Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Sharqawi, Abdu Ali Al-Haji (2007-11-16)

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Department of Defense

Office for the Administratlve Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 November 2007

Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Sharqawi, Abdu Ali Al-Haji


An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.


The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.


The following primary factors favor continued. detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stated he traveled to Bosnia for jihad and arrived therein February 1995.
  2. The detainee stated he went to the front lines after training and was placed as a guard of the front line, which meant he wasn't engaged in fighting; he was just protecting the position. The detainee stated he waited for two months to we if the fighting would resume before he returned to Yemen in February 1996.
  3. The detainee stated he heard Muslims were dying in Ogaden, Africa , so in 1996 he traveled to Kenya and stayed there for a week trying to get into Somalia. While in Nairobi, he met a Saudi who warned him against Arabs going to Ogaden, stating it was not safe. The detainee was convinced and went back to Yemen.
  4. The detainee stated he stated he traveled to Arakan, Asia in March 1997 because he heard Buddhists were killing Muslims . He was in Bangladesh for a month trying to get into Arakan, now known as Rakhiue, but couldn't so he flew back to Yemen.
  5. The detainee stated he flew to Pakistan on 18 August 2000 with the purpose of receiving training in Afghanistan for jihad in Chechnya . The detainee used a Yemeni passport and went by the name of Rami al Zurqa . Detainee stated he stayed in a hotel in Karachi for 5-7 days before flying to Quetta. The detainee stated he stayed at the Hawli Taliban guesthouse in Quetta for three weeks before he could be smuggled into Afghanistan,
  6. The detainee stated he moved to Pakistan in April or May 2001 to facilitate travel for those trying to get to Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee stated he received money from two wealthy Saudis. The detainee stated he received cash on about 20occasions between November 2001 and January 2002. In total, the amount he received is about equal to one million American dollars. The detainee stated the money was used to help Mujahedin fleeing Afghanistan.
  8. The detainee was selected by an individual to organize the mechanics and logistics for a planned attack on the American Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee obtained small amounts of TNT over several months. and stored it at a safe house.
b. Training
  1. The detainee stated once he arrived in Bosnia, he attended training with the Bosnian Army in the Mujahed Battalion for forty days. The detainee stated they taught physical training and weapons, such as the Kalashnikovs and hand grenades and his training ended March or April 1995.
  2. The detainee stated he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to take a class on electronics. The detainee stated the objective of the class was to learn how to make remote controls for explosives. The class was six months long but the detainee stated he dropped out early.
  3. The detainee stated he attended a training camp where electronics was taught.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee stated he moved to Sanaa, Yemen in 1994 to study Islamic law at an institute in Dimaj, a district of Sanaa. The detainee stated the founder and director of the institute was Sheikh Muybil at Wadi.
  2. A source stated Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi expressed support for Usama bin Laden and Jihad. Sheikh al Wadi was known to deliver personal, verbal fatwas to those desiring; to fight in the jihad.
  3. The detainee stated he fled with Usama bin Laden and his bodyguards to Kandahar, Afghanistan in December, 2004 .
  4. The detainee stated he participated in weekly group luncheons from August 2000 through May 2001 with Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  5. The detainee stated while he was in Kabul, Afghanistan he found out Usama bin Laden stayed at the same house that he did called the Bayt Allam. The detainee stated the house belonged to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
  6. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an extremist group active since the late 1970s. The group merged with Usama bin Laden' s al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.
  7. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is identified in Executive Order 13224. Executive Order 13224 was created to block property and prohibit transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
  8. The detainee stated he came in contact with Usama bin Laden at a house in Kabul, Afghanistan, the week after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
  9. The detainee possibly served briefly as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards. The detainee did not serve as a bodyguard very long because the detainee left for Pakistan before the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  10. The detainee stated he knew several Usama bin Laden guards from Yemen and had facilitated their travel to Afghanistan.
  11. The detainee stated he was a Mujahedin and had facilitated travel for al Qaida members, but he was not al Qaida.
  12. The detainee stated he never spoke to Usama bin Laden personally about arranging travel for at Qaida, but he did talk to one of Usama bin Laden's assistants.
  13. A source stated the detainee was a key facilitator of travel to Afghanistan from Pakistan. The source stated the detainee ran operations in Karachi, Pakistan.
  14. A source stated the detainee was in charge of one of the houses that he rented. The source admitted he knew that he was renting the house which would be used to hide and house the large influx of Mujahedin fighters fleeing from Afghanistan.
  15. The detainee was responsible for the physical storage of at Qaida cash and had authority to distribute funds without prior approval.
  16. An individual sent items such as money, passports, and food supplies to members of al Qaida. These items were given to the detainee, who would ensure the items would reach the people in Afghanistan who requested them.
  17. The detainee was sent by Usama bin Laden to settle a dispute between an at Qaida military commander and some Yemeni at Qaida members.
  18. Usama bin Laden made the detainee a Falcon because he was a key facilitator for the movement of men in and out of Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden was the only authority that could make someone a Falcon. The status of Falcon was based on what types of things an individual could do for the organization.
  19. The detainee photo identified ten of the hijackers involved in the 11 September 2001 attack. The detainee provided varying amounts of information on each individual.
  20. The detainee saw three of the 11 September 2001 hijackers while with Usama bin Laden in March 2001.
  21. The detainee stated he was a friend of one of the suicide bombers involved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
d. intent
  1. The detainee stated joining jihad and dying in the process of helping Muslims was a better way to die.
  2. The detainee stated he was confused about what he wanted to do upon his release. He stated there's a part of him that wants to join Zarqawi or Sheik Osama in the fight against the United States. The detainee stated he wanted to kill every American upon his release. However, another part of him wants to go far away so he can get away from all of the conflict.
  3. The detainee stated that if he is released he will be able to rejoin Usarna bin Laden.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. Two airline life vests and a back pack were found at the safe house used by the detainee. Initial testing of these items were positive for explosives. Initial testing of sample swabs taken of the two life vest and backpack tested positive for Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate. This is one of the most powerful and brisant explosives. It is often used as the main charge in blasting caps as well as the core material in some types of detonating cord.
  2. The detainee stated the 170,400 United States dollars found at the house when he was captured was originally kept at another house he believed was under surveillance.
  3. The detainee stated he always used couriers to bring money from donors in Saudi Arabia to himself in Karachi, Pakistan for extremists and their families.
  4. The detainee stated officials were bribed and documents forged in order to get people visas and passports . The detainee was responsible for the Taiz, Yemen area.
  5. The detainee stated a Saudi wanted to give him money to facilitate travel for those wanting travel to Afghanistan for training. Another Saudi would give detainee money to facilitate people's travel to Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee stated he received three video cameras from a Sheikh to send to Afghanistan. The Sheikh requested video footage of Arabs engaged in combat with Coalition Forces. This video would be used for jihad recruitment in Saudi Arabia.
  7. The Sheikh in the previous statement was one of the most prominent Saudi financiers for al Qaida.
  8. The detainee stated he was raised to view the United States as an enemy of Islam.
  9. The detainee stated he was against swearing Bayat and, having allegiance to any organization, including al Qaida , because it limited his personal freedom and would prevent him from going to Chechnya to fight.
  10. It was believed the detainee swore. bayat to Usama bin Laden.
4. The following primary factors favor release ar transfer:

The detainee stated he did not accept Usama bin Laden's claim that American civilians were legitimate targets because they paid taxes and supported the American government.


The detainee stated Usama bin Laden and al Qaida are against the United States, but his support of al Qaida did not put him in opposition of the United States. The detainee also stated he never pledged bayat.


The detainee stated he has never received explosives training.


You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified inforniation regarding your case. The AMC is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.