Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Zahrani, Yasser Talal

by OARDEC

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of Defense
[[w:Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants|Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants
at U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

To:	Al Zahrani, Yasser Talal
Subject:	Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Zahrani, Yasser Talal

1.

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2.

The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a.

Commitment

1.	The detainee finished the 11th grade and decided on his own, around August of 2001, to go to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad. He heard sheiks say that it was a duty for good Muslim men to fight the jihad alongside the Taliban.
2.	A man identified by the detainee as Ahmed Al Salami told him that he should go to Karachi, Pakistan and meet up with Saria Al Makki to get to Afghanistan. Al Salami traveled to mosques and said that it was the duty of good Muslim men to help establish an Islamic army. The enemy of this Islamic army was the Norther Alliance.
3.	Al-Salami is the deputy Chief of the Political Department for the Yemeni Socialist Party.
4.	Al Salaam is a close associate of al Qaida commander Abd Al Hadi. Al Hadi Al Iraqi is one of Usama Bin Laden's closest commanders and the person in charge of al Qaida fighters in the Afghani Northern Front.
5.	Around August of September of 2001, the detainee flew from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Dubai and on to Karachi, Pakistan. He purchased a round trip ticket for about $300 United States Dollars.
6.	Al Makki picked up the detainee at the airport in Karachi and took him to a rented room where he stayed for two days. Al Makki eventually bought tickets for him and the detainee to fly to Quetta, Pakistan.
7.	The detainee and Al Makki ultimately made it to Afghanistan, via Spin Boldak, Kandahar, Kabul and then Konduz.
8.	The detainee was very important on the Northern line in the Arab group and carried a radio.
9.	The detainee was identified as someone who was a money courier.
10.	For three months the detainee was assigned as a guard to a second line post between Konduz and Taloqan that was referred to as Issam or Issam Al Bin, which was located about 6 kilometers from the front line. He served there with about 25 other people.
11.	The Taliban fighters said that the group of Arabs, including the detainee and Uzbeki's should leave the city and the Taliban would surrender alter. However, their plan did not work and the entire group of about 400 were sent to the prison at Mazar e' Sharif.
12.	The detainee arrived at Mazar e' Sharif and was taken into an underground room. The following day the prisoners, including the detainee were in the prison yard when fighting broke out.
13.	The detainee was immediately shot in the leg and foot when the fighting broke out and fell to the ground. When the prisoners gave up and surrendered, he was one of the first removed.
14.	The surviving prisoners were put into trucks and taken to a prison at Sheberghan, Afghanistan where they were kept for one month.

b.

Training

1.	The detainee and Al Makki stopped at the Taliban Center in the city of Konduz. Al Makki told the detainee that this is where he would receive his training. The detainee said the center was basically a one room building on a large field with shooting targets.
2.	The detainee trained with two Saudi and three Afghani men at the center for one month. They were trained in the use of Kalashnikov rifle, the Makarov pistol, and hand grenades, plus field training.
3.	The detainee purchased weapons for the Taliban and trained at al Farouq camp.
4.	Weapons training was conducted on numerous weapons at al Farouq and students learned how to assember and disassemble each weapon. They received training on the AK-47, AKM and PK machine gun and would fire a total of 30 rounds in the sitting, kneeling an standing positions. They also familiarized themselves with the RPG.

c.

Connections/Associations

1.	The detainee was recognized as Al-Batar and was known to carry an AK-47 as part of the Marwan Group whose leader was a Yemeni man.
2.	Abu Ali Al-Yafi, a.k.a. Marwan, is an educated Yemeni who was known to be a very active Taliban and al Qaida recruiter in Yemen. He had experience fighting in both Chechnya and Afghanistan.
3.	The leader of the second line post was Moullah Thaker or Zaker. He was the commander of other posts as well and traveled from post to post with two or three guards.
4.	Mullah Zakir was a Taliban Commander for units north of Takharistan and was last seen with Mullah Fazel, the Taliban Minister of Defense.
5.	The detainee's instructor was Kabir Allah who was the former governor of Herat Province, former Taliban leader in Iran.

d.

Other Relevant Data

1.	The detainee was involved with food services and always on the front line base camps. He was known to have retreated to Konduz, Afghanistan where he was helping in the kitchen at the Arab guesthouse working with the cook.
2.	The detainee was identified as a Saudi who fought in Abu Dujanah's group. Abu Dujanah, is a Sudanese who fought on the front lines and carried a Kalashnikov.
3.	The detainee's name was found in a document that listed 324 Arabic names, allases and nationalities. The document was recovered from raids on safe houses associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. He was in possession of a Saudi passport.

4.

The following primary factor favor release of transfer:

The detainee said he did not engage in any fighting.

5.

You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED