ARMOR-CAVALRY: Part 1; Regular Army and Army Reserve/Tanks between the World Wars

by Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor

• Although the tank of World War I was slow, clumsy, unwieldy, difficult to control, and mechanically unreliable, its value as a combat weapon had been clearly proven. But, despite the lessons of World War I, the combat arms were most reluctant to accept a separate and independent role for armor and continued to struggle among themselves over the proper use of tanks. At the outset, thought of the tank as an auxiliary to and a part of the infantry was the predominant opinion, although a few leaders contended that an independent tank arm should be retained. After World War I came the usual American clamor for demobilization. The resulting sudden decrease in Tank Corps personnel, especially within the United States, was in sharp contrast with the rapid increase in the number of tanks on hand- and full production was just beginning. In mid-1919 the U.S. Army had 863 tanks and after deliveries on outstanding contracts were complete, 1,163. Had the war in Europe continued, there would have been five fully trained and equipped tank brigades ready for action in the spring of 1919, one for each army corps. As it turned out, the production for World War I became the mainstay of the Army's tank pool for almost two decades.

• In August 1919 the General Headquarters, Tank Corps, AEF, returned to the United States, and its chief, Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rockenbach, became the new Chief of the Tank Corps, U.S. Army, a position he held until it was eliminated in 1920.

• The Tank Corps requirements of the reorganized Regular Army after World War I were set by the General Staff in late 1918 at a general headquarters and 5 tank brigades, based upon an army of 5 corps, each with 4 divisions. As in World War I, the brigade was to consist of 3 battalions, 2 light and 1 heavy, and a repair and salvage company. Also the organization of elements within the brigade remained essentially the same as those of World War I.

• Tables of organization for all units immediately following the war were of two types- one for war, the other for peace. The one for peace called for approximately two-thirds of the personnel and equipment authorized under the war table.

• For the light tank regiment, the peacetime table included 162 tanks and 1,266 men. Three battalions were in a regiment, each battalion being further subdivided into three companies and a battalion headquarters and headquarters company. The light tank company within the regiment was almost identical in organization and equipment to the separate tank company of the division. Both had a company headquarters and 3 light tank platoons; each platoon had 5 tanks and an authorized strength of 13 men.

• For the heavy tank regiment, the peacetime table authorized 90 tanks and 1,771 men. The heavy tank platoon had 3 tanks and 33 men; otherwise, organization and equipment within the heavy and light regiments were essentially the same. In addition to the light and heavy categories of American-produced tanks of World War I, a third classification, the medium, began receiving attention in 1919. It was hoped that this in-between type would incorporate the best features of the 6½-ton light and the Mark VIII heavy and would replace both. The meaning of the terms light, medium, and heavy tanks changed between the wars. During World War I and immediately thereafter, the light tank was considered to be up to 10 tons, the medium (produced by the British) was roughly between 10 and 25 tons, and the heavy was over 25 tons. For World War II, increased weights resulted in the light tank being over 20 tons, the medium over 30, and the heavy, developed toward the end of the war, over 60 tons. During the period between the world wars, the weights of the classifications varied generally within these extremes.

• The National Defense Act of 1920 attempted, among other things, to settle the tank into its proper place within the Army, based upon World War I experiences. Under the act's comprehensive provisions, the Tank Corps was abolished, and tank units were assigned to infantry, becoming known as "Infantry (Tanks)." Moreover, the act's stipulation that "hereafter all tank units shall form a part of the Infantry" left little doubt as to the tank role for the immediate future.

• Between 1918 and 1922 an official War Department position on tanks was sought repeatedly by the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief of the Tank Corps, and the latter's successor, the Chief of Infantry. The War Department policy statement, which finally came in April 1922, was a serious blow to tank development. Reflecting prevailing opinion, it stated that the tank's primary mission was "to facilitate the uninterrupted advance of the riflemen in the attack." The War Department considered that two types of tanks, the light and the medium, should fulfill all missions. The light tank was to be truck transportable and not exceed 5 tons gross weight. For the medium, restrictions were even more stringent; its weight was not to exceed 15 tons, so as to bring it within the weight. capacity of railroad flatcars, the average existing highway bridge, and, most significantly, available Engineer Corps ponton^[1] bridges. Although an experimental 15-ton tank, the M 1924, reached the mock-up stage, this and other attempts to satisfy War Department and infantry specifications proved to be unsatisfactory. In reality it was simply impossible to build a 15-ton vehicle meeting both War Department and infantry requirements.

• In 1926 the General Staff reluctantly consented to the development of a 23-ton tank, although it made clear that efforts were to continue toward the production of a satisfactory 15-ton vehicle. The infantry- its new branch chief overriding the protests of some of his tank men who wanted a more heavily armed and armored medium- decided, too, that a light tank, transportable by truck, best met infantry requirements. The net effect of the infantry's preoccupation with light tanks and the limited funds available for tank development in general was to slow the development of heavier vehicles and, ultimately, to contribute to the serious shortage of mediums at the outbreak of World War II.

• Extensive tests were also made between the world wars on another type of tank, a model designed and developed by a private manufacturer, J. Walter Christie. The Christie tank embodied the ability to operate both on tracks and on large, solid-rubber-tired bogie wheels. The tracks were removable to permit operation on wheels over moderate terrain. Also featured was a suspension system of independently sprung wheels. The Christie had many advantages, including the amazing ability, by 1929, to attain speeds of 69 miles per hour on wheels and 42 miles per hour on tracks, although at these speeds the tank could not carry full equipment. To the infantry and cavalry the Christie was the best answer to their need for a fast, lightweight tank, and they were enthusiastic about its convertibility. On the other hand, the Ordnance Department, while recognizing the usefulness of the Christie, was of the opinion that it was mechanically unreliable and that such dual-purpose equipment generally violated good engineering practice. The controversy over the advantages and drawbacks of Christie tanks raged for more than twenty years, with the convertible principle being abandoned in 1938. But the Christie ideas had great impact upon tank tactics and unit organization in many countries and, finally, upon the U.S. Army as well.

• Actually, between the world wars there was much theoretical but little tangible progress in tank production and tank tactics in the United States. Production was limited to a few hand-tooled test models, only thirty-five of which were built between 1920 and 1935. Regarding the use of tanks with infantry, the official doctrine of 1939 largely reiterated that of 1923. It maintained that "As a rule, tanks are employed to assist the advance of infantry foot troops, either preceding or accompanying the infantry assault echelon."

• Upon adoption of the National Defense Act of 1920- which created the Army of the United States, to consist of the Regular Army, Organized Reserves, and National Guard- tank units allocated to the Regular Army were based primarily upon assignment of a tank company to each infantry and cavalry division. This meant thirteen separate companies, numbered the 1st through the 13th, but only ten were organized. Also provided were five tank battalions, the 15th through the 19th- although only three were ever activated- and the Headquarters, 1st Tank Group. Most of these units traced their origins to Tank Corps organizations of World War I. In 1929 the five battalions and the group headquarters were used to form the 1st and 2d Tank Regiments, which in 1932 became the 66th Infantry (Light Tanks) and the 67th Infantry (Medium Tanks), respectively. Two new light tank regiments, the 68th and 69th, were constituted in 1933. The 68th was organized in early 1940 by consolidating some of the former divisional tank companies; the 69th was disbanded without being activated. Also in early 1940 the 66th, 67th, and 68th Infantry (Tanks) were used to form the Provisional Tank Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. Later the same year when all infantry tank units were transferred to a newly organized Armored Force, the 66th, 67th, and 68th Infantry were redesignated the 66th, 67th, and 68th Armored Regiments, and all were assigned to the 2d Armored Division. A new 69th Armored Regiment was organized in the 1st Armored Division.

• Units of the new Organized Reserves of post-World War I were organized exceedingly understrength. By the outbreak of World War II, most of them had only officer cadres and did not enter active Federal service as organized units. As in the Regular Army, each infantry and cavalry division of the Organized Reserves had its tank company, their designations being 76th through 91st, 94th through 104th, and 461st through 466th. Also organized were the 301st through the 324th Tank Battalions and the headquarters of the 6th through the 12th Tank Groups. Several of these units were descendants of the former Tank Corps, but the majority had no prior history. Except for the 301st, 306th, and 314th, all of which had been disbanded in 1928, the tank battalions of the Organized Reserves were reorganized in 1929 as elements of the 306th through the 312th Tank Regiments. In 1932 these regiments were redesignated as the 420th through the 426th Infantry (Tanks). The following year another regiment, the 427th, was organized.

• Meanwhile, in the National Guard after World War I, twenty-two tank companies were provided initially for its infantry and cavalry divisions. They were numbered as the 22d through the 45th, except that the 25th and the 39th were omitted. There were no other National Guard tank units, although a few tank companies of infantry divisions were used, after being called into Federal service for World War II, to form four tank battalions, the 191st through the 194th.

Notes

1. Pronounced “Pontoon”