The Works of the Rev. Jonathan Swift/Volume 3/The Examiner, Number 23
NUMBER XXIII.
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1710-11.
Bellum ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi Pax quæsita videatur.
War should be undertaken only with a view to procure a solid and lasting peace.
I AM satisfied, that no reasonable man of either party can justly be offended at any thing I said in one of my papers relating to the army. From the maxims I there laid down, perhaps many persons may conclude, that I had a mind the world should think there had been occasion given by some late abuses among men of that calling; and they conclude right: for my intention is, that my hints may be understood, and my quotations and allegories applied; and I am in some pain to think, that in the Orcades on one side, and the western coasts of Ireland on the other, the Examiner may want a key in several parts, which I wish I could furnish them with. As to the French king, I am under no concern at all: I hear he has left off reading my papers, and by what he has found in them, dislikes our proceedings more than ever; and intends, either to make great additions to his armies, or propose new terms for a peace. So false is that which is commonly reported, of his mighty satisfaction in our change of ministry. And I think it clear, that his late letter of thanks to the tories of Great Britain, must either have been extorted from him, against his judgment; or was a cast of his politicks, to set the people against the present ministry; wherein it has wonderfully succeeded.
But, though I have never heard, or never regarded, any objections made against that paper, which mentions the army; yet I intended this as a sort of apology for it. And first I declare (because we live in a mistaking world) that at hinting at some proceedings, wherein a few persons are said to be concerned, I did not intend to charge them upon the body of the army. I have too much detested that barbarous injustice among the writers of a late party to be ever guilty of it myself; I mean, the accusing of societies for the crimes of a few. On the other side, I must take leave to believe, that armies are no more exempt from corruptions, than other numbers of men. The maxims proposed were occasionally introduced by the report of certain facts, which I am bound to believe are true, because I am sure, considering what has passed, it would be a crime to think otherwise. All posts in the army, all employments at court, and many others, are, or ought to be, given and resumed at the mere pleasure of the prince; yet, when I see a great officer broke, a change made in the court, or the ministry, and this under the most just and gracious princess that ever reigned, I must naturally conclude, it is done upon prudent considerations, and for some great demerit in the sufferers. But then, is not the punisliment sufficient? Is it generous or charitable, to trample on the unfortunate, and expose their faults to the world in the strongest colours? And would it not suit better with magnanimity, as well as common good nature, to leave them at quiet to their own thoughts and repentance? Yes, without question; provided it could be so contrived, that their very names, as well as actions, might be forgotten for ever: such an act of oblivion would be for the honour of the nation, and beget a better opinion of us with posterity; and then I might have spared the world and myself the trouble of examining. But at present there is a cruel dilemma in the case; the friends and abettors of the late ministry, are every day publishing their praises to the world, and casting reflections upon the present persons in power. This is so barefaced an aspersion upon the queen, that I know not how any good subject can with patience endure it, although he were ever so indifferent with regard to the opinions in dispute. Shall they, who have lost all power and love of the people, be allowed to scatter their poison? and shall not those, who are at least of the strongest side, be suffered to bring an antidote? And how can we undeceive the deluded remainder, but by letting them see, that these discarded statesmen were justly laid aside; and producing as many instances to prove it as we can; not from any personal hatred to them, but in justification to the best of queens. The many scurrilities I have heard and read against this poor paper of mine, are in such a strain, that, considering the present state of affairs, they look like a jest. They usually run after the following manner: "What! Shall this insolent writer presume to censure the late ministry, the ablest, the most faithful, and truest lovers of their country and its constitution, that ever served a prince? Shall he reflect on the best house of commons that ever sat within those walls? Has not the queen changed both, for a ministry and parliament of Jacobites and highfliers, who are sellng us to France, and bringing over the pretender?" This is the very sum and force of all their reasonings, and this is their method of complaining against the Examiner. In them, it is humble and loyal to reflect upon the queen, and the ministry and parliament she has chosen with the universal applause of her people: in us, it is insolent to defend her majesty and her choice, or to answer their objections, by showing the reasons why those changes were necessary.
The same style has been used in the late case concerning some gentlemen in the army. Such a clamour was raised by a set of men, who had the boldness to tax the administration with cruelty and injustice, that I thought it necessary to interfere a little, by showing the ill consequences that might arise from some proceedings, although without application to particular persons. And what do they offer in answer? Nothing but a few poor common places against calumny and informers; which might have been full as just and seasonable in a plot against the sacred person of the queen.
But by the way, why are these idle people so indisscreet to name those two words, which afford occasion of laying open to the world such an infamous scene of subornation and perjury, as well as calumny and informing, as, I believe, is without example; when a whole cabal attempted an action, wherein a condemned criminal[1] refused to join with them for the reward of his life? Not that I disapprove their sagacity, who could foretel so long before by what hand they should one day fall, and therefore thought any means justifiable, by which they might prevent it.
But, waving this at present, it must be owned in justice to the army, that those violences did not proceed so far among them as some have believed; nor ought the madness of a few to be laid at their doors. For the rest, I am so far from denying the due praises to those brave troops, who did their part in procuring so many victories for the allies; that I could wish every officer and private soldier had their full share of honour in proportion to their deserts; being thus far of the Athenians mind, who, when it was proposed that the statue of Miltiades should be set up alone in some public place of the city, said, they would agree to it, whenever he conquered alone, but not before. Neither do I at all blame the officers of the army for preferring in their hearts the late ministry before the present; or, if wishing alone could be of any use, for wishing their continuance, because then they might be secure of the wear's continuance too: whereas, since affairs have been put into other hands, they may perhaps lie under some apprehensions of a peace; which no army, especially in the course of success, was ever inclined to; and which all wise states have in such a juncture chiefly endeavoured. This is a point, wherein the civil and military politicks have always disagreed: and for that reason I affirmed it necessary, in all free governments, that the latter should be absolutely in subjection to the former; otherwise one of these two inconveniences must arise, either to be perpetually in war, or to turn the civil institution into a military.
I am ready to allow all that has been said of the valour and experience of our troops, who have fully contributed their part to the great successes abroad; nor is it their fault that those important victories had no better consequences at home, though it may be their advantage. War is their trade and business: to improve and cultivate the advantages of success, is an affair of the cabinet; and the neglect of this, whether proceeding from weakness or corruption, according to the usual uncertainty of wars, may be of the most fatal consequence to a nation. For, pray let me represent our condition in such a light, as I believe both parties will allow, though perhaps not the consequences I shall deduce from it. We have been for above nine years blessed with a queen, who, beside all virtues that can enter into the composition of a private person, possesses every regal quality that can contribute to make a people happy: of great wisdom, yet ready to receive the advice of her counsellors: of much discernment in choosing proper instruments, when she follows her own judgment; and only capable of being deceived by that excess of goodness, which makes her judge of others by herself: frugal in her management, in order to contribute to the publick, which in proportion she does, and that voluntarily, beyond any of her subjects; but from her own nature generous and charitable to all, who want or deserve; and, in order to exercise those virtues, denying herself all entertainments of expense, which many others enjoy. Then, if we look abroad, at least in Flanders, our arms have been crowned with perpetual success in battles and sieges; not to mention several fortunate actions in Spain. These facts being thus stated, which none can deny; it is natural to ask, how we have improved such advantages, and to what account they have turned? I shall use no discouraging terms. When a patient grows daily worse by the tampering of mountebanks, there is nothing left but to call in the best physicians, before the case grows desperate. But I would ask, whether France, or any other kingdom, would have made so little use of such prodigious opportunities? the fruits whereof could never have fallen to the ground without the extremest degree of folly and corruption; and where those have lain, let the world judge. Instead of aiming at peace, while we had the advantage of the war, which has been the perpetual maxim of all wise states, it has been reckoned factious and malignant even to express our wishes for it; and such a condition imposed, as was never offered to any prince, who had an inch of ground to dispute; quæ enim est conditio pacis, in qua ei, cum quo pacem facias, nihil concedi potest?
It is not obvious to conceive what could move men, who sat at home, and were called to consult upon the good of the kingdom, to be so utterly averse from putting an end to a long, expensive war, which the victorious, as well as conquered, side, were heartily weary of[2]. Few, or none of them, were men of the sword; they had no share in the honour; they had made large fortunes, and were at the head of all affairs. But they well knew by what tenure they held their power; that the queen saw through their designs; that they had entirely lost the hearts of the clergy; that the landed men were against them; that they were detested by the body of the people; and that nothing bore them up but their credit with the bank, and other stocks, which would be neither formidable nor necessary, when the war was at an end. For these reasons they resolved to disappoint all overtures of a peace, until they and their party should be so deeply rooted, as to make it impossible to shake them. To this end they began to precipitate matters so fast, as in a little time must have ruined the constitution, if the crown had not interposed, and rather ventured the accidental effects of their malice, than such dreadful consequences of their power. And indeed if the former danger had been greater than some hoped or feared, I see no difficulty in the choice, which was the same with his, who said, he would rather be devoured by wolves than by rats. I therefore still insist, that we cannot wonder at, or find fault with, the army for concurring with the ministry, which was for prolonging the war. The inclination is natural in them all; pardonable in those who have not yet made their fortunes; and as lawful in the rest, as love of power, or love of money, can make it. But, as natural, as pardonable, and as lawful as this inclination is, when it is not under check of the civil power; or when a corrupt ministry joins in giving it too great a scope, the consequence can be nothing less than infallible ruin and slavery to the state.