The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Lehmann - Kritisches und Experimentelles über das Wiedererkennen
In an earlier research (Phil. Stud. Bd. V) L. had sought to show that all associative processes, which most psychologists had considered as associations through similarity, could easily be explained as associations of contiguity, and that while all the results of experiments on recognition could be explained by the latter theory, association by similarity could only explain a part. In the present article he maintains his views against Höffding's attacks (V. f. W. Ph., 1889-1891), and with experimental aid assails Höffding's theory of association through similarity.
According to Höffding the recognition of a previously experienced sensation takes place by means of the "quality of familiarity" which belongs to the sensation in virtue of its repetition: the physical correlative of this quality is the greater facility with which the molecules of the brain respond to the repeated stimulus.
L.'s view is that recognition takes place by means of the reproduced ideas accompanying the repeated sensation, which ideas may or may not be found by introspection, and he contends against Höffding that a disposition towards greater facility of motion in the brain molecules can neither produce a sensation nor the elements of one, but may produce the shade of feeling often remarked in acts of recognition.
In support of his own views, Höffding advances the facts of immediate recognition, — a shade of color, a feature of the countenance, arise in consciousness along with the quality of having been seen before, of being known, but without any accompanying play, so far as we can find, of associated ideas postulated by the theory of contiguity. L. contends that the associated ideas are present, though not always open to introspection: in a series of experiments for association with the sense of smell, he was sometimes able to raise the latent association into consciousness by suggestion. The reacter reflected on the sensation before answering 'known' or 'unknown.' If the quality of familiarity lies in a greater facility of motion of the brain molecules, there is no reason why a stimulus should not be 'placed' as soon as it affects the brain.
From experiments on expectant recognition with sound, similar to those made with light (Phil. Stud. Bd. V, pp. 96-156), L. finds there is the same inclination to over-estimation of the last sensation as in cases of direct comparison of successive sensations. From this he reasons that recognition takes place through a more or less conscious comparison where a comparison is possible.
Consequently, the theory of contiguity is to be preferred to the theory of similarity: 1st, as not positing a tendency towards motion in the brain as the correlate to an element of sensation; 2d, as making fewer assumptions; 3d, as explaining more of the facts of recognition.