United States v. Russell (411 U.S. 423)

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United States v. Russell (1973)

Syllabus

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United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), is a Supreme Court case dealing with the entrapment defense. The court split 5-4 and maintained the subjective theory that had first been adopted in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Although an undercover federal agent had helped procure a key ingredient for an illegal methamphetamine manufacturing operation, and assisted in the process, the Court followed its earlier rulings on the subject and found that the defendant had a predisposition to make and sell illegal drugs whether he worked with the government or not.

Russell had admitted to that during his appeal, but he and his lawyers argued that the entrapment defense should focus entirely on what the federal operatives did and not his state of mind. They asked the Court to overrule two previous cases that had established this "subjective" test in favor of the "objective" one they advocated. It declined to do so. But Justice William Rehnquist pondered the possibility that what has become known as "outrageous government conduct" might force a judicial hand in an entrapment case regardless of any specific rights that had been or not been violated. While he backed away from it in a later opinion, his words have become a rallying point for advocates of the objective entrapment standard.

4818304United States v. Russell — Syllabus1973

Court Documents

Opinion of the Court

Dissenting Opinions: Douglas; Stewart

Supreme Court of the United States

411 U.S. 423

United States v. Russell

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

No. 71-1585. Argued: February 27, 1973 --- Decided: April 24, 1973

An undercover narcotics agent investigating respondent and his confederates for illicitly manufacturing a drug, offered them an essential ingredient which was difficult to obtain, though legally available. After the agent had observed the process and contributed the ingredient in return for a share of the finished product, respondent was found guilty by a jury which had been given the standard entrapment instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there had been "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise."

Held: The entrapment defense, which, as explicated in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, prohibits law enforcement officers from instigating criminal acts by otherwise innocent persons in order to lure them to commit crimes and punish them, did not bar the conviction of respondent in view of the evidence of respondent's involvement in making the drug before and after the agent's visits, and respondent's concession "that he may have harbored a predisposition to commit the charged offenses." Nor was the agent's infiltration of the drug-making operation of such a nature as to violate fundamental principles of due process. Pp. 428-436.

459 F.2d 671, reversed.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN. J., joined, post, p. 436. STEWART, J.. filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL. JJ.. joined, post, p. 439.

Deputy Solicitor General Lacovara argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Edward R. Korman, Jerome M. Feit, and Roger A. Pauley.

Thomas H.S. Brucker, by appointment of the Court, 409 U.S. 946, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert E. Prince.^[1]

↑ Paul G. Chevigny and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

[ref1-1] Paul G. Chevigny and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

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