The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Pace - Das Relativitätsprincip in H. Spencer's psychol. Entwicklungslehre
Spencer holds that our knowledge, not less than the outer world, has evolved from a condition where its elements were still homogeneous and united. In the course of development they gradually become separated and opposed to each other ; the ultimate reality remains however in spite of all differentiating, the unconditioned in which the conditioned factors of knowledge are united. P. divides his discussion into (1) the original unity; (2) the negation of the unity; (3) the restoration of unity. He holds that neither of the two factors, subject and object, appears in our perceiving consciousness; for just this separation points to an earlier state which united subject and object in the same reality. Thought has not to create a unity out of a plurality, but to analyze the given unity and logically distinguish its factors. This separation, which P. ascribes to thought, is for Spencer a fact already brought about by development. His failure, according to P., consists in his trying to solve a logical problem by means of a biological or psychological answer. The fundamental property of consciousness is just the activity of will, which Spencer has neglected. A mere repetition of experience does not disturb the original unity of thought and object. Further, he maintains that Spencer, in his analysis of existence, does not create an objective reality for us. At the beginning of his analysis the feelings — even the "feeling of resistance" — were mere phenomena of consciousness, and such they remain to the end. As regards the relativity of knowledge, if any one regards all knowledge as a relation between subject and object, he will indeed suppose that the subjective factors are originally separated from the objective, and brought into relation through knowledge. It is more just, however, to confine this description to the sphere of thinking. The relations which are constituted by thought connect only the isolated conceptions in the place of sense-perceptions. Whenever the objective worth of knowledge is considered, the expression "relative" is to be avoided. Only the knowledge that we have negated the original unity can justify the hope of again uniting its elements in thought. Since we are able to explain the world by thought, that which we suppose as ground of unity must be intelligible. The Unknowable can set limits to our knowledge: it cannot complete it. If the Absolute is unknowable, it is vain to ask whether it is useless to ask whether it is fixed and unchanging, or in process of development; for we are not in a position either to affirm or deny anything concerning it. P. holds that in Spencer's view of the problem of a theory of knowledge lies his fundamental failure. Subject and object are set over against each other, and the question is how they can be brought into agreement. Hence arises the fruitless attempt to clothe purely subjective phenomena with objective reality.