battles within the city walls and Mujahideen mobile groups maintained control over the suburbs. Unlike other areas of Afghanistan, there was little in-fighting among the factions involved in the fighting around Kandahar and the Mujahideen ran thefight cooperatively through regular meetings of a coordination council.This cooperation provided tactical flexibility to the Mujahideen andtheir redundant fortifications ensured that Soviet/DRA offensiveswould never progress far. Most notable is the regular rotation ofMujahideen from the forward positions. A relief in place is a difficultprocedure for the best-trained troops. The Mujahideen routinelyrelieved front-line forces without a loss in combat effectiveness. Thisis very impressive for any force, and even more so for a force that is indirect contact and is heavily outgunned and poorly supplied. There was a significant DRA/Soviet force garrisoned in the area.The DRA 2nd Corps, 15th Infantry Division, 7th Tank Brigade, 3rdBorder Guard Brigade garrisoned Kandahar city. The Soviet 70thSeparate Motorized Rifle Brigade, the DRA 366th Fighter Regiment,the DRA 379th Separate Bombing Squadron and a Soviet Spetsnaz battalion garrisoned the Kandahar international airport. The Chapter 11, Vignette 8 Page 309 DRA/Soviet operations in the Malajat area were very predictable bytime and location. They continually tried to penetrate and sweep theentire area instead of cordoning off and sweeping a smaller sectionthoroughly. Although the combat in the Malajat area was a fightthrough a fortified area, the DRA/Soviets continued to treat it as apenetration and exploitation rather than a systematic reduction.DRA/Soviet tactical intelligence apparently did not pick up the patternin Mujahideen resupply and relief activities to exploit it. KANDAHAR ., cBABUR co* IV / /4)%34, KM 0 • •TABILS An • / •/ NAGAHAN/ is ■/ •/ Atc.$ ■ •0.0 ..., / cp.- C" A BABAVALISAHEB ••• •• ■ ■ •■ARGHANDAB O CHAHAR Map 11-12 ZHAREDASHTAPLAIN HIGHWAY 1 <C)cDCa —1cD0CDCn co 0 co0 c. c. CDCD 0.U)CD 0<.CD cQ 7f!‘ VIGNETTE 9 BATTLE FOR CHAHARQULBA VILLAGEby Commander Akhtarjhan During the Soviet occupation, the eastern bank of the ArghandabRiver near Kandahar city was a safe haven and the Mujahideen wouldnot fight in this area. The west bank was Mujahideen territory. I hadmy base in Babur village in the orchards of the west bank (later, afterthe Soviets withdrew, I established east bank bases in Baba Valisahebvillage, Pir-e Paymal and in the western suburbs of Kandahar). Mysenior commander was Mulla Naqib. During the Soviet occupation, hehad a remote base in Khakrez mountain, but his main base was inChaharqulba village. My eldest brother was killed in fighting at thisvillage base. My next oldest brother fought out of the Babur baseand became a commander when my oldest brother was killed.Commanders were selected based on the social position of the family,education, and personal leadership talents. Family ties were impor-tant. A commander brought his relatives into the group and a presti-gious family could raise a large group. Since my brother establishedthe group, it was natural that my brother, and, subsequently, I shouldsucceed to the command In fundamentalist Mujahideen groups,commanders were picked for ideological commitment and not forfamily ties. Many teenagers joined the Mujahideen because the DRAwould press-gang youth into the army and Mujahideen bases were agood place to avoid the draft. In June 1987, during the month of Ramadan, the DRA/Sovietslaunched a major operation in the Arghandab (Map 11-12 - Chahar).During the operation, the enemy concentrated in Nagahan and thenmoved northeast alorig the western bank of the Arghandab River.Another column crossed the Arghandab River from Baba Valisaheb.They began with a heavy air attack against suspected Mujahideenbases. We moved to our bunkers. The west bank was actually aMujahideen fortified zone, which we laced with bunkers, fighting posi-tions and trenches. Further, since the green zone was full of orchards, Commander Akhtarjhan was a Jamiat-I-Islami (JIA) commander in Arghandab Districtnorthwest of Kandahar. He was an elementary school student when he joined the Jihadat the age of 12. At the end of the war he was 25 years old and a commander. He joinedthe Jihad because he had had two brothers in the Jihad and they were both killed. He tooktheir place as family tradition dictated. He served under Mulla Naqib, the most powerfulJamiat commander in the area. [Map sheet 2180]. Page 312 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War it was already cut up by irrigation ditches, so there was always aplace to fight from. We did not leave the bunkers since we were pinnedby all the aviation ordnance. Usually, the Soviets would deploy tanksalong the edge of the green zone and, after the heavy artillerybombardment and tank fires, they would send infantry (usuallyDRA) into the green zone with instructions to collect our weaponssince everyone in the impact area would be dead. The infantry wouldmove out confidently and the Mujahideen would come out of theirbunkers. The Mujahideen would inflict heavy losses on the infantryand capture many of these ill-trained DRA recruits. We sent the pris-oners north through the mountains and then, by circuitous routes,south into Pakistan. We had built a veritable fortress around the baseat Chaharqulba. Some Mujahideen would defend the bases, whileothers would range further afield to provide maneuver and depth to the battlefield. It was very hard to move tanks into the green zone.The Soviets would try to push tanks into the area to get close to theMujahideen, but the terrain channelized their movement and madethem vulnerable. The Soviets and DRA moved from two directions against theMujahideen but were met with constant resistance from Mujahideenfighting positions. Soviet tanks came from the Zhare Dashta andstayed on the plain west of the green zone as they crept toward ourbase at Chaharqulba. It took them a week of fighting to cover the sixkilometers to our base. All of their tanks were sandbagged againstour RPGs, so we were having difficulty stopping them. Finally, weMujahideen commanders went to Naqib and said that we are out-numbered and should leave the base. Naqib said that this is theirlast battle and will decide the contest between them and us. They'vetried to conquer the base for years and this is their last throw. If weleave, we will never get in again. If we stop them, then they will notreturn. We replied that the RPGs were not working against sand-bagged tanks. Naqib took an RPG and strode out to the forwardpositions to kill a tank. We commanders stopped him and promisedto fight to the end. Heavy fighting continued throughout that day, but we stopped theenemy and they withdrew to Ta'bils—some kilometers to the south.We pursued them to Ta'bils, engaging the enemy in the streets,killing many of them. The Mujahideen then withdrew toChaharqulba before dawn. The following days, the enemy mounted athree-pronged attack from Ta'bils in southwest, from Baba Valisahebin the southeast and from Jelawor in the northwest. They employed Chapter 11, Vignette 9 Page 313 tanks and artillery on the plain of Zhare Dashta in support. Sincethe orchards were impenetrable to their tanks, their tanks supportedtheir infantry like naval gunfire from ships. Their tanks would waituntil their infantry closed with our base and then would edge into thechannelized approaches. As soon as their infantry fell back, thetanks would fall back. Tanks are of little value in the green zone andwould seldom advance there. APCs, however, would advance ininfantry support. However, their movement was also very channel-ized and they were easy to attack on the flank. The enemy would precede his attack with heavy air and artillerybombardment. The Mujahideen would stay in their bunkers to surviveand only leave a few observers in the fighting positions. As soon as theobservers saw the enemy approach, the Mujahideen would come out oftheir bunkers and man the fighting positions. The enemy infantrywould suffer casualties and then fall back. Many of the DRA soldiersdefected. We would broadcast over megaphones "We are not yourenemy. We are your brothers. Join us." Still, the enemy infantry even-tually gathered strength and returned to attack our base from thesouth and southeast and then closed from Jelawor. Our defenses were vulnerable in the northwest. After continuousfighting, our Mujahideen were having trouble staying awake. At onefighting position, a DRA patrol penetrated the position and stole arecoilless rifle. The gunner was asleep. Commander AhmadullahJan saw them taking the recoilless rifle and followed them. Some 25-30 meters away, two APCs were waiting for the DRA patrol. Beforethey reached their APCs, Ahmadullah Jan and his men, plus anotherMujahideen group, intercepted them and fought a fire fight. Theydestroyed one APC, recovered the recoilless rifle, captured the patroland captured the remaining APC. They brought the patrol leader, aDRA lieutenant, to Mulla Naqib. Naqib told him "We don't want tokill you, but tell your fellows that we will not leave and this willmean death for more of you. Stop your attacks and return to yourbarracks." The lieutenant replied, "I can't do this because myfamily is in Kabul." We let him go anyway that evening. The fighting continued for 34 days. During the 34 days, a routineemerged. The enemy would begin the morning with an aircraft andartillery bombardment from the south and southeast. Usually, theywould then send eight helicopter gunships to work over the area.Then, they would launch infantry attacks. The Mujahideen wouldemerge from their bunkers, occupy fighting positions and wait for theapproaching infantry. We were hard to see since we had excellent Page 314 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War fighting positions and wore garlands of grapevines as camouflage. Welet the enemy get closer than ten meters to us before opening fire. Welet them get this close for two reasons. First, we wanted to be sure toget them with the first shot. Second, we wanted to prevent theirescape. We laid thousands of PMN mines10 in the area—particularlyon the infantry approaches from Jelawor. After DRA attacks failed,they would often run into the mines as they tried to escape. The enemywould retreat and we would go out and collect their weapons, rationsand ammunition. If the enemy was not attacking us, we wouldsend out ambush parties to hit his columns on the main road. It wasusually quiet at night. Sometimes the enemy would fire artillery andbomb us at night but would never attack at night. They did not knowtheir way around the area in the dark, so they did not attempt anynight combat. The DRA had a district government post and local militia on theeast bank. We Mujahideen had our families and R&R1 1 facilities onthe east bank since the government would not bomb that area.Supplies came from our homes on the other side of the river, butduring heavy fighting, they could not supply us and we were on ourown. We could not cook since the enemy would shell any smoke theysaw. We had plenty of ammunition since the base was well-suppliedand we could resupply ammunition to our positions readily. Food,however, was a serious problem although the number of combatantsat the Chaharqulba base did not exceed 500 Mujahideen at any time.The intensity of fire sometimes prevented us from eating during theday—and sometimes even during the night. Sometimes we wouldsalvage rations left behind by the Soviets and DRA. The Sovietswould leave lots of food behind, particularly bread. Often our solerations would be Soviet bread soaked in water. We also had a problem with treating the wounded. We had medicswho had graduated from a short course in Pakistan and were qualifiedto perform basic first aid. We normally evacuated our wounded toPakistan for treatment and recovery. During the siege, however, wecould not send our wounded to Pakistan. We could not remove theshrapnel and so many of our seriously wounded died of their wounds.We had a few Arabs in our base at this time. They were there for Jihadcredit and to see the fighting. "If you are Muslims, help us collect the 10 The PMN mine is a small, plastic antipersonnel mine manufactured by the SovietUnion. It is pressure activated. The Mujahideen called them Kandani (sugar pots) due totheir similarity in size and shape. 11 Rest and relaxation. Chapter 11, Vignette 9 Page 315 wounded," we would tell them. They would refuse. Except for the Ta'bils offensive and ambushes, we were defending.The Soviets were there in strength, but they stayed on the plain withtheir tanks and artillery and seldom committed their own infantry.Their tanks and artillery blackened the plain. It seemed that theymust have had a thousand of them, but they just stayed there. TheDRA infantry was doing most of the attacking and dying. The fightbled the DRA to the point where they could not take any more casual-ties. Finally, after 34 days of fighting, the enemy forces broke contactat 1100 hours and withdrew. In the past, the enemy had tried to takeus, but never had he come in such force or stayed for so long. We lost up to 60 Mujahideen and commanders KIA in the base andmany others in areas around the base. DRA and Soviet casualties areunknown, but we were always catching the enemy in surprise attacks,so his casualties must have been much higher than ours. DRA casual-ties were definitely higher than Soviet casualties. I feel that theenemy finally quit due to his casualties.12 COMMENTARY: The Soviets used the conscript DRA infantry extensive-ly and supported them with artillery and air power. The DRA infantrywas poorly trained and equipped and had serious morale problems.The use of DRA forces as "throw-away" infantry did nothing to increasemorale. DRA forces had a reputation for passivity on the battlefieldand deserting at the first opportunity. The Mujahideen defenses were relatively weak from the Jelawordirection, but the Soviets apparently did not push hard enough on thisaxis to discover this. Soviet and DRA tactical intelligence effortsappear inadequate. The Soviet/DRA willingness to drag combat out for 34 days andthen break contact and withdraw is remarkable. Their refusal topush for quicker resolution strengthened the Mujahideen hand andgradually created a qualitative change in the situation to theMujahideen advantage. On the other hand, the fragmented nature of the Mujahideen resistance meant that the Mujahideen in 12 Page 6, Afghanistan Report #40, July 1987, published by the Crisis & Conflict AnalysisTeam of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan: "It was reported that overa period of one and a half month (sic) ending June, 1987, the Soviet-Kabul troops had suf-fered about 250 soldiers killed and 800 injured in Qandahar city and its suburbs. They lostmore than 100 vehicles, tanks, and jeeps, besides 13 aircraft/helicopters. About 2,500Afghan government soldiers joined the Mujahideen during this what seemed to be thelongest Soviet-Kabul operation against the Mujahideen for several years. The offensiveapparently spilled over into July 1987." Page 316 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chaharqulba fought in isolation, bearing the full force of whateverthe Soviets and DRA could muster. Outside Mujahideen assistancein the form of ambushes against supply convoys and raids on theforces in Nagahan and on the Zhare Dashte plain would have clearlyeased the pressure on the Chaharqulba Mujahideen, but there waslittle operational and strategic cooperation and coordination amongthe various Mujahideen factions. The Mujahideen factions inKandahar cooperated better than elsewhere, but as this vignetteshows, this cooperation was still limited. The Mujahideen were quick to pursue a retreating enemy and theiroffensive into Ta'bils is a good example. Unless a force has establisheda strong, cohesive rear guard, it is disorganized during withdrawal andunable to concentrate combat power. This instant transition to pursuitwas characteristic of the Afghans when fighting the British earlier thiscentury and last. VIGNETTE 10 ZHAWAR ONEby Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani Zhawar was a Mujahideen base in Paktia Province located somefour kilometers from the Pakistan border. A 15-kilometer road goesfrom Zhawar to the major Pakistani forward supply base at MiramShah. Zhawar began as a Mujahideen training center and expandedinto a major Mujahideen combat base for supply, training and stag-ing. As the base expanded, Mujahideen used bulldozers and explo-sives to dig at least 11 tunnels into the south-east facing ridge ofSodyaki Ghar Mountain. These huge tunnels stretched to 500 metersand contained a hotel, a mosque, arms depots and repair shops, agarage, a medical point, a radio center and a kitchen. A gasolinegenerator even provided power to the tunnels and the hotel's videoplayer! This impressive base became a mandatory stop for visitingjournalists, congressmen and other "war tourists." Apparently, thisconstruction effort also often interfered with basic construction offighting positions and field fortifications. The Mujahideen "ZhawarRegiment," some 500 strong, was permanently based there. Thisregiment was primarily responsible for logistics support of the mobilegroups fighting in the area and for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK)groups in other provinces of Afghanistan. Due to the primary logis-tics function, the regiment was not fully equipped for combat, but wasa credible combat force. The regiment was responsible for localdefense and for blocking infiltration of Khad and KGB agentsbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan. They manned checkpoints alongthe road to screen identification papers. The regiment had a Soviet Lieutenant Omar (Zabit Omar) graduated from the Kabul Military Academy in the 1970s.After the communist coup and the Soviet invasion, Lieutenant Omar joined the Mujahideenof the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) founded by Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis.He was a close aide to Jalaluddin Haqani and fought with him throughout the war. Haqaniran the Mujahideen effort in the crucial Paktia Province. Lieutenant Omar also served asa group commander in Paktia Province throughout the war. [Map sheet 2983, vic grid8267]. Mawlawi Nezamuddin Hagan' was a group commander and a deputy to Jalaluddin Haqani.He was a member of the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) founded by MawlawiMohammed Yunis Khalis. He joined the Mujahideen following the communist coup in 1978and fought in the Paktia area. Prior to the Soviet invasion, his group had liberated the areasurrounding Khost and only the city of Khost remained under government control. / / /ZHAWAR 1 Map 11-13 Page 318 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 11, Vignette 10 Page 319 D30 122mm howitzer, two tanks (captured from the DRA post at Bariin 1983), some six-barrel Chinese-manufactured BM-12 MRL andsome machine guns and small arms. A Mujahideen air defensecompany also defended Zhawar with five ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns. The air defense machine guns werepositioned on high ground around the base. Defense, of the approach-es to the base was the responsibility of other Mujahideen groups. In September 1985, the DRA moved elements of the DRA 12thInfantry Division from Gardez, with elements of the 37th and 38thCommando Brigades. They moved from Gardez circuitously throughJaji Maidan to Khost since the direct route through the Satakadowpass had been under Mujahideen control since 1981. This forcejoined elements of the 25th Infantry Division which was garrisonedin Khost. Shahnawaz Tani13 commanded this mixed force. The DRAmilitary units had their full complement of weapons and equipment,but desertion, security details and other duties kept their unitschronically understrength. Since the DRA could not mobilize suffi-cient force from one regiment or division, they practiced "tacticalcannibalism" and formed composite forces for these missions. Late one September afternoon, the DRA force began an infantryattack supported by heavy artillery fire and air strikes on Bari,which is northeast of Zhawar (Map 11-13 - Zhawar 1). Zhawar wasnot prepared for this attack since most of its major commanders,including Haqani, were on the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Haj). TheDRA recaptured Bari and drove on to Zhawar. The Mujahideen react-ed by positioning an 80-man group to block the ridge on the easternslope of the Moghulgai mountains which form the eastern wall of theZhawar base. The DRA force arrived at night and during the nightfighting lost two APCs and four trucks. Eventually, the DRA becamediscouraged, withdrew and returned to Khost.14 Mujahideen fromthe nomad Kochi tribe, led by Malang Kochi, Dadmir Kochi andGorbez Mujahideen, recaptured Bari. The DRA then launched its next attempt from the town ofTani. They recaptured the town of Lezhi from the Mujahideenand killed Commander Mawlawi Ahmad Gul. The major comman-ders returned to Pakistan from the Haj on that day (4 September) 13 General Shahnawaz Tani was from the neighboring town of Tani and enjoyed somepopular support in the area. He later became DRA Defense Minister. On 6 March 1990,he joined forces with Mujahideen faction leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar in an attempted coupagainst communist President Najibullah. When the coup failed, he fled to Pakistan. 14 Perhaps this was a reconnaissance in force. Page 320 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War and hurried north to Zhawar to take command. The Mujahideenfrom Lezhi retreated south while a 20-man Mujahideen force blockedthe Manay Kandow pass. The pass is dominated by a high peak which is capped with athick rock slab. Under the slab was a natural cave which theMujahideen improved. The cave could accommodate the 20 Mujahi-deen during artillery and air strikes. The Mujahideen also dugcommunications trenches so that they could quickly reoccupy theirfighting positions once the firing stopped. The firing positions domi-nated the Tani plain and were well positioned to stop any infantryattack. The DRA repeatedly attacked the pass but could make noheadway. The infantry would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fireand stop. Then massed air and artillery would pound the area. Theinfantry would again try to attack, but would again be stopped imme-diately. The procedure would then repeat itself, but the DRA madeno headway during its 10-day attack. After 10 days, the DRA calledin heavy Soviet airstrikes which continuously hit the mountain top.The thick rock slab began to sway and rock. The Mujahideen wereafraid that the rock slab might shift and crush their cave, so theyfinally withdrew. It was 14 September 1985. As the Mujahideen fell back, the DRA established OPs on highground and started adjusting air and artillery strikes. This gavethe tactical advantage to the DRA and their infantry moved throughthe pass. The Mujahideen rear guard desperately engaged the DRAinfantry with machine gun fire, and aircraft with ZGU machineguns. The DRA continued to advance and seized the high ground ofTor Kamar. Tor Kamar is within a kilometer of Zhawar base and well with-in the range of machine gun fire. The DRA thought that theMujahideen did not have any heavy weapons and became carelessand bunched their forces on the high ground. Two Mujahideen, AlamJam and Muhammad Salim, were former tank commanders in theDRA. In the late afternoon, they moved their tanks out of the cavesand swung north into firing positions. They opened fire afid theirfirst rounds destroyed a DRA OP sending an artillery OP scope andsoldiers flying. The Mujahideen tankers then traversed to the secondOP and destroyed it with their next rounds. Then they opened up onthe other DRA soldiers. The mauled DRA force fell back and maneuvered through the 15 Local name for the chalk layers in the rock which mark this saddle. Chapter 11, Vignette 10 Page 321 "bird droppings" saddle15 to the east side of Tamberi Ghat TheMujahideen countered with blocking positions which they held forfive days. Haji Amanullah Khan and Ismail Khan played major rolesin the fighting at this stage. The DRA Commander, General Tani moved his CP into the ManayKandow pass and tried to reinvigorate the DRA assault, but theMujahideen held. During the fighting, the Mujahideen shot down ahelicopter, but lost a major commander—Mawlawi Fathullah.Mujahideen reinforcements arrived from Pakistan and as far awayas Jalalabad and Urgun. Commander Mawlawi Arsalah arrived.The DRA were getting chronically low on men and supplies and, after42 days of fighting, General Tani broke contact and conducted anight withdrawal. Mujahideen casualties were 106 MA and 321 WIA. DRA andSoviet losses were heavy, but their numbers are unknown because theyevacuated their dead and wounded. COMMENTARY: Zhawar was a symbol of Mujahideen invincibilityin the border area and the Soviets and DRA felt that they had todestroy this myth. The Mujahideen were convinced that Zhawar wasimpregnable and failed to take some basic security precautions.September-October and March-April are historically the best monthsin Afghanistan for campaigning, since the weather is reasonableand the roads are dry. August-September that year was also the timeof the Haj and the senior leadership of the area all made thisreligious pilgrimage together. Consequently, the senior leadershipwas absent when the battle started and other Mujahideen comman-ders had to take command of the battle. Field fortifications aroundZhawar were neglected and incomplete. The excellent field forti-fications at the mouth of the Manay Kandow pass bought time toimprove the other fortifications The complacent attitude almost costthe Mujahideen their base. Only the unexpected appearance ofMujahideen armor at a crucial minute prevented a DRA victory. The Mujahideen were able to move men and supplies fromMiram Shah in Pakistan throughout the battle. The DRA apparent-ly made no attempt to impede access by deploying scatterablemines against the route. - L MANAYKANDOV.NI, •...„,„„ ••C.1;:r MIRAM SHAH ■•... • • PAKISTAN SPIN KHWARA --• ../ s • HAWAR • I . • • -•-••• \ I (-.0?2.34 KM ••.‘•••—•••ZHAWAR 2 Map 11-14 Page 322 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War • •in BORIKHEL •// /1II/ /___ .....‘_.I /--,,V,..4 \\//,/1\// 111/ 11\ VIGNETTE 11ZHAWAR Two by Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman On 2 April 1986, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was in the Zadranarea when he saw approximately 20 transport helicopters flying over.He radioed the commanders at Zhawar and warned them. He expect-ed that the helicopters would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radiomessage, he saw another group of helicopters, including some heavytransport helicopters, flying the same direction. These were escortedby jet fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. Zhawarhad 700-800 Mujahideen combatants, plus air defense forces, at thetime. However Jalaluddin Haqani, the Zhawar Commander, was atMiram Shah. Mawlawi Haqani also radioed this information sepa-rately to Jalaluddin Haqani, who set out immediately for Zhawar. The usual Soviet/DRA pattern for an attack on a Mujahideen basewas to pound the area heavily with air strikes and then follow the airstrikes with air assault landings, artillery fire and a ground advanceto link up with the air assault forces. The air strike gave theMujahideen commanders warning, reaction time and a solid indica-tor where the attack would go. In this case, the Mujahideen werecaught by surprise. Their intelligence agents within the DRA failedto tip them off and the helicopters landed the DRA 38th CommandoBrigade on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. Therewere 15, helicopters in the first lift which landed at 0700 hours.More lifts followed to get the entire brigade on the ground. The firsttwo helicopters landed on Spin Khwara plain. Some of the landingzones were within a kilometer of the Pakistani border (Map 11-14 -Zhawar 2). Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to thewest of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed two helicopters whilethey were on the ground. Following the air assault, Soviet jet aircraft Lieutenant Omar contributed to the previous vignette. Mawlawi Nezamuddin Hagan' contributed to the previous vignette. Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman was a group commander from the Zadran tribe in Paktia Province.His brother was killed in this action. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap,London: Leo Cooper, 1992, 166-173 and ljaz S. Gilani and Fazal-Ru-Rahman, AfghanistanReport, Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, Number 25, April 1986, 2-5 alsoconsulted for this vignette. Page 324 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defensewas not very effective against these aircraft.• Instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bombersand close-air support aircraft, the Mujahideen went on the offensiveand attacked the landing zones. They quickly overran four landingzones and captured many of the DRA commandos. Mujahideen rein-forcements moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to Zhawar • and tookthe commandos from the rear. The commandos were trapped betweentwo forces and were killed or captured. By the end of the day, theMujahideen captured 530 commandos from the 38th Brigade.16 Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with smart munitions made ordnanceruns on the caves. Since the caves faced southeast toward Pakistan,the Soviet aircraft overflew Pakistan in order to turn and fly at thesouthern face with the smart weapons. Smart missiles hit the firstwestern cave and killed 18 Mujahideen outright. Smart missiles hitthe second western cave and collapsed the cave opening trapping some150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was 150-meters long andused as the radio transmission bunker. The commander, JalaluddinHaqani, who had just arrived from Miram Shah, was among thosetrapped the second cave. Soviet bombers followed the attack of the aircraft with the smartordnance. They dropped tons of bombs and, in so doing, blasted awaythe rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideenescaped. The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. Therewas one group of commandos on high ground who held out for threedays before they were finally overrun. The DRA had regarrisoned Lezhi since Zhawar One and hadfought for the possession of the Manay Kandow Pass to Zhawar forsome 10 days following the air landing. Mujahideen attacked theirLOCs and the airfield at Khost while the Mujahideen holding theManay Kandow checked their advance. In first battle for Zhawar,DRA/Soviet artillery and air strikes stopped at night, but this timethey were conducted around the clock. At night, they dropped aerialflares for illumination. This heavy fire support continued for 12 days.Finally, more DRA and Soviet forces came from Khost, through Tani,to reinforce the effort at Lezhi. The Mujahideen fell back from theLezhi area into the higher mountains and slowly the DRA/Sovietforce moved through the Manay Kandow. At the same time, the 16 Following Zhawar Two, the remnants of the 38th Commando Brigade became the baseof the newly-formed 2nd Division. Chapter 11, Vignette 11 Page 325 DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking column from the Lezhi areathat moved to the east. This column moved toward Moghulgai moun-tain on the east flank of Zhawar. There, a regiment of HIHMujahideen waited in defense. However, as the DRA column neared,the HIH regiment withdrew without a fight. At the same time,Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. He had headand facial wounds, but rumors spread among the Mujahideen thatHaqani was dead. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar and movedhigh into the surrounding mountains as the two ground columnsclosed into Zhawar after 12 days of combat. The DRA held Zhawar for only five hours. Mujahideen had movedMRL up on the Pakistan border and fired on the communists. TheDRA hurriedly tried to destroy the caves with explosives and booby-trapped the area. They also planted seismic-detonated mines in thearea and sprinkled aerial-delivered butterfly bombs over the area.The DRA took pictures for their propaganda victory and withdrewto their base camps. The Mujahideen returned to Zhawar on thefollowing day. The first Mujahideen to enter the area were killed byseismic mines The Mujahideen withdrew and fired mortars, BM12and machine guns into the area to set off the seismic mines. Thenthey began the slow process of finding the rest of the mines manual-ly. The Mujahideen pushed forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi andother areas. Since the DRA was only in Zhawar for five hours, theDRA did not manage to destroy the caves, but just collapsed someentrances. Weapons that were stored in the caves were still intactand useable inside. From this experience, the Mujahideen learned tomake connecting tunnels between caves. They reopened the cavesand built connecting tunnels. The caves were improved and length-ened to 400-500 meters long.17 Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA andSoviet losses were unknown, but the Mujahideen destroyed twohelicopters on the ground, shot down two jets and captured 530personnel of the 38th Commando Brigade. The Muja'hideen held afield tribunal. Yunis Khalis and others were the judges. They triedand executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the Brigadeand another colonel who landed with the brigade to adjust artilleryfire. There were 78 other officers among the prisoners. They weregiven a chance to confess to their crimes from different battles and 17 Veterans of Zhawar have proposed to Haqani that the caves be restored and kept asa museum so that 200 years from now, people can visit them and reflect on their heritage. Page 326 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War then all the officers were executed. All the soldiers were givenamnesty since they were conscripts who were forced to fight. 'Theamnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years of labor servicein exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics, werereeducated and released after two years. COM1VIEND1RY: The withdrawal of the HIH regiment, coupled with therumors of Haqani's death, greatly aided the DRA victory. Haqani'sloss, besides affecting Mujahideen morale, cost the Mujahideen whatlittle command and control they had left at this juncture of the battle.The DRA failed to throw a blocking force on the Miram Shah road,although they knew that Mujahideen reinforcements were movingalong this route. As a minimum, they could have employed scatterablemines on the road, but they left the route open. Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging onher border and reportedly transported Mujahideen to the border andsupplied MRL to the Mujahideen who fired them across the borderinto Zhawar. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense againsthelicopter gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipeshoulder-fired air defense missiles, but they were not effective.Pakistan sent some officers into Zhawar during the fighting to take outattacking aircraft with the British Blowpipe shoulder-fired missilesand show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a mountainand firing 13 Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani captain and hisNCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft.18 The DRA celebrated the fall of Zhawar as a major victory, butZhawar was back in full operation within weeks of the attack. 18 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, London: Leo Cooper, 1992, 171. VIGNETTE 12 KRER ONEby Commander Assadullah In late March 1986, the Soviet and DRA forces launched a majoroffensive against Mujahideen bases at Krer on the Pakistani border(Map 11-15 - Krer 1). Krer is located east of the Sarkani Districtcenter in Kunar Province. The Mujahideen maintained two bases inthe mountain valley named "Shahid Abdul Latif' and "Fatha." TheMujahideen could reach the Bajuar area in Pakistan from the twobases. The bases served as border supply depots and staging areasfor Mujahideen attacks against the Soviet/DRA forces in KunarProvince. My Asama Ben Zaid Regiment manned both of the Krerbases. The regiment's manpower fluctuated depending on therequirements and situation. The proximity of the bases to Mujahi-deen camps across the border in Pakistan made it easier to reinforcethe Krer regiment at short notice. In March 1986, prior to the enemyoffensive, my regiment was under-strength. Later in the battle,when reinforcements arrived from Bajuar in Pakistan, the number ofMujahideen reached nearly 400. We had many indications that the Soviets and DRA were planningan attack, but we did not know when it would be launched. Duringthe last week of March, when the weather was still cold and themountain tops were still covered with snow, we detected enemy move-ment from the Sarkani direction across the Nawabad bridge. Theenemy made no attempt to conceal or camouflage his action andapparently wanted to draw our attention to his movement. We laterfound out that the enemy's show of force was part of a deception planto cover another attack that the enemy launched from Pashad—about20 kilometers southwest of Sarkani. We did not expect an attack onKrer from Pashad. We prepared for an enemy attacking from Commander Assadullah is from Charquala village in Narang Subdistrict of Kunar Province.He is the son of Mawlawi Mohammad Amin. He graduated from high school and emigrat-ed to Pakistan in 1978 and later entered the Jamiat Islami faction's (JIA) military academyand completed the year-long course. He became a Mujahideen regimental commander of the Krer-based regiment. This was the Asama Ben Zaid Regiment of Sarkani District(Asama Ben Zaid was a close companion of the Prophet Mohammad and one of theProphets military leaders. At one point, Asama ben Zaid fought the Byzantines). TheRegiment belonged to the Sayyaf faction (IUA) and so Commander Assadullah switchedfactions. [Map sheets 3287 and 3387]. I J. fritKRER 1 Map 11-15 SARKANI BAJUAR P •A - e • 41114. Iva • KRER ♦ •• PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN • PASHAD NAWABAD BR Chapter 11, Vignette 12 Page 329 Sarkani and deployed the bulk of the force to the valley entrancefacing the Sarkani District center. This was the main avenue ofapproach to Krer and I expected the enemy to use it. A mixed Soviet/DRA column, led by local guides, crossed theKunar River at Nawabad bridge, northeast of Sarkani, and attackedmy forward positions in the late afternoon (Map 11-14 - Krer1). Thiswas where I expected them and heavy fighting ensued as enemyinfantry and armored vehicles fought with my resistance fightersat the valley entrance. Both sides had heavy losses. While theenemy tied my forces down, he launched another attack from Pashadalong the mountain paths to outflank my force. This attackingcolumn consisted of Soviet infantry (possibly a Spetsnaz detachment)and it moved undetected to the rear of my force and seized theundefended high ground on the Spina Tsoka mountains. From there,the Soviet detachment attacked us from the rear and overran bothMujahideen valley bases, including our main supply depot. By nextmorning, we had lost all our installations and were surrounded bythe enemy forces. The enemy was pounding our positions from thehigh ground to our rear. I had crossed the border and mobilized a Mujahideen force in theBajuar camps and, as the enemy fought for Krer, the reinforcingMujahideen force moved toward Krer to help the embattled defend-ers. My reinforcements moved early in the morning to the border andinfiltrated through concealed approaches to Krer since the enemydominated the main road from the high ground. Around noon, I wasmoving with a six-man group when we stumbled on a group ofSoviets. Apparently, they were a command group. We attacked thegroup and after a brief but fierce clash, in which both sides threwhand grenades at each other, we killed a senior Soviet officer. Thisapparently lead to the withdrawal of the Soviets. With the arrival of the Mujahideen reinforcements, the Soviet position was threatenedfrom the rear. Fragmented fighting broke out in separate areasthroughout the valley. The enemy began to pull out in the afternoonand by the evening we Mujahideen recaptured the valley and ourbases. The bases were mostly destroyed by the enemy. We caught a group of Soviet soldiers in one of our supply caves atthe depot. We attempted to flush them out and lost severalMujahideen killed and wounded to AK-74 fire. Finally, we fired anRPG into the cave and then threw hand grenades into it silencing theenemy. The next morning we found several dead Soviets in the cave.We buried our dead and evacuated our wounded. I had roughly 25% Page 330 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War casualties (33 KIA and 40 WIA). I think that enemy losses werehigher because we captured some 60 enemy small arms.19 COMMENTARY: By drawing the bulk of the Mujahideen forces awayfrom their base and attacking the base from the rear, the Sovietsachieved a major surprise through deception and good planning. Thisenabled them to overrun and destroy the Mujahideen bases withoutfacing any resistance. But Soviet failure to block the Mujahideen rein-forcement routes resulted in apparent heavy Soviet losses and forcedthem to withdraw from the areas they had so easily captured.Mujahideen rapid reinforcement changed the course of the battle.Seizing and retaining the initiative is crucial to any tactical scheme.The Mujahideen lost the initiative to the enemy at the beginning of thebattle. But, the Soviets failed to retain the initiative and lost it to theMujahideen maneuver of reserves from the rear. This decided the finaloutcome of the battle. Guerrilla warfare is no different from conven-tional warfare in that a reserve can drastically change the situationthrough quick and effective commitment before the opponent consoli-dates his tactical success. 19 Pakistani Strategic Studies Review, April 1986 notes: "Soviet forces launched air-cum-ground attack on Mujahideen base in Krer area killed 26 Mujahideen destroyed their entirearmament and lost 42 men after 15 hours fighting March 26. Mujahideen killed 70 Kabuland 50 Soviet troops and lost 42 men in their bid to break Soviet-Kabul encirclement ofSoran base in Krer area of Sarkani District March 28-31. Mujahideen repulsed Sovietattack after hours of occupation of their base in Krer after inflicting heavy losses andcapturing three Soviet troops during 48 hours fighting March 30-31." VIGNETTE 1 3 KRER Two by Commander Assadullah At the end of 1987, when the Soviet forces were preparing to begintheir negotiated withdrawal from Afghanistan, they launched anumber of high-visibility offensives, which served their propagandacampaign which claimed that the Soviet Army was able to defeat anyMujahideen force anywhere. To this end, the Soviets conducted oper-ation Magistral in Paktia Province to open the "unopenable" Gardez-Khowst highway. At the same time, the Soviets attacked majorMujahideen border bases. In Kunar Province, the Soviet/DRA forcestargeted the Mujahideen bases at Krer for destruction. Apparently,they intended to establish a border security outpost at the SpinaTsoka Mountain on the border with Pakistan to control several infil-tration routes connecting the Nawa Pass, Gonjgal and other valleysin Pakistan with the road to Sarkani and the valleys of Shonkray,Shalay, and Olay in Afghanistan. In late December 1987, I received intelligence reports that aSoviet-led DRA column would attack the Krer bases. The intelligenceagents did not know when the attack would come. There were only170 men in my regiment at that time. I established security postsand conducted reconnaissance along the routes over which I expectedthe attack. Based on past enemy behavior, I, expected him to avoidnight combat and night maneuver. I expected him to attack at dawnor later and to use the valley approach. The enemy surprised me. Hechose to move and fight at night and, instead of using the valleyapproach, he moved to the north flank of the mountain and attackedover it. He did this to get behind my forward defenses and unhingemy defense (Map 11-16 - Krer 2). The enemy moved from Sarkani at night in two columns. Onecolumn moved against the Mujahideen "Fatha" base and the othermoved deeper in a flanking maneuver to the rear of my defenses andtried to climb the heights of Spina Tsoka mountain. The column head-ing toward the "Fatha" base climbed the ridge from the east. Therewas a security outpost there consisting of 10-12 men sleeping in a tentand a small hut. The enemy soldiers silently approached the guardand killed him without making any noise. The other Mujahideen at the Commander Assadullah is the source of the previous vignette. -ocococo C) —1 CD co 0CD CD Cr) CD 0 CD CD OO fa). CDCD C7. C) CA CDcoOcn.cocg, Chapter 11, Vignette 13 Page 333 outpost were fast asleep and were caught by surprise. The enemy waskilling them when some of them woke up and a shoot-out ensued. TheMujahideen at "Fatha" died to the last man. The noise from the gunfire alerted the rest of my Mujahideen. Thesecond enemy column had not yet reached the crest of Spina Tsokamountain. My Mujahideen occupied fighting positions and met theapproaching enemy with heavy fire. A fierce battle continued through-out the night. The enemy column was deep in our positions, but wehad cut off his withdrawal routes. We expected to bloody the enemy ashe fought to reopen his withdrawal routes. Instead, the enemy columncontinued over the mountain path all the way to Pashad, some 20 kilo-meters southwest of Sarkani. We did not expect the enemy to with-draw in that direction. Meanwhile, my Mujahideen directed heavy fire on the enemy at the"Fatha" base and it began a fighting retreat back to Sarkani. By dawn,the enemy had withdrawn from the Krer base and taken his dead andwounded with him. Mujahideen losses included 18 killed and 20wounded (again about 25% casualties). COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA commander did a good job on analyz-ing the pattern set by his forces in the area. Using this stereotype, theDRA commander caught the Mujahideen commander by surprise, eventhough he had been warned. The Soviet/DRA commander knew thatthe Mujahideen considered the Soviets and DRA reluctant to move andfight at night and reliant on readily identifiable terrain for night move-ment. Therefore, he advanced stealthily at night over unexpectedapproaches. This gave him tactical surprise and allowed him to wipeout a critical Mujahideen outpost virtually without resistance.However, his apparent lack of coordination between the two columnsdisclosed his attack prematurely and denied victory the secondcolumn. Had both columns been in position and launched their attackssimultaneously, they might have achieved better results. The Mujahideen were asleep despite sufficient warnings becausethey reacted to a stereotype and pattern. Mujahideen actions, oncealerted, were commendable, particularly in cutting off the obviousSoviet/DRA route of withdrawal. Whether the Soviet/DRA comman-der's original plan included withdrawal over the Pashad mountainroute or whether it was a decision that he made on the spot, it clearlysaved the force from some heavy casualties. Had the Mujahideen alsoblocked the Pashad route, the Soviet/DRA force might have been invery serious trouble and faced possible annihilation. COCD O CD 0 cp 0 5 -- 0 0 03. 0CDCD 533 •=7. CD Cf) 0 VIGNETTE 14 THE FALL OF CHAGHNI BASE CAMPby Commander Abdul Razek,Haji Pir Mohammad, and Amir Mohammad Chaghni base camp is in Shahr-e Safa District about 10 kilome-ters from Highway 1—the main highway from Kabul to Kandahar.We normally set ambushes on the south side of the road, since thenorth side is open between Shahr-e Safa and Kalat. There was onlyone place optimum for ambush—a six-kilometer stretch where adry river bed parallels the road way. We could hide many Mujahi-deen in the high ground overlooking the road and escort vehiclescould not cross the river bed to get up into our ambush positions,since the dry river banks were like sheer walls. Although no APC ortank could get across, we mined the area between the road andthe river bed anyway. The high ground of Sher Alikhan Mountainprotected our withdrawal. Further, there were no villages or villag-ers nearby to provide warning to the enemy. We built permanentfighting positions at this site and we ambushed the enemy at thissite continually, but they always seemed surprised. The enemyconvoy would usually reach our ambush site in the late afternoonsince they left Kabul about 0800. The enemy usually sent tanks,BMPs and APCs to escort their convoys. We normally positioned ourheavy weapons on favorable ground higher up and positioned oursmall arms forward. At the point that we usually laid our ambushes, there was oneroad that intersected our area. It had to cross the river bed, but weusually mined that road as well for good measure. The normal reac-tion of the enemy convoy, when ambushed, was to drive off the roadto the north to get out of range of our weapons. They never tried toattack us. Their trucks would be burning and destroyed, everythingwould be in chaos and everyone was looking to his own survival.There was no coordinated response. Escort tanks and APCs would Abdul Razek was a major commander in the Kandahar area. Several of the current Talibanleaders once worked for him. His command included Shahr-e Safa District northeast ofKandahar. [Map sheet 2280, vic grid 6016]. Haji Pir Mohammad was a subgroup commander for Abdul Razek in the Kandahar area.Amir Mohammad was a combatant in Abdul Razek's group. Page 336 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War fire at random, but they would never dismount troops and push themforward. Then enemy aircraft would' arrive and make strafing runs,but it would be too late because darkness would be falling. Ourgroup and Chaghni base camp was a real thorn in the side of theenemy. It was in the year of Islam Dara (October 1986) that the Sovietscaptured our base at Chaghni. Our commander, Abdul Razek, wasnot at the base but was visiting other Mujahideen in Kandahar andHelmand with a representative of our faction headquartered inPeshawar. At 0400 hours, the enemy dropped illumination flaresthat lit up the area like it was day. Everybody was sleeping atChaghni except for the sentries. The enemy followed this with an airand MRL bombardment. Early in the morning, helicopters came andlanded troops at four LZs (Map 11-17 - Chaghni). Some 45 heli-copters were involved. These four LZs were located on the highground to secure the flanks for their advancing tanks and infantry.When the air assault forces reported that the way was clear, thetanks and mechanized infantry moved from Shahr-e Safa. Theartillery fire and airstrikes were so heavy that they probablyassumed that no one was left alive. The Soviets had moved earlier from Kandahar to Shahr-e Safa.Now, the enemy ground column came from Shahr-e Safa south toKadu, where they turned east in the canyon between MayantakGhar and Kharwari Ghar mountains. Air assault forces on theseheights safeguarded their passage. The movement of the enemy wasvery slow since they waited as the air assault forces moved alongthe high ground to secure passage for them. They reached Kadu inthe morning. It took them from 0800-1600 hours to travel theremaining 11 kilometers from Kadu to our base. At the end of thecanyon was the village of Mayu. There, the ground column split. Themain body continued east toward the village of Bandaki. Our base camp was to the east of Bandaki, located in a saddlebetween the Caki Ghar and Dumunaray Ghar mountains. Again, airassault forces on the heights safeguarded their passage. The otherpart of their column was a flanking detachment. It turned south atMayu through the village of Shahbed and then to the south ofDumunaray Ghar mountain to block our escape and to shoot at ourbase. Their tanks reached our base in the afternoon. As they nearedour position, they put in the fifth and sixth LZ to not only secure theiradvance but also to attack down from the high ground. Haji PirMohammad was using a ZGU on hill 1722. Amir Mohammad Chapter 11, Vignette 14 Page 337 engaged a helicopter coming toward them, but missed. The heli-copter went over the crest of the hill where Abdul Ghani was waitingwith a RPG. Abdul yelled that the helicopter was landing infantryand he would get it. He shot it with his RPG. Only four or five per-sonnel had gotten out of the helicopter when he hit it. The remainsof that helicopter were there for more than year. We had deployed our forces to maximize the fire power of ourseven 82mm recoilless rifles, five ZGU-1 machine guns, six DShKmachine guns and many RPG-7s. We also had some mortars, but wecould not use the mortars very well. A mortar is good against astationary target, but is hard to use against a moving target. Most of the fighting was between their armored vehicles and our recoillessrifles and RPGs. They were so close that we could hear their Russianvoices. They were also using loudspeakers telling us to surrendersince our plight was hopeless and we would be killed. That languagewas Pushto from their Afghans. We answered these broadcasts withfire and destroyed seven tanks and APCS. We shot down one jet andthey intensified their fire. As they launched their attacks against us,they would show their location to the supporting aircraft with redsmoke. This kept their own aircraft from attacking them. Night fell and everything was confused and chaotic as we lostcommand and control. No one knew where the Soviets were and wherethe Mujahideen were. We Mujahideen fought on until 0200 or 0300hours in the morning. Then, as we ran out of ammunition, we beganto slip away to the northeast. A close friend of Pir Mohammad's wasstanding close to him when he was killed. Pir Mohammad carried hisbody to high ground, where he left the body in a safe place and left thearea. There were 220 Mujahideen in the base. We had 22 KIA-21 ofour Mujahideen and one guest who was spending the night at ourbase. Most of the 198 survivors escaped to the northeast. The Sovietsnow owned the base. They spent 24 hours there, looted it, anddestroyed as much of our installation as they could. Before Commander Razek had left Chaghni, he had sent groups outto scout the road. They reported that the roads from Kandahar andArghestan were closed. He sent out scouts again the next night andthey reported that the roads were still blocked. The next day, towardlate afternoon, he went to Shahr-e Safa by tractor and then north intothe mountains and then turned and followed the Arghandab RiverValley down to Kandahar. The trip took five days. At Kandahar, hediscovered that the airport was very busy as waves of aircraft flewin and out. He was told that the ground detachment had also left Page 338 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War and was headed northeast. He did not have much communications atthat time. In the late afternoon, he learned that the fighting wasfocused at his base. He went to his other bases in Kandahar andgathered Mujahideen and MRL. He then took the same circuitousroute back to his base. As they reached Shahr-e Safa, the Soviets hadalready gone, so he sent his Kandahar reinforcements back andwent on to Chaghni. The survivors were gone and those left were alldead. It was a mess. Everything destroyed or damaged. Booby trapsand mines were all over the area. Gradually the surviving Mujahi-deen returned. Commander Razek decided that this was no longer asafe place for a permanent base and converted it to a mobile base for50 Mujahideen. Five days after we buried our dead, we packed 150rockets and went to exact revenge on the Kandahar airport. One night, some two weeks later, we buried our rockets or putthem in hideouts or safe-houses near Khoshab to the north of theairfield. We had to do this very secretly, as we did not want the localsto know. The next night, we set up our 150 rockets with remote-control firing devices aimed at the airfield. The remote control firingdevices were essential because it is impossible to stay in theopen area after firing. The first salvo of 50 rockets fired at night.After the first salvo, planes took off and hit the area at random. Thenext salvo fired at sunrise and the third salvo at 0700 hours—about one hour later. After each salvo of 50 rockets, planes wouldfly over and shoot at random, but there were no Mujahideen in thearea. After the third salvo, the enemy sent armored vehicles intothe area to search. They encircled the area and sent dismountedinfantry into the cordon. They found the spent launchers. Most of the Soviet aircraft losses were from rocket attacks onplanes parked on the ground, not from air defense. This attack report-edly damaged many aircraft. Before Stingers, Soviet and ChineseSA-7s proved very ineffective. We only brought down two aircraft inthe Kandahar area with SA-7s. COMMENTARY: The Soviet advance on Chaghni was slow, but theSoviets were finally learning to dominate the high ground beforethey moved their ground force. Apparently the Soviets had goodintelligence to support this attack. However, the Soviets did notblock all escape routes and the bulk of the Mujahideen force escaped.Mujahideen reconnaissance, on the other hand, was lacking andthey were surprised. Still, the Mujahideen had plenty of time to hitthe Soviets or evacuate their base during the slow Soviet advance. Chapter 11, Vignette 14 Page 339 They took few precautions and were not aggressive in contestingthe Soviet advance. The Mujahideen showed a lack of commandand control—reflecting the absence of their leader and a workingchain of command. Further, the commander had not trained hismortar crews in engaging moving targets. CHAPTER COMMENTARY The Mujahideen safe-havens in Pakistan and Iran were absolute-ly essential for the survival of their force. Pakistan was particularlyimportant since most of the external aid came through Pakistan.These safe havens allowed the Mujahideen a place to shelter theirfamilies, resupply, treat their wounded, train, sell war booty tosupport their families, rest and exchange tactical information andintelligence. Pakistan provided forward supply depots near theborder and the Mujahideen built most of their major supply depotsnear the Pakistan border. These Mujahideen major supply depotswere a constant target of the Soviets and DRA. In some areas, theMujahideen developed forward supply depots and tried to movemost of the supplies forward. In contested areas, the Mujahideenmoved their forward supply depots about to avoid capture. The majorsupply depots, however, were stationary and vulnerable. A dictum ofguerrilla warfare is that the guerrilla should not hold ground.Mujahideen logistics forced the Mujahideen to hold ground.

Mujahideen defenses were built around heavy crew-servedweapons. The popular image of the guerrilla is a small force carryingan assortment of small arms. Most insurgencies start that way, butsuccessful insurgencies need heavy weapons. The problem withheavy weapons is that they and their ammunition are hard to trans-port. The Mujahideen became very adept at field fortifications anddeveloped shelters which protected them from intense air andartillery attack. On the other hand, throughout the war, theMujahideen had difficulty fighting air and artillery systems and hadto learn how to survive them—particularly when defending. Theintroduction of the Stinger man-portable air defense missile in 1986provided upgraded Mujahideen air defense and forced the Soviets tochange their aerial tactics to avoid losing aircraft.

Soviet assaults on Mujahideen defenses were initially hamperedby their reluctance to fight at night, their over-reliance on firepowerat the expense of maneuver, and their reluctance to operate far fromtheir armored vehicles. As the war progressed, the Soviets developed Page 340 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War better light infantry, began conducting more night combat and more-skillfully employed air assault and ground combat tactical elementstogether. Still, throughout the war, the Soviets were hampered bylack of sufficient infantry forces.