Translation:Shulchan Aruch/Choshen Mishpat/156

Paragraph 1- If one of the members of an unopened alleyway- there are those who say that one does not have the power to object in an alleyway and all these laws only apply to courtyards- was to become a doctor, craftsman, blood-letter, document scribe or non-Torah schoolteacher, the other members of the alleyway can object because additional people will be entering and exiting the courtyard. Even if every member of the alley would agree except for one, that one person may stop him. Similarly, if one owns a house in a courtyard-partnership, he may not rent to any of these individuals. To sell to such people, however, there are those who say it is permitted and the members of the alley will then litigate with the purchaser, provided, however, that he may not sell to a gentile who will not listen to the judgement.

Paragraph 2- Neighbors in a courtyard can object to a store in the courtyard and say they cannot sleep because of the sound of the people entering and exiting. Rather, he must do his work in his store and sell in the market. They cannot, however, object and say we cannot sleep because of the sound of the hammer or mill once he has already established his behavior and they did not object. There are those who say that even initially one cannot object to what someone does in his own store and home. This is only applies to healthy individuals. If they are sick and the sound damages them, however, they may object.

Paragraph 3- Similarly, one can teach Torah to Jewish children in his home and the neighbors cannot object and say we cannot sleep because of the sound of the children. The same applies to any mitzvah activities and the neighbors cannot object.

Paragraph 4- If one member of an alleyway or courtyard become a craftsman and none of the others objected because he was already established, and people were entering and exiting and the other members were silent, he would not obtain any rights. The other members have the right at any time to say they cannot sleep because of the sound of people entering and existing, because this damage is like smoke and dust, which one cannot obtain rights to.

Paragraph 5- Members of an alleyway may force each other not to have among them a tailor, tanner or any other craftsman. If there was such a craftsman in the alleyway and no one objected, or if there was a bathhouse, store or mill and another member came and made another one opposite the existing one, the current owner cannot stop him and say he is cutting of his livelihood. Even if the new individual is from another alleyway, they cannot stop him because they already have that craftsman among them. There are many that say that in the case of a courtyard or an alleyway that is not open, they would be able to object, even in such a case. The craftsman himself, however, would not be able to object and say you are cutting off my livelihood. If one who lives in another country and wants to set up a store next to this store or a bathhouse next to this bathhouse, however, the members would be able to prevent him. If he pays government taxes with them, they would not be able to stop him. There are many who say that even in such a case he has no right to enter any alleyway that has people from his trade, because a member of that trade has the right to prevent him from entering since he is from another city. In the case of another alleyway, however, he cannot object because the new individual pays taxes. The people of the city have the right to object in all cases and say we cannot sleep because of the sound of people entering, notwithstanding the fact that they already have such a craftsman. If one did not yet pay taxes and now he wants to work and will pay taxes, there are those who say his fellow craftsman can stop him until he rents a house and becomes like a member of the city. There are those that say that one who gives the “king’s gift” is not considered to have paid taxes, until he gives taxes to the ruler of this particular city that has jurisdiction over them. In all these cases, there is no distinction between a scholar and others, other than in the case of peddlers which will be discussed shorty. There are those that say that if the people of the city need the scholar’s Torah, they cannot object, even if there is another scholar in the city because “the jealousy of scholars creates an increase in wisdom.” If a scholar brings his merchandise to the city, everyone is required to refrain from selling until the scholar sells his wares. If there is a gentile who is selling, so there will be no gain to the scholar, everyone is permitted to sell. See Yoreh Deah Siman 243. If one has a business arrangement with a gentile, there are those places that rule that others are prohibited from interfering with his livelihood and doing business with that gentile, and there are some places that do not rule that way. There are those who permit another Jew to go to that gentile to lend him, do business with him, bribe him and take property from him because a gentile’s property is considered ownerless. There are those who prohibit it. Even where a Jew regularly does work with a gentile, it would be prohibited for another Jew to compete and do the work at a cheaper price. If he wants to do it, we would rebuke him. Nevertheless, if he violated and did the work we would not remove the money from him. See later Siman 227. If two individuals live together and one wants to lend with interest to a gentile, the other cannot object. The same applies to anything similar. See later 228:18.

Paragraph 6- Residents of a country cannot stop peddlers traveling through cities because it is an Ezra-regulation to have peddlers traveling through cities so that perfume will be readily accessible to Jewish girls. Thus, it seems to me that this only applies to those who sell perfume or something similar, but in other cases there is no distinction between peddlers and anyone else. They cannot, however, set up a permanent stand and sit there without permission from the people of the city. If he is a scholar he can set up anywhere. The same rules that apply to scholars apply to schoolteachers.

Paragraph 7- Residents of a city can stop merchants who bring their wares to sell in the city from selling them individually as storekeepers do. If they only sold on market-days, the people of the city cannot stop them, so long as they sold in the market. They cannot knock on doors, however, even on a market-day. If they have an outstanding loan in the city, they can sell the amount needed for sustenance, even if it is not a market-day, until their debt is repaid and then they will leave. The same applies to lending with interest to gentiles, and the people of the city may stop them. They cannot stop them if they come on a market-day and lend with interest to the people who are gathered there to go to the market, however. If they have an outstanding loan in the city, they can lend until they make enough money for sustenance in order that they can collect their debts. There are those that say that this that people of a city can stop people of another city, is only is there is no loss to the consumer because they are selling just as the others in the city are selling and their merchandise is no better than those of the people in the city. If they were selling at a cheaper price or if their merchandise was better, however, in which case the consumers are benefiting, the seller-merchants cannot object, so long as the consumers are Jews. If only gentiles were benefiting, however, this would not apply. When merchants brings other merchandise that the city does not have, even though it is no cheaper or better than the existing merchandise, the people of the city cannot object. If members of the city fled to a settlement because of a concern of danger, the people in the settlement cannot stop them from making enough profit for them to live until the danger passes. Based on the small amount of commerce they are involved in, they will carry the burden of the public. If they are included in the city-tax, the members of the city cannot stop them. Similarly, if they come to expel someone from the city who does not have the right to live there, they cannot expel him until he collects his debts, and he can profit in the meantime the amount required to live. There are those who say that this that the merchant is only required to pay taxes based on his transactions is only where they are not allowing him to live there. If they are allowing him to live there completely, however, he must pay taxes as if he was a full resident or he must leave. There are those who disagree with this. If people of a city are involved in commerce in another city, it is not in their power to force them to give as much taxes as they want. Rather, we tell them give such and such amount or we object to them transacting in their cities. If people from another city come to spend in another city and not cause any gain to the people of the city, the people of the city do not have the right to object, notwithstanding the fact that the market rate will increase. All this only applies when others are coming to transact in a city that they do not live in, and that is why the members of the city have the right to object even though they are willing to pay taxes because they were not part of the tax base until now. If they want to come live in that city and pay taxes like a member of the city, however, there are those who say they have the right to do so because a person has the right to live in whatever place he wants. The original residents did not acquire the rights to the city. There are those who disagree and say that they do have the right to object, specifically in today’s age where we live under the jurisdiction of other nations and there is a fear that if there are more residents, something negative can arise from such other nations and thus one who wants to live there have the status of a “pursuer.” Everyone agrees that if the people of the city have the ability to close the doors, to have the rulers object to immigrants coming or some other way of preventing people from moving in, they have the right to do so. There are those places that have a custom to create a cherem against people coming to move there, in which case they have the power to force immigrants via cherem, but not by law. They can decree that no one may transact with those people coming to live there without permission. If the city has a Rabbi, he may make a decree on any student of his who is coming to live there. There are those who say that a cherem against immigration would not take effect on a scholar because he can live wherever he wants to. If they voided the cherem for one person and they gave him permission to live there for a set time, we do not say the entire cherem is voided and they can force him out later. If Reuven and his children lived in one settlement and made a bona-fide claim that they obtained rights, the obtainment of rights would be valid and they can object to Shimon living there. If Shimon claims with witnesses that he was afraid to object because Reuven and his children would snitch to the government, Reuven would not obtain rights. If Reuven was a snitch but his sons were not, however, they would obtain rights, because the son of a thief has the power to obtain rights. We apply the same rules with respect to obtaining rights to live as we do to obtaining rights to real property. There is an ancient custom that if one traveled from a city for 12 months and indicated that he has no intention of returning, he had lost his rights. If he did not indicate that he did not intend on returning, however, he would not lose his rights until he was away for three years. If he indicated that he had the intention of returning, he would not even lose his rights after three years. There are those who say that even where he did not indicate intention either way he would not lose his rights. If people of a city had the rights to live and they were driven out one time for the city and some of them subsequently returned and reestablished the city, the others will have no claims against him. See the end of Siman 149 with respect to someone who has obtained rights against the public with respect to a mitzvah.