The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi/Chapter X

by Andrew Halliday Douglas

CHAPTER X

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

POMPONAZZI always shews a marked anxiety about the ethical effect of his theories. It is characteristic of him that he constantly desires to shew his philosophical conclusions to be consistent with the highest views of moral life, and with the binding obligation of moral duties. In particular he labours to prove that his doctrine of the soul's mortality not only does not deprive morality of any sanction, but even establishes morality upon a better basis. The ground on which he rests this latter claim for his doctrine is that it makes morality independent of every consideration of rewards and punishments, and so places it upon its true foundation.

But first he was obliged to meet a number of arguments by which it was sought to prove his conclusion hostile to morality. It was argued that to deny the future life was to deprive virtue of its motives and sanctions: for how could men be induced to prefer death to dishonour, or to die for duty, if death ended all? Or would it be reasonable to ask them to do so? Again, if the Divine Government were represented only by its operation in the present life, it seemed impossible to trace in it any principle of justice, or to maintain the existence of a moral order at all. Finally there was the most profound and fundamental objection of all, that in this life man does not, and cannot, attain his End: but a being for ever precluded from attaining its natural end is an impossibility: therefore, it was argued, since

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for the attainment of the end of man a further existence is required, that extension of existence must be given.

Pomponazzi accepts the issues thus offered to him. He admits that his doctrine must be tried by these tests. He proposes, on his own principles, salvare rationem virtutis. He will not for a moment allow that his view of human life leads to immoral conclusions, or lessens the sanctions and destroys the motives for moral action. If it were to follow from the soul's mortality that men should prefer dishonour to death, or fail to persist in duty even to the point of death, that certainly would be something contra naturam 1 , but by his determination of good ness as a thing desirable for its own sake, he proposes to shew that this does not follow. Similarly he vindicates Divine Justice and the reality of a moral order, as something independent of rewards and punishments in a future state.

But he deals most fully with the argument against him in the most general form namely as concerning the possibility of man's attaining in this life the end of his being. He proposes such a view of the nature and end of man, and of the possibilities (however limited) of the present life, as shall permit man on earth to reach a certain relative perfection that perfection, Pomponazzi would say, which is appropriate to his condition and place in the universe and to attain a measure of real happiness.

This is the question which Pomponazzi takes up first, in the fourteenth chapter of the De Immortalitate.

He raises first the question, whether it be possible for man in this life to attain the end of his being. And he admits that if we suppose that " end " to be intellectual contemplation, it can in no sense be attained within the bounds of mortality. How few men have in this life ability, time, or opportunity for philosophic thought! How utterly imperfect and rudimentary is the highest earthly knowledge so that it is rather to be called ignorance than knowledge, a guess rather than a certainty! Again, the more one knows, one still desires to know the more. Then there are so many arts, so many sciences, and life is all too short to master even one. And how many obstructions there are, and how many accidents may befall, to hinder the pursuit of

1 De Imm. xill. p. 99; cf. xiv. p. 117.

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truth; how difficult is the struggle; how uncertain the outcome; how suddenly all may come to an end 1!

This is the negative case against the sufficiency of the present life. But the positive argument, on which the thinkers of that time depended to prove the immortality of the soul, was that the soul of man desires and demands infinity. It is true that the beasts also desire the prolongation of life, and have an instinct of self-preservation; but they do not desire this like men appetitu cognoscitivo, while " we know the eternal and desire that we too should become eternal and immortal." This appetite belongs, it was said, to the very constitution of our nature. It is in all men: "but if it is in all, it will be natural 2 ."

Similarly, quoting Augustine, Pomponazzi weighs in one place the argument from the religious instinct in man. The soul finds its happiness in the knowledge and love of God; but if it knew that that knowledge and love were to cease, its happiness would be at an end. Hence the expectation of immortal life is necessary to the felicity of man 3 .

Pomponazzi boldly meets here this issue, as to the end of man's being. The true end of any particular being, he says, is that which is appropriate to itself. It does not do to say such or such a condition is the highest, or the best conceivable: there fore it must be the final end of such or such a being. But each being has an end appropriate to itself 4 . For example, sentiency is in an absolute sense " better " than insentiency; yet is a stone not sentient " for if it were, it would cease to be a stone." So we are not justified in attributing dogmatically to man what are really Divine attributes 5 .

1 De fmm. xin. pp. 96 flf. and xiv. pp. 104 flf.

2 " Cognito aeterno cupimus et nos aeternos fieri et immortales." "Appetitus iste...est a voluntate nostra intrinsece." "Si autem est in omni, erit naturalis." Comi. de An. f. 131 v.

3 Op. cit. f. 132 v.

" Unaquaeque res saltern perfecta hahet aliquem finem Non tamen quod est

magis bonum debet unicuique rei pro fine assignari, sed solum secundum quod convenit illi naturae et ei proportionatur. " De Itnm. XIV. p. 104.

5 " Etsi sentire melius est quam non sentire, non tamen convenit lapidi sentire, neque esset bonum lapidi, sic enim non amplius esset lapis." " Quare assignando finem homini si talem qualem Deo et intelligentiis assignaremus non conveniens foret assignatio, quandoquidem sic non esset homo." Ibid.

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As for the appetite or desire for immortality, he has simply to say that it is an unreasonable desire. To the argument that it is " natural," and therefore not to be disappointed, he had already answered that such necessity may hold in the case of unconscious instincts; but where, as in this case, argument is involved, there is always room for an incorrect process of reasoning to creep in 1 . No doubt, if Divine conditions of being are set before us, our will desires them: whether it is justified in so doing, is another question. If our desires are not to be disappointed, they must be regulated by sound reason 2 .

It is true that in intelligence man partakes of the eternal principle. But a mole has eyes, yet does not see (although Aristotle compares human intelligence rather to an owl than to a mole, for an owl sees a little). At any rate in considering man's end he is to be rated as an intermediate being .

It does not become the mortal, says Pomponazzi in the same strain, towards the end of his book, to desire immortal felicity; and a wise man will not set his heart upon what is impossible. It is not then the part of a man who has learned to control him self and moderate his desires (homo temperatns) to yearn for

1 "In quod fertur voluntas sine cognitione, frustrari non potest: at si per cognitionetn, frustrari potest nisi sit recta ratio." Op. cit. x. p. 81.

2 " Ad illud vero de experimento, in primis mirere quomodo Divus Thomas illud adduxerit, cum Aristoteles 3 Ethic, dicat voluntatem esse impossibilium, veluti in appetendo immortalitatem: unde si voluntas nostra non est nisi in anima intellectiva, si appetendo immortalitatem per Aristotelem appetit impossibile; non ergo anima humana potest esse immortalis. Quare dicitur ad argumentum non esse evidens signum illud, quoniam ut ibi dicit philosophus, voluntas naturaliter est impossibilium cum in impossibili possit salvari ratio boni. Et quod ulterius dicebatur appetitum naturalem non frustrari; verum est sumendo naturale ut distinguitur ab intellective, nam illud est opus intelligentiae non errantis; unde in quod fertur voluntas sine cognitione, frustrari non potest: at si per cognitionem, frustrari potest nisi sit recta ratio. Praesentato enim summo bono etiam Diis conpetente, voluntas fertur in illud esse impossibile; quare ne frustretur oportet voluntatem esse regulatam per rationem rectam." Op. cit. X. pp. 80, 81.

3 " Et talpa oculos habens non videt, sed in animali non frustrantur ut habetur (in) lib. De Hist. Anim. Quare et humanus animus desiderat immortalitatem quam consequi non potest absolute, sed sufficit quod separata simpliciter consequatur; quare Aristoteles 2 Metaphys. comparavit humanum intellectum noctuae et non talpae, noctua enim aliqualiter videt, talpa autem nihil, unde et 9 Metaph. tex. ult. dixit intellectum humanum in cognoscendo abstracta non esse caecum, sed caecutientem; quapropter aeternitatem affectat, sed non perfecto appetitu desiderat." Op. cit. x. p. 82.

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immortality. " Nor ought what is mortal to seek immortal happiness, since the immortal is not congruous with the mortal ...which is why at the beginning we laid down that to each thing is assigned an end appropriate to it; for if a man be moderate he will not seek the impossible, nor will it be suitable to him: for to have such happiness belongs to the Gods, who are independent in every way of matter and mutation the opposite of which is the case of the human race, which holds an intermediate position between mortal and immortal beings 1 ."

It is not true then, Pomponazzi maintains, that men miss their end in this life. He meets the allegation by two suggestions which are perhaps the most original ideas to which his mind gave birth. He offers a twofold correction of the accepted ideas about a man's end. In the first place, he suggests the conception of the human race as an organism, in which the different parts combine to promote a common end. Individual men may come to little, or do little in this world; yet they may fill each a place in the common life and do each a part in the common work of the whole human race. He institutes an elaborate comparison with the body 2 , and employs also the analogy of a symphony of voices rendering different parts 3 . But for the order produced, he says, by the variety of individual men and individual fortunes, the individual himself could not exist; as it is each contributes to the other, and to the whole 4 . The passage is a lively and interesting one; but the special point at which Pomponazzi aims in it has, I think, been generally overlooked. It is a part of his answer to the argument that the ends of

1 " Neque mortalis immortalem felicitatem appetere debet, quoniam immortale mortali non convenit...quare primo supposuimus quod unicuique rei proportionatus finis assignetur; si enim homo sit temperatus non impossihilia appetet, neque sibi conveniunt; talem enim habere felicitatem est proprium Deorum, qui nullo modo a materia et transmutatione dependent: cujus oppositum contingit in humano genere quod est medium inter mortalia et immortalia." De Imm. xiv. p. 1 14.

14 " Universum humanum genus est sicut unum corpus ex diversis membris constitutum quae et diversa habent officia, in communem tamen utilitatem generis humani ordinata," etc. Op. cit. XIV. p. 107.

3 "Sic commensurata diversitas inter homines perfectum, pulchrum, decorum, et delectabile general." Ibid.

4 " Individuum minima constare posset Unumque tribuit alteri, et ab eodem cui

tribuit recipit, reciprocaque habent opera." Ibid.

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human beings are not attained in the present life, and that life so far as this earth is concerned is meaningless and vain. He proposes a point of view other than that of the individual mode of reckoning, other than that which counts the gains of individual fortunes, taken in isolation. This is the use which he makes of the conception of a real and living unity of the human race. The design of this thought in his mind is, in measuring the attainments of man's mortal state, to substitute for the review of the mingled and often disappointing experiences of individuals a contemplation of a large and harmonious development in the race; and thus to turn the point of the objection, that in this life the ends of humanity are not attained 1 .

But in the second place, with reference to man's attaining the ends of his being in this life, Pomponazzi raises the question of what is the essential end of man, taken even as an individual. He prepares to dispute the conventional belief, that the end of man is intellectual attainment, intellectual contemplation.

He proceeds accordingly to examine the nature and the powers of man, to ascertain in the exercise of which of them he is to find his end.

The fact to which he has just referred, that all men work together to a common end, implies the existence of a common nature in men. This common nature he finds to consist in three rational powers (intellectus) the "speculative" or theoretical, the " practical " or moral, and the " factive " or mechanical. For there is no man, he says, of full age and in possession of all his faculties, who does not share to a greater or less extent in each of these three rational powers 2 .

In an interesting passage he traces the rudiments of the theoretical understanding in all men, on the principle that the "common sense" and ordinary perceptions of men are in essence the same activities which in their full development make the various sciences and arts. Thus even the axioms of metaphysics are part of the common stock of mankind (for example, the

1 Ibid.

2 "Dicamus quod omnes homines ad hujusmodi finem communem consequendum debent in tribus intellectibus communicare, scilicet speculativo, practice, et factivo: nullus enim homo est non orbatus, et in aetate debita constitutus, qui aliquid horum trium intellectuum non habeat." Ibid.

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axiom of non-contradiction), and its objects matters of universal apprehension (God, Being, the One, the True, the Good). Similarly, in the case of the various branches of science, all men possess and exercise the elements of mathematics and astronomy, of perspective and music, of rhetoric and dialectic 1 . It is even more evident that all men exercise the practical reason, and have some aptitude for moral, civic, and domestic life. A certain degree of mechanical skill again is necessary for the very preservation of life.

The question is, then, in the exercise of which of these powers does man attain his true end as man; in which does he realise the specific and characteristic attributes of humanity and thus fulfil his proper destiny? Pomponazzi prepares to answer that it is in the exercise of the practical or moral reason 2 .

First by a negative criticism he shews that the end of man is not to be found in the exercise of either of the other powers he has distinguished. In each case he adduces two arguments a general argument from the analogy of nature or the fitness of things, and an empirical argument drawn from the facts and necessities of actual life. Thus with regard to theoretical speculation he points out, first, that even in so far as it is vouchsafed to men, it is rather a Divine gift than an endowment properly belonging to the nature of man 3; and secondly, that in its full development it is not, and cannot be, the possession of more than a very small proportion of mankind 4 , and the part of the human race which gives itself wholly to intellectual pursuits as the end of life, even allowing for all the variety of these pursuits, bears the same proportion to the whole as the heart does to the body. It is certainly quite different in this respect with the mechanical arts; for the greater part of mankind is wholly given over to these, and the whole female sex occupied with almost nothing

1 Op. cit. xiv. p. 108.

2 " Hujusmodi intellectus (scil. qui est circa mores, respublicas et res domesticas) vere et proprie humanus nuncupatur, ut Plato in De Republica et Aristoteles in Ethicis testantur." Op. cit. xiv. p. 109.

3 " Speculativus intellectus non est hominis, sed deorum... maximum donuin deorum est philosophia." Ibid.

4 "Etsi homines omnes aliquid hujus habent, exacte tamen et perfecte paucissimi et habent et habere possunt. " Ibid.

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else. Yet still there are two reasons why the end of life cannot be sought in these. In the first place, in correspondence with his argument that speculative knowledge is more Divine than human, is the argument that mechanical art cannot be the attribute which marks out man in the system of nature, or that which is distinctively human, since it is shared by man with the lower animals. Secondly he refers to the impossibility, as a fact in life, that one man should cultivate all the mechanical arts; each of these competes with and excludes the others, so that it is laid down by all sound social thinkers, and proved in experience, that he who attempts to excel in more than one shall not excel in any 1 .

Proceeding then positively to establish his point, he makes much of the fact that in common speech a man is called " good " or " bad " absolutely, only in respect of moral qualities 2 .

Hence it is that a man does not take it amiss to be told that he is no metaphysician, or physicist, or artisan; but when he is called a thief, or intemperate, or unjust, or imprudent, he feels that he is being accused of not being what he ought to be, and blamed for something that is within his power. " But to be a philosopher, or to be a house-builder, is not within our power, nor are such things absolutely incumbent upon man 3 ."

Nay, he can go further, and say that to require of every man the cultivation either of the theoretical understanding or of the mechanical arts would be inconsistent with the general well- being of the human race. For the common good of humanity exactly requires that in these respects there should be differences among men that speculation, and mechanical labours, and the various sub-divisions or departments of each of these, should be attended to by different individuals. Returning to his conception of a common life in humanity and a common end which all the members of the race variously serve, he lays down, first, that all men are one in the possession, to some extent, of the " three

1 Op. cit. xiv. p. no.

2 " Secundum namque virtutes et vitia homo dicitur bonus homo, et malus homo; at bonus metaphysicus non bonus homo dicitur, sed bonus metaphysicus: bonusque domincator non bonus absolute, sed bonus domificator nuncupatur." Ibid.

? Op. cit. xiv. p. iii.

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rational powers 1 ": secondly, that moral virtue is absolutely necessary to the fulfilment by each individual of his several office, and to the well-being and indeed the very preservation of the whole 2; whereas, thirdly, this is so far from being the case with the several vocations of men, whether speculative or practical in their character, that on the contrary neither human society at large nor the particular human being could stand, or even continue to exist, but for the variety of tasks and functions among men; all are necessary, while no one human being could possibly overtake them all 3 .

The moral vocation of man, then, " qui proprie hominis est," is alone "fit to be law universal." It, and it alone, is binding on every man and always 4 . Pomponazzi examines the faculties of human nature in order to discover in the exercise of which of them that nature is to find its end; and he concludes that a man's true end is to be found in the exercise of moral reason and in the moral conduct of life. His other powers a man is to cultivate in part, and in various proportions according to his nature and his place in life; but this with all his might and to perfection; absolutely and without limitation he is to be, in this sense, a "good man 5 ." And this view is verified by the criterion which Pomponazzi had set up of a common aim of the race, which its individual members are to serve: " For the universe would be completely preserved, if all men were zealous and highly moral, but not if they were all philosophers or smiths or builders 6 ."

1 " Participare de illis tribus intellectibus secundum quos etiam homines inter se communicant et vivunt." Op. cit. xiv. p. in.

2 "Quantum ad intellectum practicum qui proprie hominis est, quilibet homo perfecte debet habere; ad hoc enim ut genus humanum recte conservetur, quilibet homo debet esse virtuosus moraliter et quantum possibile est carere vitio." Ibid.

3 " Non enim constaret mundus si quilibet esset speculativus, imo neque ipse, cum impossibile sit unum genus hominum, utpote physic(or)um, sibi esse sufficiens; neque esse tantum domificatorum genus, vel aliquid hujusmodi: neque fieri potest ut unus perfecte exerceat opera alterius, nedum omnium, sicut contingit in membris." Op. cit. xiv. p. 112.

4 " In quocunque statu reperiatur, sive egenus, sive pauper, sive dives, sive mediocris, sive opulentus." find.

8 " Quare universalis finis generis humani est, secundum quid de speculative et factivo participare, perfecte autem de practice." Ibid.

6 " Universum enim perfectissime conservaretur si omnes homines essent studiosi et optimi, sed non si omnes essent philosophi vel fabri, vel domificatores." Ibid.

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This discrimination of the moral law as the one universal rule in human life is the first point in Pomponazzi's ethical doctrine which deserves the description of it by Ad. Franck 1 as a " foreshadowing of the Critique of Practical Reason, for which the world was still to wait 300 years."

Again, whereas it had been remarked that the various intellectual and practical pursuits in which men may engage impede one another, and compete with one another, so that a man has to choose among them and cannot possibly cultivate all to perfection or even more than one, it is not so with the moral virtues; for moral life is a unity; and the cultivation or attainment of one virtue, so far from hindering the pursuit of another, puts us on the way to it: indeed the attainment in perfection of one virtue would imply really the attainment of all. This harmony in moral life, unique in human experience, fits it to be the essential and all-incumbent life of man 2 .

Pomponazzi proceeds accordingly to draw his conclusion as to man's attainment of his true end and excellence within the limits of mortality 3 .

The ground on which he holds this is once more defined to be that moral excellence is the only truly essential excellence of man. Admitting that the intellectual part of mankind is in a sense the highest part, he does not infer that every man should attain to the excellence of that part, any more than that in the body every member should exercise the functions of those which are considered to be the highest parts of the body, such as the heart or the eye 4 .

Nor, although a man comes short as many a man will of perfection in the highest (intellectual) pursuits and of the peculiar

1 In the Journal des Savants for 1869 (p. 407).

2 " Ut dicitur in Ethicis, virtutes morales sunt connexae, et qui perfecte habet unam habet omnes; quare omnes debent esse studiosi et boni." De hum. xiv. p. 112.

3 " Quapropter ad rationem dicitur quod si homo mortalis est, quilibet homo potest habere finem qui universaliter convenit homini." Op. dt. xiv. p. 113.

4 " Ad rationem dicitur quod si homo mortalis est, quilibet homo potest habere finem qui universaliter convenit homini. Qui tamen competit parti perfectissimae non potest, neque convenit; sicut non quodlibet membrum potest habere perfectionem cordis et oculi, imo non constaret animal; sic si in quolibet homo esset speculativus, non constaret communitas humana;...felicitas igitur non stat in habitu speculativo per demonstrationem tanquam conveniens universaliter generi humano, sed tan- quam primae parti principali ejus." Ibid.

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" felicity " that belongs to them, need he be said to have missed his end or his felicity; for although poorly endowed in intellectual, or alternatively in " mechanical " powers, he may be rich in moral attainment and moral worth, which are sufficient to make him happy. Nay, only in these does true happiness or success (felicitas) consist. For while a man may be called " happy " on other grounds, such as mechanical success, or a high degree of speculative attainment, he is only truly and properly felix in so far as he is morally good. For this is that which is within the poiver of all men 1 .

It is in the light then of this revised conception of the end of man and of the most valuable elements in human life, that the question of the sufficiency of the present life is to be asked and answered. In this light Pomponazzi reconsiders the charge against earthly life, that it is meagre and unsatisfying; and he claims to prove that it is enough to satisfy the needs of man's nature, and does permit him, if he will, to realise his destiny.

The restriction, for example, and incompleteness of human knowledge, of which so much is made by those who depreciate earthly life, wear a different aspect from the changed point of view. If intellectual contemplation were the very end of man's existence, it could not be supposed to be so frustrated as it is here; and a future life would evidently be necessary to supply the deficiencies, and carry on the poor beginnings, of this. But as it is, the position of man with regard to knowledge may be considered altogether appropriate to his condition; for it may fairly be maintained that in this life each man possesses know ledge enough, and sufficient intellectual light, to enable him to fulfil his moral vocation as a man. In relation to absolute truth, and those matters which are the objects of the higher Intelligences, his light may in comparison be dim and his sight feeble, while at the same time he may have sufficient knowledge for the conduct of life; and indeed it may well be that the degree of knowledge vouchsafed to man is exactly that which is most appropriate to the working out of his moral task 2 . In that case

1 " Agricola enim, et faber, egenus vel dives, si moralis sit, felix nuncupari potest, et vere nuncupatur, sorteque sua contentus abit." Op. cit. Xiv. p. 114. s " Inter res morales nihil excellentius haberi potest." Ibid.

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his position is suitable to his nature, and to his fulfilment of his true end 1 .

The reference to those beings who enjoy a perfect exercise of intelligence recalls the general consideration which Pomponazzi had already brought forward earlier in the book, that the end of man must be appropriate to his nature and to his position as a being of intermediate rank in the hierarchy of things 2 .

It is remarkable that, while thus escaping the argument from the necessity of intellectual perfection, by the substitution of a moral for an intellectual ideal of life, Pomponazzi did not consider the argument which many would think the strongest argument for immortality the argument, namely, from the necessity of moral perfection or at least of a higher degree of moral progress than is here attained or attainable by man. His was not the age or country for an enthusiastic moral idealism of that kind; and Pomponazzi's own moral feelings lacked the zeal and intensity which should give wings to such aspirations. Ethically, as a writer and a man, he was rather sober and serious than fervent or enthusiastic. He would probably have met this argument by another reminder of the natural limitations of man, and by enjoining moderation and deprecating unattainable ideals. He would have distinguished as usual between the human and the superhuman. You ought not to attempt, he would have said, to force human nature beyond its scope, or pitch the standard of human virtue too high. And on a modest and moderate view of what is in any case possible to a man, this life might be considered sufficient for its attainment by those who make a reasonable effort, who do their best.

Meanwhile his belief is that man may find on earth a suitable, an appropriate destiny, which it is his duty to accept as sufficient. In a former argument, in answer to the claim that the desire for immortality implied its actual attainment, he had urged that

1 " Quod ulterius addebatur, quoniam talis speculatio. non videtur posse facere hominem felicem cum sit valde debilis et obscura; huic dicitur quod tametsi in ordine ad aeterna hujusmodi sit, et ad earn quae intelligentiarum, tamen inter res morales nihil excellentius haberi potest, sicut Plato in Timaeo dixit." Ibid.

- " Unicuique rei proportionatus finis assignatur Talem enim habere felicitatem

(scil. immortalem) est proprium Deorum qui nullo modo a materia et transmutatione dependent; cujus oppositum contingit in humano genere quod est medium inter mortalia et immortalia. " Op. cit. xiv. pp. 114, 115.

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every "appetite" needs to be corrected by "right reason." Here he bases the same contention on moral grounds; the acceptance of the limitations of our state is treated as a matter of moral obligation; " for if a man is moderate, he will not desire what is impossible, nor is that fitting to his nature 1 ." It is not a question of what we should like, but of what befits us.

He goes on, then, in justification of what he has suggested as the true end of man an end attainable within the limits of this life to show that peace and happiness are possible to man on earth.

Certainly in fulfilling his true end a man ought to find peace ("finis debet quietare"). But it might be argued with a show of reason that man cannot find peace or happiness if his existence and his hopes are confined to the present life. It does not quite appear, from a somewhat obscure passage, what the precise difficulty is. Probably it is that this life is such a scene of change and trouble. Or the suggestion may be, that earth is not sufficient to satisfy the large desires of man, or bring his mind to rest. Or it might be held, as Pomponazzi observes elsewhere, that the fear of death poisons life and makes happiness, or at least rest, impossible.

Pomponazzi replies characteristically by defining the measure and kind of the " peace " enjoyed by man. He quotes Aristotle's teaching that human happiness is not inconsistent with many changes, and many lesser misfortunes. He does not, of course, forget how Aristotle finds in goodness the essence of happiness, and in the permanency of moral attainments its true stability; so that the peace or security of the good man can survive even great outward misfortunes, borne with a high spirit. This was Pomponazzi's own conception of the security (stabilitas) of man. But at present he is concerned with that suggestion of Aristotle's doctrine, that human happiness can be real without being perfect, " stable," yet not without disturbance: and that indeed an un broken rest and unmingled happiness do not belong to the human lot 2 .

"Si enim homo sit temperatus, non impossibilia appetet, neque sibi con- veniunt." Op. cit. xiv. p. 114.

- Arist. Nic. Eth. Bk I, Chap. XI.

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He compares man to a tree, whose leaves are always being shaken, but which is not at every blast plucked up by the roots. While always exposed to change and always in some degree of trouble, he would say, man has nevertheless his deep-rooted peace. If not a perfect happiness on earth, he has yet a real happiness. While always in fear of death, again he might have said, he does not every moment die. But if his happiness were not a vexed and mingled happiness, his peace a " disturbed stability," he would not be a man 1 .

Reverting to the matter of knowledge, he uses the happy illustration of the different degrees of knowledge appropriate to different times of life. The child has only a child's mind; yet he is happy. He does not possess the knowledge of a grown man; but he does not therefore make himself miserable nor complain that he is harshly and unreasonably restricted. His contentment arises from the fact that he has that which is proper to his age: it is sufficient for his happiness 2 . So may man be content with that which is appropriate to his nature; nor need he complain 3 . A man may not know all that is to be known, nor so clearly but that his knowledge might be clearer; but this need not deprive him, as it was argued, of his peace of mind, if he has all that is appropriate to his condition 4 .

In answer to the suggestion that all man's happiness is poisoned by the fear of change and the certainty of ultimate loss, which (it is said) make his condition one of misery rather than of felicity, Pomponazzi says very finely " Illiberalis

1 " Cum ulterius dicebatur quia finis debet quietare, hoc autem hominis in- tellectum et voluntatem non quietare, huic dicitur quod Aristoteles in fine i Ethic, non ponit felicitatem humanam tanquam perfecte quietantem; imo ponit quod quantum- cumque homo sit felix non tamen tarn stabilis est quin multa perturbent ipsum; non enim esset homo; verum non removent a felicitate, sicut non quivis ventus evellet arborem, licet moveat folia. Quare in humana felicitate sufficit stabilitas non removibilis, licet aliqualiter conturbabilis. " De Imm. xiv. p. 115..

2 " In juvenili enim si exactam non habet cognitionem, quae in virili congruit, dummodo habeat juvenili congruentem contentus est pro ilia aetate, neque amplius appetit quam sibi conveniat." Ibid.\

3 " Quare neque angustiabitur ut dicebatur." Ibid.

4 "Cum ulterius procedebatur quod nunquam tanta scit quanta scire potest, nee tarn clare quin clarius; dico quod hoc non tollit felicitatem eius, dummodo tantum habeat quantum sibi pro illo statu convenit, et ex parte sui non deficiat." Ibid.

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hominis est non velle restituere quod gratis accepit." For indeed mortality is man's appointed condition 1 . Even the ancients teach us that, holding life as we do only on condition of paying the debt to nature at the last 2 , we ought to give it up with thanks to God and nature. To fear that which is inevitable is folly 3 .

Nor is human life upon these terms, as it has been made out, " worse than the life of the brutes." For, in virtue of that moral worth which it may possess, it is far, even at the worst, from being the miserable condition it is said to be; and in any case it is infinitely preferable to a merely animal existence. Mere duration is not the test of a satisfying existence: " Who would prefer the long life of a stone or of a stag to that of a man how ever mean? 4 " In the worst bodily condition a thinking man can possess a quiet mind. Nay, every wise man would prefer to endure the worst hardships and tribulations rather than in an opposite condition to be foolish, base, or vicious. For so far from its being true, that in view of the difficulty and unsatisfactoriness of higher aims in this life (the labour, say, of the pursuit of knowledge, the renunciation of bodily enjoyments, and the dim knowledge which at the best we gain, with the prospect of losing all we have acquired) reason would counsel us, if this life were all, to decline upon bodily indulgence and excess the mere truth is that the smallest share in knowledge and virtue is to be preferred to the total sum of bodily delights 5 . So he prepares the way for his answer to the next argument.

It has been argued 6 that, if death ended all, no man could ever for any reason willingly seek death. In this way it was sought to prove that the doctrine of mortality was inconsistent with the obligation of duty and the necessities of moral life. For, death being altogether evil, no man would then ever be

1 "Cum homo praesupponitur mortalis." Op. cil. XIV. p. 116.

2 "Cum ea lege receperit ut sciat naturae concessurum." Ibid,

3 Ibid,

4 "Quis mallet esse lapidem vel cervum longae vitae quam hominem quantum- cunque vilem?" Ibid,

5 " Quaecumque modicula particula scientiae et virtutis praeponenda est omnibus dekctationibus corpornlibus." Op. dt. XIV. p. 117.

6 O/>. cit. xm. p. 99.

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willing to die for duty. He would rather commit any baseness than meet death; nor would he die for his friend, his country, or the public good. But such a conclusion is " against nature " and repugnant to the universal feelings of mankind.

Pomponazzi met this argument, and deprived it of all its force, by the fundamental consideration that virtue is in itself desirable and vice hateful virtue in itself preferable to all things, and vice of all things the most to be feared and shunned. Now, as Aristotle had said, of two evils we must choose the less. And to die for others, or in order to escape an act of baseness, is a gain to the individual a gain in virtue, which is the most precious of all things; and it is a gain to the race, because it harmonises with and confirms its right instincts. But a crime injures the community, of which the criminal is also a part; and, still more, injures the criminal himself 1 . A soul marred by baseness is a diseased soul 2; and by it a man does injury to his own humanity 3 . Even if by wrong a soul could escape death for ever, sin would still be misery 4 . But the soul cannot live for ever; death follows at last in any case; and for him who seeks by crime to escape death there is no immortality except " an immortality of shame and contempt." By doing right, again, true happiness is secured; which is something, however short its duration may be 5 .

1 " Cum igitur in eligendo mortem pro patria, pro amicis, pro vitio evitando, maxima virtus acquiratur, aliisque multum prosit, cum naturaliter homines hujusmodi actum laudent nihilque pretiosius et felicius ipsa virtute, ideo hoc maxime eli- gendum est. At scelus perpetrando communitati maxime nocet, quare et sibi, cum ipse pars communitatis sit, vitiumque incurrit quo nihil infelicius, cum desinat esse homo, ut Plato pluribus locis in De Republica dicit." Op. cit. xiv. p. 117.

2 " Anima cum peccato extirpanda est." Op. cit. XIV. p. 118.

3 " Desinit esse homo." See note i above.

4 " Animaque si aeterno viveret in peccato summa miseria est, quandoquidem ipsi animae nihil deterius est ipso vitio." Op. cit. XIV. p. 118.

5 " Ad adeptionem etiam illius virtutis sequitur felicitas, vel magna pars felicitatis, etsi parum duratura...neque magnum tempus vivere cum infamia est praeponendum vivere tempore parvo cum laude. " Op. cit. xiv. pp. 117, 118.

Pomponazzi meets ingeniously the logical quibble of the schools, that no man could willingly choose death, if death were the end of all, for death would then be annihilation, and the will cannot choose "nothing" but must always move towards some "good." " Neque per se in tali casu mors eligitur, cum nihil sit; verum actus studiosus, licet ad eum sequatur mors: sicut non committendo vitium, non renuitur vita, cum in se sit bona, sed vitium renuitur, ad cujus perpetrationem sequitur vita." Op. cit. xiv. p. 1 18.

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Pomponazzi does not deny that most men, if they thought death were the end, would prefer even dishonour to death; wherefore wise legislators restrain the masses of mankind from crime and incite them to courage by threats and promises for the future life; but those who need such influences are only they who do not know the true nature of vice and virtue 1 .

By the same consideration, of the essential gain of goodness and the loss inseparable from evil-doing, does Pomponazzi seek to remove the difficulty that might be felt about the Divine Government in view of the inequality of rewards and punishments in this life. Rewards and punishments, it was argued 2 , fall in this life so irregularly; so many crimes go undetected, so many more unpunished, and so many good actions fail of their reward, that if this life were all, it would be impossible to believe in a righteous government of the universe: we should be obliged to conclude either that God does not govern, is not omnipotent (in which case he would be no longer God), or else that he is unjust either supposition being abhorrent and inadmissible. Wherefore, it was said, there must be another life in which good and evil fortune shall be exactly proportioned to desert.

Pomponazzi answers all this in the bold way which is characteristic of him. He frankly admits the alleged inequalities in the distribution of outward rewards and punishments. Nevertheless he affirms that no good action goes unrewarded and no evil action unpunished, in this life. He does so on the simple ground that virtue is its own reward and vice its own sufficient punishment.

We must distinguish, he says, between the " essential " and the "accidental" reward or punishment 3 . He also expresses

1 "Ignorant excellentiam virtutis et ignobililatem vitii." Op. cit. XIV. p. 118. Pomponazzi supports his argument by instances of irrational creatures dying for

one another and to preserve the species: they have no life after death, and yet it must be worth while thus to die, for in so doing they are guided by instinct, which is infallible: " Natura dirigitur ab intelligentia non errante; non ergo et in homine hoc est contra rationem." Op. cit. xiv. p. 120.

2 Op. cit. xin. p. 100.

3 " Sciendum est quod praemium, et poena, duplex est, quoddam essentiale et inseparable, quoddam vero accidentale et separabile." Op. cit. XIV. p. 120.

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this in the case of punishment as the distinction between the inward guilt (poena culpae) and the outward loss (poena damnt).

It is in respect of its " essential " consequences that conduct never goes unrequited. Nothing better than goodness itself can possibly be possessed by human nature 1: this is the best that can befall; and therefore in being good a man infallibly has his reward. It is in this that the security and stability consist which Aristotle ascribes to the good man 2 . On the other hand, wickedness of itself implies unhappiness; for first of all, baseness itself is of all things the most miserable 3 , while, further, all sorts of outward dispeace attend it as well 4 .

Wherefore, he says, Aristotle, asking the question why prizes are given in all other contests, but not in the efforts after virtue and knowledge, answers that it is because a prize, to be a prize, must be of more value than the game; but nothing is of more value than virtue or knowledge; and therefore there is nothing fit to be the reward of those efforts except the virtue and the knowledge themselves.

The " separable " recompense of action is admittedly variable and irregular. The reason of this he does not here enquire into 5: the fact is undoubted, but that does not affect the essential connection between virtue and well-being, vice and calamity 6 . The

1 " Nihil enim majus natura humana habere potest ipsa virtute." Ibid.

2 See Arist. Nic. Eth. Bk I. Chap. xi. " Praemium essentiale virtutis est ipsarnet virtus quae hominem felicem facit. Nihil enim majus natura humana habere potest ipsa virtute, quandoquidem ipsa sola hominem securum facit et remotum ab omni perturbatione: omnia namque in studioso consonant: nihil timens, nihil sperans, sed in prosperis et adversis uniformiter se habens, sicut dicitur in fine i Ethic, et Plato in Critone dixit, viro bono neque vivo neque defuncto potest aliquid malum contingere." De Imm, xiv. p. 120.

3 " Poena namque vitiosi est ipsum vitium, quo nihil miserius, nihil infelicius, esse potest." Ibid.

4 "Quod autem perversa sit vita vitiosi, et maxime fugienda, manifestat Aristoteles 7 Ethic, ubi ostendit quod vitioso omnia dissonant: nemini fidus, neque vigilans neque dormiens quiescit, diris corporis et animi cruciatibus angustiatur," etc. Op. cit. xiv. p. 121.

5 " Cur autem aliqui praemiantur vel puniuntur accidentaliter, aliqui vere non, non est praesentis propositi." Op. cit. xiv. p. 122.

"Sic non omne bonum remuneratum est, et omne malum punitum; neque hoc inconvenit, cum accidentalia sunt." Op. cit. xiv. p. 121.

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irregularity of the outward ("accidental ") reward or punishment matters the less since the intrinsic or " essential " consequence is in itself incomparably greater 1 .

Finally Pomponazzi goes one step further. The inward gain or loss, he says, by virtue or vice respectively, is in each case greater where there is no outward recompense, than where there is such recompense. The outward reward (at any rate so far as it was in view when the good action was done) actually diminishes the real gain of the good action; the suffering of outward punishment lessens the inward loss by sin. This is put crudely that the incidence of the outward consequence positively interferes with the development of the intrinsic consequence, whether of gain or loss in order by the paradox to emphasise the main position, that the absence of external reward makes absolutely no difference to a man's reaping the fruit of his goodness; that in escaping outward punishment a man is still left to bear the utmost consequences of wrong-doing. So far from the absolute gain or loss whichever it be being diminished by the absence of material profit or detriment, he will assert that it is positively increased.

He explains his meaning. It then appears that he did not precisely intend that the happy outward consequences of good ness diminish its real gains; but only that if they are considered as an inducement, if a man sets them before him as his end, he is so much the less a good man, and makes so much the less of the real gains of goodness. The man who does right without hope of reward has a higher virtue than the man who has an eye to that reward. He has more of that inward and intrinsic reward which virtue itself is".

The application of the idea in the converse case is somewhat different. In proportion as a man suffers outwardly through

1 " Accidentale praemium longe minus est essentiali praemio, poena namque accidentalis... longe minor est poena essentiali... culpae poena longe deterior est poena damni." Op. cit. XIV. pp. 121, 122.

2 " Sciendum est quod quando bonum accidentaliter praemiatur bonum essentiale videtur diminui, neque remanet in sua perfectione. Exempli causa aliquis virtuose operatur sine spe praemii: alter vero cum spe praemii. Actus secundi non ita virtuosus habetur sicut primi. Quare magis essentialiter praemiatur qui non accidenta liter praemiatur eo qui accidentaliter praemiatur." Op. cit. xiv. p. 122.

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his fault, it is suggested, his inward loss thereby (poena culpae) is lessened. It does not appear whether this diminution is due to a remedial power in the punishment, lessening sinfulness; or whether the idea is that, forensically speaking, his guilt is reduced by expiation. So far, the argument is clear that if the poena culpae (the inward and intrinsic loss through sin) be thus diminished through the endurance of the poena damni (outward loss), the absolute loss is lessened, and, speaking absolutely, the man is a gainer. The ultimate standard of gain and loss is the inward one, the standard of character, of more or less actual goodness. As always, Pomponazzi maintains again that any outward loss or suffering is well borne which makes the man a better man; while, on the other hand, the man who remains " unpunished " is yet the loser by his sin, and perhaps loses more, really because he has not suffered 1 .

Thus, once more, whatever be the history of outward rewards and punishments, human action, Pomponazzi concludes, never goes really unrequited 2 .

These applications of the idea of Virtue as an end in itself, reminiscent as they are of the doctrines of Kant, find no counterpart in Pomponazzi's immediate predecessors among the schoolmen, or in the Arabians, or in the Renaissance Platonists.

Two other difficulties in the way of his doctrine, and Pomponazzi's manner of dealing with them, may be briefly mentioned.

It was urged that if the soul be not immortal, almost all mankind, believing in its immortality, has been deceived. Pomponazzi replied that this is not necessarily an inconceivable supposition; for in any case, since there are " three religions,"

1 " Eodem quoque modo qui vitiose operatur, et accidentaliter punitur, minus videtur puniri eo qui accidentaliter non punitur. Nam poena culpae major et deterior est poena damni. Et cum poena damni adjungitur culpae diminuit culpam. Quare non punitus accidentaliter magis punitur essentialiter eo qui accidentaliter punitur." Ibid.

2 " Dicitur nullum malum esse essentialiter impunitum, neque bonum essentialiter irremuneratum esse....Omnis virtuosus virtute sua et felicitate praemiatur....At contranum de vitio contingit, ideo nullus vitiosus impunitus relinquitur." Op. cit. XIV. pp. 120, 121.

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either all mankind or a majority of men have held erroneous creeds 1 .

Here also we find the most deliberate statement of Pomponazzi's frequently expressed opinion, of the right of prudent legislators to impose upon their subjects useful and restraining beliefs, although known by themselves to be untrue. Truth is not the concern of the legislator, but good living only 2; and men have to be influenced, he says, according to their nature, some by higher, some by lower considerations. " The legislator, knowing that men's lives are prone to evil, and aiming at the common weal, has sanctioned the belief that the soul is immortal, not caring about the truth of the belief, but about its moral value 3 ." He is justified, it is argued, in so doing on the very same grounds on which a nurse is permitted to limit the knowledge of a child, or a physician to deceive a sick person or one of unsound mind 4 .

The last objection on moral grounds to his conclusion with which Pomponazzi deals, is the allegation that the immortality of the soul is the belief of all good men, and its mortality is held only by those who desire to lead immoral and sensual lives. He first denies the fact: " Nam manifeste videmus multos pravos homines credere, verum passionibus seduci; multos etiam viros sanctos et justos scimus mortalitatem animarum posuisse," and so forth; and he enumerates the names of the virtuous heathen. Besides, he says, it must be taken into account that there have been many who have known the soul to be mortal, but have dissembled their belief, by way of reserve or as a moral precaution (" sicut medicus ad aegrum, et nutrix ad puerum "). But, secondly, even if the case were so, it need not be; for all the duties of morality and religion (" Deum colere, divina honorare, preces ad Deum fundere, sacrificia facere") are on the theory of the soul's mortality fully binding: being right

1 Op. cit. xiv. p. 123.

2 " Politicus est medicus animorum; propositumque politic! est facere hominem magis studiosum quam scientem." Ibid.

3 " Respiciens legislator pronitatem viarum ad malum, intendens communi bono, sanxit animam esse immortalem, non curans de veritate, sed tantum de probitate." Op. cit. xiv. p. 124.

4 Op. cit. xiv. p. 138.

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in themselves 1 they are to be sought and practised. And finally, he repeats that all these things are even performed with a more perfect, because a more disinterested, virtue by those who have no hope of a future life and its rewards, and are not actuated by fear of future punishment; and so he concludes, " quare perfectius asserentes animam mortalem melius videntur salvare rationem virtutis quam asserentes ipsam immortalem 2 ."

1 " Actus maxime virtuosi." Ibid.

2 Op. cit. XIV. p. 139.